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Abstract. Indistinguishability properties are essential in formal verification of cryptographic proto-
cols. They are needed to model anonymity properties, strong versions of confidentiality and resistance
against oﬄine guessing attacks. Indistinguishability properties can be conveniently modeled as equiva-
lence properties. We present a novel procedure to verify equivalence properties for a bounded number of
sessions of cryptographic protocols. As in the applied pi-calculus, our protocol specification language is
parametrized by a first-order sorted term signature and an equational theory which allows formalization
of algebraic properties of cryptographic primitives. Our procedure is able to verify trace equivalence for
determinate cryptographic protocols. On determinate protocols, trace equivalence coincides with obser-
vational equivalence which can therefore be automatically verified for such processes. When protocols
are not determinate our procedure can be used for both under- and over-approximations of trace equiv-
alence, which proved successful on examples. The procedure can handle a large set of cryptographic
primitives, namely whose equational theory is generated by an optimally reducing convergent rewrite
system. The procedure is based on a fully abstract modelling of the traces of a bounded number of
sessions of the protocols into first-order Horn clauses on which a dedicated resolution procedure is used
to decide equivalence properties. We have shown that our procedure terminates for the class of subterm
convergent equational theories. Moreover, the procedure has been implemented in a prototype tool
A-KiSs (Active Knowledge in Security Protocols) and has been effectively tested on examples. Some
of the examples were outside the scope of existing tools, including checking anonymity of an electronic
voting protocol due to Okamoto.
1 Introduction
Cryptographic protocols are distributed programs that rely on the use of cryptography to secure electronic
transactions such as those that arise in electronic commerce and wireless communication. They are also
being applied in new domains such as in Internet voting. For example, French citizens living abroad were
allowed to vote via the Internet in the parliamentary elections in 2012 [?]. In Estonia, Internet voting has
been allowed in parliamentary elections since 2007 [?]. Internet voting was also deployed in the state elections
in New South Wales, Australia in 2015 [?]. This has led to increasing demands on the complexity of desired
security properties, leading to more complex cryptographic protocols. Given the socio-economic-political
consequences and the history of incorrect design of cryptographic protocols, the need for formal proofs of
correctness of protocols is of great importance and has been widely recognized. Formal reasoning about
cryptographic protocols is challenging as one has to reason against all potentially malicious behavior—all
communication between protocol participants is assumed to be under the control of an adversary.
In order to make the task of formal analysis amenable to automation, usually the assumption of back-box
cryptography and unbounded computational power on the part of the adversary is made. This adversarial
model is often called the Dolev-Yao model as it is derived from the positions that Dolev and Yao took in their
seminal paper [41]. It has proved extremely successful, and there are several automated tools [17,9,34,43]
that can automatically check trace-properties such as (weak forms of) confidentiality and authentication.
? Parts of this work has been done while the first, third and fourth author were affiliated to LSV, CNRS & Inria &
ENS Cachan and the second author was affiliated to LORIA, CNRS & Inria & Universite´ de Lorraine.
While these trace-based properties are certainly important, many crucial security properties can only be
expressed in terms of indistinguishability (or equivalence). They include strong flavors of confidentiality
[18]; resistance to guessing attacks in password based protocols [14]; and anonymity properties in private
authentication [3], electronic voting [39,13], vehicular networks [35,36] and RFID protocols [7,22]. More
generally, indistinguishability allows to model security by the means of ideal systems, which are correct by
construction [4,37]. Indistinguishability properties of cryptographic protocols are naturally modeled by the
means of observational and testing equivalences in cryptographic extensions of process calculi, e.g., the spi
[4] and the applied-pi calculus [2]. While we have good tools for automated verification of trace properties,
the situation is different for indistinguishability properties. This paper is an attempt to address this concern.
State-of-the-art Many results have been obtained in the restricted case of a pure eavesdropper, i.e., a passive
adversary: for static equivalence many decidability results have been shown [1,32,10] and exact [15,30] and
approximate [19] tools exist for a variety of cryptographic primitives. In the case we consider indistinguisha-
bility in the presence of an active adversary, who can interact in an arbitrary way with honest participants
less results are known. Hu¨ttel [47] showed undecidability of observational equivalence in the spi calculus,
even for the finite control fragment, as well as decidability for the finite, i.e., replication-free, fragment of the
spi calculus. The decidability result however only holds for a fixed set of cryptographic primitives and does
not yield a practical algorithm. Current results [19,?,53] allow to approximate observational equivalence for
an unbounded number of sessions. However, this approximation does not suffice to conclude for many appli-
cations, e.g., [39,7]. Our approach overcomes these limitations for some applications in [39]. We still cannot
conclude for the e-passport example in [7], albeit for a different reason: our procedure does not currently
handle else branches in protocols.
Symbolic bisimulations have also been devised for the spi [21,20,54] and applied pi calculus [38,49] to avoid
unbounded branching due to adversary inputs. However, only [38,54] and [21] yield a decision procedure, but
again only approximating observational equivalence. The results of [38] have been further refined to show
a decision procedure on a restricted class of simple processes [33]. In particular they rely on a procedure
deciding the equivalence of constraint systems, introduced by Baudet [14], for the special case of verifying
the existence of guessing attacks. Baudet’s procedure allows arbitrary cryptographic primitives that can be
modeled as a subterm convergent rewrite system [1]. An alternate procedure achieving the same goal was
proposed by Chevalier and Rusinowitch [26]. However, both procedures are highly non-deterministic and do
not yield a reasonable algorithm which could be implemented. Therefore, Cheval et al. [24] have designed a
new procedure and a prototype tool to decide the equivalence of constraint systems, but only for a fixed set
of primitives. Tools have also been implemented for checking testing equivalence [42], open bisimulation [54]
and trace equivalence [25] for a bounded number of sessions but only a limited set of primitives. One may
note that [25] is the only decision procedure to consider negative tests, i.e., else branches, which are crucial
in several case studies [7,3].
Our contribution In this paper we introduce a new procedure for verifying equivalence properties for processes
specified in a cryptographic process calculus (without replication). The messages in the calculus are modeled
as terms equipped with an equational theory, similar to the applied pi calculus. Our main contributions are
as follows.
– Our procedure checks for two equivalences which over- and under-approximate the standard notion of
trace equivalence ≈t for cryptographic protocols: the under-approximation can be used to prove protocols
correct while the over-approximation can be used to rule out incorrect protocols.
– Cortier and Delaune have shown in [33] that observational equivalence coincides with ≈t for the class of
determinate processes. They also give a decision procedure for a strict sub-class of determinate processes,
namely, simple processes. We show that the coarser relation coincides with ≈t, and thus our procedure
can be used to verify observational equivalence for the whole class of determinate processes.
– A novelty of our procedure is that it is based on a fully abstract modeling of symbolic traces for a bounded
number of sessions in first-order Horn clauses. This is in contrast to the constraint-solving techniques
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employed by Tiu et al. [54], Cheval et al. [24,25], Baudet [14] and Chevalier et al. [26] for verifying under-
approximations of observational equivalence. Techniques based on Horn clauses have been extensively
used, e.g., by Blanchet [17], Weidenbach [55] and Goubault [46], in the case of an unbounded number
of sessions. Affeldt and Comon [5] faithfully encode a bounded protocol into Horn clauses with rigid
variables. Of these tools, only Blanchet [17] can verify an equivalence property, which happens to be
an under-approximation of observational equivalence. Horn clause modeling of an unbounded number of
sessions of security protocols may allow false attacks. On the other hand, we have proven our modeling
of a bounded number of sessions to be precise.
– Our modelling is fully abstract for arbitrary cryptographic primitives that can be modeled as a convergent
rewrite system which has the finite variant property [31,44]. This allows us to handle a larger class
of cryptographic primitives than [54,24,25,14,26]. Following our work, the recent work by Santiago et
al. [53] also provides support for rewrite systems which have the finite variant property. They additionally
cover associative-commutative theories, even though their experimental evaluation suggests that these
theories yield frequent non termination problems for the associative-commutative theories. Moreover,
they only provide support for a restricted class of processes. We were also able to show termination of
our procedure for the sub-class of subterm convergent rewrite systems. Please note that static equivalence
is undecidable even for the class of optimally reducing convergent rewrite systems [6]. Optimally reducing
convergent rewrite theories generalize subterm convergent rewrite systems, while maintaining the finite
variant property. Moreover, even though our termination proof does not apply, our tool terminated on
specific protocols whose cryptographic primitives can be modeled as a convergent rewrite theories. These
included the electronic voting protocols by Okamoto [52] and Fujioka et al. [45] which use trapdoor
commitment and blind signature respectively.
– Our procedure is implemented in the AKiSs (Active Knowledge in Security protocols) prototype tool
and we used it among others to successfully prove anonymity in an electronic voting protocol [45]. For
this electronic voting protocol, this is the first automated proof.
An extended abstract of the paper [23] authored by R. Chadha, S. Kremer and S¸. Ciobaˆca˘ appeared in
the European Symposium of Programming in 2012. In addition to the proofs that were not present in the
extended abstract, this paper also contains the proof of termination for subterm convergent rewrite theories.
The proof of termination is due to V. Cheval.
2 Preliminaries
We recall some standard definitions and establish some notations that we shall be using throughout the
paper.
2.1 Terms
Let F be a signature, i.e., a finite set of function symbols and let ar be a function which assigns to each
function symbol a natural number. Given a function symbol f ∈ F , we say ar(f) ∈ N is the arity of f . A
function symbol of arity 0 is called a constant. Given a set of atoms A and a signature F , we denote by
TF,A the set of terms built inductively from A by applying functions symbols in F . Given sets of atoms
A1,A2, . . . ,An, we denote the set TF,∪1≤i≤nAi by TF,A1,A2,...An . We assume that we have the following
countably infinite pairwise disjoint sets: a set N of private names, a setM of public names, a set C of public
channel names, a set W of parameters, and a set X of message variables. Intuitively, elements of the set
N represent nonces generated by honest principals of a protocol, elements of M represent nonces available
both to the adversary and to the honest participants and elements of C represent names of public channel
(e.g. the name of a public network). Elements of W are pointers used by the adversary to refer to messages
output by the honest participants in a protocol. We fix an enumeration w1,w2, . . . of the elements of W. We
let x, y, z range over X . We also define the following sets.
3
Definition 1. The set TF,N ,M,W,X , denoted Terms, is the set of all terms, the set TF,N ,M, denoted Messages,
is the set of messages and the set TF,N ,M,X , denoted SMessages, is the set of symbolic messages.
If t is a term, we denote by vars(t) the set of variables appearing in t, by names(t) the set of names
(public or private) appearing in t and st(t) the set of all subterms of t. The functions vars, names and st are
extended as expected to sequences and sets of terms. A position is a string of positive natural numbers and
 denotes the empty string. The set pos(t) of positions of a term t is defined as usual [11]. If p ∈ pos(t) then
t|p is the subterm of t at position p.
Example 1. Consider the signature F = {enc, dec, pair, fst, snd} where ar(enc) = 3, ar(dec) = ar(pair) = 2
and ar(fst) = ar(snd) = 1. The term t = pair(enc(a, k1, r1), enc(b, k2, r2)) models the pair of the encryptions
of public names a and b with keys k1, resp. k2 and randomness r1, resp. r2. The set of positions pos(t) =
{, 1, 11, 12, 13, 2, 21, 22, 23} and t| = t, t|1 = enc(a, k1, r1) and t|23 = r2.
Substitutions A substitution is a partial function σ :W ∪X → Terms. We only consider substitutions which
map elements of W to elements in Messages and elements of X to elements of SMessages. The domain of σ,
denoted by dom(σ), is defined as usual: dom(σ) = {o ∈ W∪X | σ(o) 6= o}. For our purposes, we only consider
substitutions with finite domains. We let range(σ) = {σ(u) ∈ T |u ∈ dom(σ) }. If dom(σ) = {u1, u2, . . . , un }
and ti = σ(ui) for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n then we shall write σ as {u1 7→ t1, . . . , un 7→ tn }. σ is said to be ground if
range(σ) ⊆ Messages. The notation names(σ) will denote the set names(range(σ)). A substitution σ can be
extended to a (total) function σext :W∪X → Terms by letting σext(x) = x if x /∈ dom(σ) and σext(x) = σ(x)
if x ∈ dom(σ). As usual, σ extends homomorphically to a function applyσ : Terms → Terms obtained
by “applying” σext homomorphically. Given t ∈ Terms, we denote applyσ(t) by tσ. If σ is a substitution
and X ⊆ W ∪X , we denoted by σ[X] the substitution whose domain is restricted at most to X. Given two
substitutions σ and τ , the substitution obtained by composing σ and τ , denoted στ , is the unique substitution
such that στ(x) = (σ(x))τ for all x ∈ W ∪ X .
2.2 Rewriting and unification
Two terms s and t are (syntactically) unifiable if there exists a substitution σ such that sσ = tσ. We denote
by mgu a function which associates to any two unifiable terms s and t a most general unifier σ of s and t
such that σ = σ[vars(s, t)]. It is well known [11,12] that for any two unifiable terms s and t, there is a most
general unifier, unique up to variable renaming.
A rewrite system R is a set of rewrite rules of the form ` → r where `, r ∈ Messages, names(l, r) = ∅
and vars(r) ⊆ vars(`). A term t can be rewritten in one step to u, denoted t→R u, if there exist a position
p ∈ pos(t), a rule ` → r in R and a substitution σ such that t|p = `σ and u is obtained from t by replacing
the subterm t|p by rσ. →∗R denotes the transitive and reflexive closure of →R. A rewrite system is said to be
confluent if for any t, t1, t2 such that t→∗R t1 and t→∗R t2 there exists u such that t1 →∗R u and t2 →∗R u. A
rewrite system is said to be terminating if it does not admit any infinite sequence t0 →R t1 →R t2 →R . . .. It
is said to be convergent if it is both confluent and terminating. In a convergent rewrite system R, for every
term t there is a unique term t′ such that t →∗R t′ and there is no u such that t′ →R u. t′ is said to be the
normal form of t. We denote by t↓R the normal form of the term t. Two terms s and t are said to be equal
modulo R, written s =R t, if s↓R = t↓R. Given a substitution σ we denote by σ↓R a substitution such that
dom(σ↓R) ⊆ dom(σ) and for all u ∈ dom(σ), σ↓R(u) = σ(u)↓R.
Example 2. Continuing Example 1, consider the rewrite system R = {dec(enc(x, y, z), y)→ x, fst(pair(x, y))→
x, snd(pair(x, y))→ y}. The first rewrite rule models that a message can be decrypted, provided decryption
uses the same key (represented by variable y) as encryption. The two last rules model projection of the first
and second component of a pair. Then we have that t = fst(pair(dec(enc(a, k, r), k), b))→R fst(pair(a, b))→R
a = t↓R.
We recall the notions of optimally reducing [51] and subterm convergent [1] rewrite systems.
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Definition 2. A rewrite system R is said to be optimally reducing if for any `→ r ∈ R and any substitution
θ such that all proper subterms of `θ are in normal form, we have that rθ is in normal form.
Definition 3. A rewrite system R is said to be subterm convergent if R is convergent and for each rule
`→ r ∈ R, we have that either r ∈ st(`) or r is a constant.
We immediately note that any subterm convergent rewrite system R can be easily converted into an
equiavlent optimally reducing rewrite system by replacing every rewrite rule `→ r in R by `→ r↓R.
Example 3. The rewrite system R = {dec(enc(x, y, z), y) → x, fst(pair(x, y)) → x, snd(pair(x, y)) → y} given
in Example 2 is subterm convergent. We shall examples of convergent rewrite systems that are not subterm
convergent when we discuss the case studies on electronic voting in Section 6.2.
Remark 1. When R is clear from the context or unimportant we will simply drop the subscript R in →R and
↓R.
2.3 The finite variant property
Given a convergent rewrite system, we now define the notion of complete set of variants, which was introduced
by Common-Lundh and Delaune [31]. Our notion is slightly stronger than the notion defined in [31] and was
first introduced in [44]. See [?] for a comparison of the various definitions of variants.
Definition 4. A set of substitutions variants(t1, . . . , tk) is called a complete set of variants of the terms
t1, . . . , tk if for any substitution ω there exist σ ∈ variants(t1, . . . , tk) and a substitution τ such that for all
1 ≤ j ≤ k we have that ω[vars(tj)]↓ = (σ↓τ)[vars(tj)] and (tjω)↓ = (tjσ)↓τ .
Intuitively if variants(t) = {σ1, σ2, . . . σk } then the set of terms preterms(t) = { tσ1↓, tσ2↓, . . . , tσk↓ }
represent pre-computations of all possible instances of t in the following sense: If ω is a substitution and tω
is the term tω↓ then there is a term t′ ∈ preterms(t) and a substitution τ such that t′τ is the syntactic term
tω. No rewrite rules are needed to compute tω from t
′τ.
Example 4. Consider the rewrite system introduced in Example 2 and let t = dec(fst(x), y). We have that
variants(t) = {∅, σ1, σ2} where ∅ denotes the identity substitution and
σ1 = {x 7→ pair(z1, z2)}, and
σ2 = {x 7→ pair(enc(z1, y, z2), z3)}
Intuitively, the substitution ∅ covers the cases where both the decryption and projection may fail, σ1 cor-
responds to the situation where the projection succeeds, but decryption may fail, and σ2 accounts for the
situations where both projection and decryption succeed. Note that the case where projection fails and
decryption succeeds is not possible.
In [28], Ciobaˆca˘ presents an algorithm for computing such complete sets of variants which is correct
whenever the rewrite system is optimally reducing [51]. Optimally reducing rewrite systems include subterm
convergent systems [1] (and hence the classical Dolev Yao theories for encryption, signatures and hash
functions), as well as a theory for modeling blind signatures [48]. Moreover, complete sets of variants can be
used to perform unification modulo R [44,28].
Definition 5. Given sets of terms {si}i∈I and {ti}i∈I , let X = vars({si, ti}i∈I). A set of substitutions
mguR({si ?= ti}i∈I) is called a complete set of unifiers modulo R of the system of equations {si ?= ti}i∈I if
each of the following holds:
1. dom(σ) ⊆ vars(X) for each σ ∈ mguR({si ?= ti}i∈I)
2. siσ =R tiσ for each i ∈ I and for each σ ∈ mguR({si ?= ti}i∈I).
3. For any substitution θ such that siθ =R tiθ for every i ∈ I, there exists a substitution σ ∈ mguR({si ?=
ti}i∈I) and a substitution τ with θ[X] =R (στ)[X].
For singleton systems, we also write mguR(s, t) instead of mguR({s, t}).
For the remaining of the paper, we assume that the rewrite system is convergent and has the finite variant
property.
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2.4 Frames, deducibility and static equivalence
Recall that we have fixed an enumeration w1,w2, . . . of the elements of the set W. As in [2], we will use the
notion of a frame to represent messages which have been recorded by the attacker.
Definition 6. A frame ϕ is a substitution {w1 7→ t1, . . . ,wn 7→ tn} where ti ∈ Messages (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
Intuitively, wi in a frame points to the i-th message recorded by the attacker in a protocol run. Note
that in our definition, every frame with |dom(ϕ)| = n has dom(ϕ) = {w1, . . . ,wn}. We denote the set of all
frames as Frames. The adversary can use the public names as well as recorded messages to construct new
messages. This is modeled as the deducibility relation.
Definition 7. Any term in TF,M,W is said to be a recipe. We say that a message t is deducible from ϕ with
a recipe r (written as ϕ `r t) if t ∈ Messages and rϕ =R t. We write Recipes for the set TF,M,W .
Intuitively, the recipe r tells how the attacker can construct the message t from the recorded messages.
Note that the same term t can be constructed using different recipes. A frame ϕ′ = {w1 7→ t′1, . . . ,wm 7→ t′m}
extends a frame ϕ = {w1 7→ t1, . . . ,wn 7→ tn} if m ≥ n and if t′i = ti for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. It is easy to see that
if ϕ′ extends ϕ and if ϕ `r t then ϕ′ `r t.
Example 5. Consider the signature F and the rewrite system R in Example 2. Let ϕ = {w1 7→ enc(s, k, r),w2 7→
k} where s, k, r ∈ N are private names. Then we have that ϕ `dec(w1,w2) s. Note that dec(w1, k) 6∈ Recipes
as k ∈ N . If we had that s ∈ M we would also have that ϕ `s s reflecting that public names are always
deducible.
We now recall static equivalence of frames [2] to capture indistinguishability of frames. Recall that two
terms can be indistinguishable to an attacker even if the two terms are distinct. For example, 0 encrypted
using a symmetric key unknown to the attacker and 1 encrypted using the same key are indistinguishable
to the attacker. Thus, instead of checking of direct equality between messages, the attacker can perform a
series of tests to distinguish between two frames. This is the intuition behind the following definition:
Definition 8. Let r1, r2 ∈ Recipes. A test r1 ?= r2 holds in a frame ϕ (written (r1 = r2)ϕ) if ϕ `r1 t and
ϕ `r2 t for some t, i.e., r1 and r2 are recipes for the same term in ϕ.
Frames ϕ1 and ϕ2 are statically equivalent (written ϕ1 ≈s ϕ2) iff for all r1, r2 ∈ Recipes we have that
(r1 = r2)ϕ1 iff (r1 = r2)ϕ2.
Example 6. Let a, b ∈M and r, k, k′ ∈ N . We have that {w1 7→ enc(a, k, r),w2 7→ k} 6≈s {w1 7→ enc(b, k, r),w2 7→
k} because the test (dec(w1,w2) ?= a) distinguishes the two frames. However, {w1 7→ enc(a, k, r),w2 7→ k′} ≈s
{w1 7→ enc(b, k, r),w2 7→ k′}.
3 A cryptographic process calculus
We shall assume that cryptographic protocols are modeled using a simple process calculus which has sim-
ilarities with the applied pi-calculus [2]. The applied pi-calculus has proven to be useful for specifying and
verifying cryptographic protocols; there are tools that automate verification of protocols in this model [17].
We shall further restrict our attention to the finite, i.e., replication-free fragment of applied pi-calculus. This
restriction is important because observational equivalence becomes undecidable with replication [47]. With
this restriction, one can model a bounded number of protocol instances.
In this section we define our process calculus. We begin by defining its syntax.
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Syntax Recall that we have fixed a first-order signature F , a set N of private names, M of public names, a
set C of public channel names, a set W of parameters, and a set X of message variables (see Section 2). The
terms of the set TF,N ,M,W,X are also identified modulo a fixed subterm convergent rewrite system R (see
Section 2).
We model a bounded number of instances of a cryptographic protocol as a finite set of traces. Traces are
defined using sequences of actions generated by the following grammar (note that here in and out are fresh
symbols not occurring in F):
a ::= in(c, x) receive action
out(c, t) send action
[s
?
= t] test action
where x ∈ X , s, t ∈ SMessages, c ∈ C. A trace T is a sequence of actions T = a1.a2. . . . .an. As usual, a receive
action in(c, x) acts as a binding construct for the variable x. We assume the usual definitions of free and
bound variables for traces. We also assume that each variable is bound at most once. A trace is ground if
it does not contain any free variables. The set of ground traces shall be represented as GndTraces. We also
assume the usual definition of a name occurring in a trace.
A process P is defined to be a set of traces P = {T1, . . . , Tn}. We say that a process is ground if all of its
traces are ground. We identify traces with singleton processes.
Remark 2. Contrary to the applied pi calculus [2] we do not have an ν operator for generating new names:
as we only consider a finite number of sessions we can simply use private names in N . We have also not
explicitly included the parallel operator | and the choice operator +. One could include these and generate
the corresponding set of traces. Thus, there is no loss in expressivity. However, we note that an explicit
enumeration of the traces can result in an exponential number of traces.
Semantics The semantics of a process is defined using the semantics of its traces. The semantics of a
trace is given in terms of a labeled transition system T. We assume that all interactions between protocol
participants are mediated by the adversary. The labeled transition system records the interaction of the
protocol participants with the adversary. The set of labels of T is defined using the set Recipes. Recall that
the set Recipes is the set TF,M,W (see Section 2). The set of labels, Labels, is
Labels = { in(c, r),out(c), test | r ∈ Recipes, c ∈ C }.
The labeled transition system T is a subset of (GndTraces×Frames)× Labels× (GndTraces×Frames) and
we shall write (T, ϕ)
`−→ (T ′, ϕ′) whenever ((T, ϕ), `, (T ′, ϕ′)) ∈ T. The frame in the transition system is used
to record the messages that the protocol participants have sent in the past. The relation





in(c,r)−−−−→ (T{x 7→ t}, ϕ)
Send
(out(c, t).T, ϕ)







The label in(c, r) indicates a message sent by the adversary over the channel c and r is the recipe that
adversary uses to create this message. The label out(c) indicates a message sent over the public channel c
and the transition rule Send records the message sent in the frame. Finally, the rule Test is an internal
action.
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As usual, we shall write (T0, ϕ0)
`1,...,`n−−−−−→ (Tn, ϕn) when (T0, ϕ0) `1−→ (T1, ϕ1) . . . `n−→ (Tn, ϕn) and we say
that `1 . . . `n is a run of (T0, ϕ0). We shall write (T, ϕ)
`
=⇒ (T ′, ϕ′) when either (T, ϕ) test
∗,`,test∗−−−−−−−−→ (T ′, ϕ′)
and ` 6= test or (T, ϕ) test
∗
−−−→ (T ′, ϕ′) and ` = test, where test∗ denotes an arbitrary number of test actions.
We write (T, ϕ)
`1,...,`n
====⇒ (Tn, ϕn) when (T, ϕ) `1=⇒ (T1, ϕ1) `2=⇒ . . . `n=⇒ (Tn, ϕn). If P = {T1, . . . , Tm} is a
process, we write (P,ϕ)
`1,...,`n−−−−−→ (T ′, ϕ′) (resp. `1,...,`n====⇒ (T ′, ϕ′)) if there exists a trace T ∈ P such that
(T, ϕ)
`1,...,`n−−−−−→ (T ′, ϕ′) (resp. (T, ϕ) `1,...,`n====⇒ (T ′, ϕ′)).
Process equivalences In this section we will define various flavors of trace equivalence which will be useful in
this paper. We first recall the standard definition of trace equivalence in cryptographic process algebras.
Definition 9 (Trace equivalence). A ground process P is said to be trace-included in a ground process
Q (written P vt Q) if whenever (P, ∅) `1,...,`n====⇒ (T, ϕ) then there exist T ′, ϕ′ such that (Q, ∅) `1,...,`n====⇒ (T ′, ϕ′)
and ϕ ≈s ϕ′. Two processes P and Q are trace-equivalent (written P ≈t Q) if P vt Q and Q vt P .
We will also define two other notions of trace equivalence, one coarser and one more fine-grained. The
coarser trace equivalence, which we denote by ≈ct is the trace equivalence that can actually be verified by
our procedure.
Definition 10 (Coarse trace equivalence). Given ground processes P and Q, we say that P vct Q
if whenever (P, ∅) `1,...,`n====⇒ (T, ϕ) and (r1 = r2)ϕ for some recipes r1, r2 then there exist T ′, ϕ′ such that
(Q, ∅) `1,...,`n====⇒ (T ′, ϕ′) and (r1 = r2)ϕ′. We say that P ≈ct Q if P vct Q and Q vct P .
The following example illustrates the difference between ≈t and ≈ct.
Example 7. Let P and Q be the ground processes defined as follows:
P = {out(c, a).out(c, a) } and
Q = {out(c, a).out(c, a), out(c, a).out(c, b) }
Clearly P vct Q. Observe also that Q vct P . Indeed, only trivial equalities hold on the frame {w1 7→ a,w2 7→
b}, and therefore these also hold on {w1 7→ a,w2 7→ a}. Thus, we have that P ≈ct Q while P 6≈t Q.
We will however show that these two notions coincide for a class of determinate processes. In the context
of the applied pi calculus determinate processes were previously studied by Cortier and Delaune in [33].
Definition 11 (Determinate process). We say that a ground process P is determinate if whenever
(P, ∅) `1,...,`n====⇒ (T, ϕ) and (P, ∅) `1,...,`n====⇒ (T ′, ϕ′) then ϕ ≈s ϕ′.
Intuitively, determinate processes are processes in which the adversary’s static knowledge at any instance
is completely determined by its past interaction with the protocol participants. The following is immediate
from the definition.
Proposition 1. A ground trace, i.e, a ground process consisting of single trace, is determinate.
As already mentioned above, it was demonstrated in [33] that trace equivalence coincides with obser-
vational equivalence for determinate processes. We show that ≈t and ≈ct also coincide for this class of
processes.
Theorem 1. If P and Q are ground processes then P ≈t Q implies P ≈ct Q. Furthermore if P and Q are
determinate, then P ≈ct Q implies P ≈t Q.
Proof. (⇒) Follows immediately from definition of ≈t and ≈ct.
(⇐) Let P and Q be determinate processes. We need to show that P ≈ct Q implies P ≈t Q. We proceed
by contradiction. Suppose that P ≈ct Q and P 6≈t Q. We suppose P 6vt Q (the case of Q 6vt P being
symmetric). As P 6vt Q we have that there exist `1, . . . , `n, T , ϕ, such that (P, ∅) `1,...,`n====⇒ (T, ϕ) and
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1. either there exist no ϕ′, T ′ such that (Q, ∅) `1,...,`n====⇒ (T ′, ϕ′),
2. or for all ϕ′, T ′ such that (Q, ∅) `1,...,`n====⇒ (T ′, ϕ′) we have that ϕ 6≈s ϕ′.
In the first case we have that P 6≈ct Q, contradicting our hypothesis. In the second case, as ϕ 6≈s ϕ′, there
exist r, r′ such that (r = r′)ϕ and (r 6= r′)ϕ′ (or vice-versa, the other case is symmetric). As P vct Q, we
have that there exist T ′′, ϕ′′ such that (Q, ∅) `1,...,`n====⇒ (T ′′, ϕ′′) and (r = r′)ϕ′′. As Q is determinate, we
have that ϕ′ ≈s ϕ′′. This yields a contradiction, as (r 6= r′)ϕ′ and (r = r′)ϕ′′ would imply ϕ′ 6≈s ϕ′′. uunionsq
Additionally, we introduce a more fine-grained notion of trace equivalence, denoted ≈ft .
Definition 12 (fine-grained trace equivalence). Given ground processes P and Q, we say that P vft Q
if for each trace T ∈ P there exists a trace T ′ ∈ Q such that T ≈t T ′. We say that P ≈ft Q if P vft Q and
Q vft P .
It follows directly from the definition that ≈ft⊂≈t. The difference between these two relations is illustrated
by the following example.
Example 8. Let P and Q be ground processes defined as follows:
P = { out(c, enc(a, k)).out(c, enc(b, k)).in(c, x).[x = enc(a, k)].out(c, k),
out(c, enc(a, k)).out(c, enc(b, k)).in(c, x).[x = enc(b, k)].out(c, k)}
Q = { out(c, enc(a, k)).out(c, enc(b, k)).in(c, x).[x = enc(dec(x, k), k)].out(c, k)}
where k ∈ N is a private name and a, b are constants. The test x = enc(dec(x, k), k) simply checks whether
x is an encryption with key k. It is not difficult to see that P ≈t Q but P 6≈ft Q.
As already mentioned our procedure is able to check ≈ct which coincides with ≈t when processes are
determinate. In the case where processes are not determinate we can use our procedure to check ≈ct and
≈ft in order to over- and under-approximate ≈t. Indeed, as traces are determinate processes a procedure for
checking ≈ct can be used to verify ≈ft .
4 Modeling traces as Horn clauses
Our decision procedure is based on a fully abstract modelling of a trace in first-order Horn clauses. We give
the details of this modelling; we start by giving some definitions that we need for defining the predicates
used in the logic.
Symbolic labels and symbolic runs We define the set of symbolic labels as
SLabels = {in(c, t),out(c), test | t ∈ SMessages, c ∈ C}
and the set of symbolic runs, SRuns, as the set of finite sequences of symbolic labels (see Figure 1). The
empty sequence is denoted by . Sometimes we simply write (empty space) for . Intuitively, a symbolic
label stands for a set of possible labels, and a symbolic run stands for a set of possible runs of the protocol.
Symbolic Recipes We assume a set Y of recipe variables disjoint from X . The set of terms TF,M,W,Y shall be
called symbolic recipes and denoted by SRecipes. We use capital letters X,Y, Z to range over Y. Intuitively,
a symbolic recipe stands for a set of recipes.
We extend the definition of substitutions to include variables from Y in its domain. However, we only
consider substitutions that map variables in Y to SRecipes. A ground substitution must map variables in Y
to Recipes. The notion of most general unifiers is extended to symbolic recipes as expected.
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Predicates The predicates used in our modelling and the semantics of the predicates are given in Figure
1. The ground predicates are interpreted over a pair– a trace T and a frame ϕ. A predicate P with free
variables, is interpreted over a triple- a trace T, a frame ϕ and a substitution σ:
(T, ϕ0, σ) |= P iff (T, ϕ0) |= Pσ.
We consider four kinds of predicates, all of which have a symbolic run as an argument. Intuitively, the
reachability predicate rw says that each run represented by w is possible, i.e., does not block due to a test
that fails. The intruder knowledge predicate kw(R, t) says that whenever a run represented by w happens,
the (symbolic) message t can be constructed by the intruder using the (symbolic) recipe R. The identity
predicate iw(R,R
′) says that whenever the (symbolic) run w is executed, the (symbolic) recipes R and R′
are recipes for the same (symbolic) term. Observe that the term t in the definition of the predicate iw(R,R
′),
if it exists, must be unique (modulo R). The reachable identity predicate riw(R,R
′) is a short form for the
conjunction of the predicates rw and iw(R,R
′).
Formulas and statements We consider first-order formulas built using the above predicates and the usual
connectives (conjunction, disjunction, negation, implication, existential and universal quantification). As
in the case of predicates, a formula is interpreted over a triple consisting of a trace T , a frame ϕ and a
substitution σ; and the semantics is defined as expected.
Note that in case f is a ground formula, we shall omit σ as we do not need the substitution σ. If in
addition to f being ground, we have that dom(ϕ) = ∅, we simply write T |= f for (T, ∅) |= f .
Symbolic Runs (w ∈ SRuns, ` ∈ SLabels):
w :=  | `, w
Predicates (w ∈ SRuns, R ∈ SRecipes, t ∈ SMessages):
rw (Reachability predicate)




′) (Reachable identity predicate)
Semantics for ground predicates (`i ∈ SLabels, R ∈ SRecipes, t ∈ SMessages,
T ∈ GndTraces, ϕ ∈ Frames):
(T, ϕ0) |= r`1,...,`n if (T, ϕ0) L1−−→ (T1, ϕ1) L2−−→ . . . Ln−−→ (Tn, ϕn)
such that `i =R Liϕi−1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n
(T, ϕ0) |= k`1,...,`n(R, t) if when (T, ϕ0) L1−−→ (T1, ϕ1) L2−−→ . . . Ln−−→ (Tn, ϕn)
such that `i =R Liϕi−1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n
then ϕn `R t
(T, ϕ0) |= i`1,...,`n(R,R′) if there exists t such that
(T, ϕ0) |= k`1,...,`n(R, t) and
(T, ϕ0) |= k`1,...,`n(R′, t)
(T, ϕ0) |= ri`1,...,`i(R,R′) if (T, ϕ0) |= r`1,...,`n and (T, ϕ0) |= i`1,...,`n(R,R′)
Fig. 1: Predicates
We now identify a subset of the formulas, which we shall call statements. Statements will take the form
of Horn clauses, and we shall be mainly concerned with them.
Definition 13. A statement is a Horn clause of the form H ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn where:
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1. H ∈ {rl1,...,lk , kl1,...,lk(R, t), il1,...,lk(R,R′), ril1,...,lk(R,R′)}.
2. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n,Bi = kl1,...,lji (Xi, ti)
for some l1, . . . , lk ∈ SLabels, t ∈ SMessages, R,R′ ∈ SRecipes, ji ≤ k, t1, . . . , tn ∈ SMessages and
X1, . . . , Xn ∈ Y. Furthermore X1, . . . , Xn are distinct variables and if H = k`1,...,`k(R, t) then vars(t) ⊆
vars(t1, . . . , tn).
We implicitly assume that in a Horn clause all variables are universally quantified. Hence, all statements
are closed formulas.
Remark 3. We sometimes abuse language and call σ a closing substitution for a statement H ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
if σ is closing for each of the formulas H,B1, . . . Bn.
Remark 4. Let f = H ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn be a statement.
– f is said to be a reachability statement if H is of the form rl1,...,lk .
– f is said to be a deduction statement if H is of the form kl1,...,lk(R, t).
– f is said to be an equational statement if H is of the form il1,...,lk(R,R
′).
– f is said to be a reachable identity statement if H is of the form ril1,...,lk(R,R
′).
4.1 The set of seed statements
As mentioned above, our decision procedure is based on a fully abstract modelling of a trace in first-order
Horn clauses. In this section, given a trace T we will give a set of statements seed(T ) which will serve as a
starting point for the modelling. We shall also establish that the set of statements seed(T ) is a sound and
(partially) complete abstraction of the trace T. In order to formally define seed(T ), we start by fixing some
notational conventions.
Let T = a1.a2. . . . .an be a ground trace. We assume w.l.o.g. the following naming conventions:
1. if ai is a receive action then ai = in(ci, xi).
2. xi 6= xj for any i 6= j.
3. if ai is a send action then ai = out(ci, ti).
4. if ai is a test action then ai = [si
?
= ti].
Moreover, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n let `i ∈ SLabels be as follows:
`i =

in(ci, xi) if ai = in(ci, xi)
out(ci) if ai = out(ci, ti)




For each 0 ≤ m ≤ n, let the sets RcvT (m), SendT and TestT (m) respectively denote the indices of the receive
actions, send actions and test actions amongst a1, . . . , am. Formally,
RcvT (m) = {i | 1 ≤ i ≤ m, ai = in(ci, xi)}
SendT (m) = {i | 1 ≤ i ≤ m, ai = out(ci, ti)}
TestT (m) = {i | 1 ≤ i ≤ m, ai = [si ?= ti]}
.
Given a set of public names M0 ⊆ M, the set of seed statements associated to T and M0, denoted
seed(T,M0), is defined to be the set of statements given in Figure 2. If M0 = M, then seed(T,M) is
said to be the set of seed statements associated to T and in this case we write seed(T ) as a shortcut for
seed(T,M).
Remark 5. Please note that while constructing the set of seed statements, we apply the most general unifier
modulo R to all tests. In addition, we also apply finite variants. This allows us to get rid of rewriting in our
procedure.
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Example 9. As an example consider the signature F = {pair, fst, snd, h, a} where ar(pair) = ar(h) = 2,
ar(fst) = ar(snd) = 1, and ar(a) = 0 equipped with the rewrite system R = {fst(pair(x, y))→ x, snd(pair(x, y))→
y} and the trace
T = in(c, x).[fst(x)
?
= a].out(c, h(s, snd(x))).out(c, s)
The set seed(T, ∅) (ignoring public names) consists of the following clauses:
rin(c,x) ⇐ k(X,x) (1)
rin(c,pair(a,x)).test ⇐ k(X, pair(a, x)) (2)
rin(c,pair(a,x)).test.out(c) ⇐ k(X, pair(a, x)) (3)
rin(c,pair(a,x)).test.out(c).out(c) ⇐ k(X, pair(a, x)) (4)
kin(c,pair(a,x)).test.out(c)(w1, h(s, x))⇐ k(X, pair(a, x)) (5)
kin(c,pair(a,x)).test.out(c).out(c)(w2, s)⇐ k(X, pair(a, x)) (6)
kw(a, a)⇐ (7)
kw(fst(Y ), fst(y))⇐ kw(Y, y) (8)
kw(fst(Y ), y1)⇐ kw(Y, pair(y1, y2)) (9)
kw(snd(Y ), snd(y))⇐ kw(Y, y) (10)
kw(snd(Y ), y2)⇐ kw(Y, pair(y1, y2)) (11)
kw(pair(Y1, Y2), pair(y1, y2))⇐ kw(Y1, y1), kw(Y2, y2) (12)
kw(h(Y1, Y2), h(y1, y2))⇐ kw(Y1, y1), kw(Y2, y2) (13)
where w ∈ {u | ∃v. uv = in(c, pair(a, x)).test.out(c).out(c)}.
We may note that in the first block of 4 reachability statements (1–4), in order to satisfy the test
[fst(x)
?
= a], the attacker needs to be able to construct a pair pair(a, x). This condition is obtained by
computing mguR({fst(x) = a}) = {x 7→ pair(a, x)}. The second block of clauses adds a knowledge clause for
each send action in the trace. The third block of clauses represents the attacker capabilities. It computes
the set of variants on f(y1, . . . , yk) for each function symbol f in the signature, e.g., variants(fst(x)) =
{∅, {x 7→ pair(x, y)}} (where ∅ denotes the identity substitution).
We shortly show that the set of seed statements is a sound and (partially) complete modelling of a trace.
However, we need one more definition to state this fact.





H ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
)
∈ K
σ grounding for f B1σ ∈ H(K) . . . Bnσ ∈ H(K)
Hσ ∈ H(K)
ExtendK
ku(R, t) ∈ H(K)
kuv(R, t) ∈ H(K)
(Equivalently, H(K) is the least Herbrand model of K ∪ {k`1,...,`n+1(X,x)⇐ k`1,...,`n(X,x)}n∈N.)
We show that as far as reachability predicates and intruder knowledge predicates are concerned, the set
seed(T ) is a complete abstraction of a trace (please see Appendix B for the proof):
Theorem 2. Let T be a ground trace.
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r`1στ↓,...,`mστ↓ ⇐ {k`1στ↓,...,`j−1στ↓(Xj , xjστ↓)}j∈RcvT (m)
for all 0 ≤ m ≤ n
for all σ ∈ mguR({sk = tk}k∈TestT (m))
for all τ ∈ variants(`1σ, . . . , `mσ)
k`1στ↓,...,`mστ↓(w|SendT (m)|, tmστ↓)⇐ {k`1στ↓,...,`j−1στ↓(Xj , xjστ↓)}j∈RcvT (m)
for all m ∈ SendT (n)
for all σ ∈ mguR({sk = tk}k∈TestT (m))
for all τ ∈ variants(`1σ, . . . , `mσ, tmσ)
k(c, c)⇐
for all public names c ∈M0
k`1,...,`m(f(Y1, . . . , Yk), f(y1, . . . , yk)τ↓)⇐ {k`1,...,`m(Yj , yjτ↓)}j∈{1,...,k}
for all 0 ≤ m ≤ n
for all function symbols f of arity k
for all τ ∈ variants(f(y1, . . . , yk)).
Fig. 2: Seed statements
– (Soundness.) For any statement f ∈ seed(T ) ∪H(seed(T )), T |= f .
– (Completeness.) If (T, ∅) L1,...,Lm−−−−−−→ (S, ϕ) then:
1. rL1ϕ↓,...,Lmϕ↓ ∈ H(seed(T )).
2. if ϕ `R t then kL1ϕ↓,...,Lmϕ↓(R, t↓) ∈ H(seed(T )).
Remark 6. Please note that the set seed(T ) is only partially complete in that we have not shown in Theorem
2 that if ϕ `R t and ϕ `R′ t then iL1ϕ↓,...,Lmϕ↓(R,R′) ∈ H(seed(T )).
We will shortly show how the completeness of seed(T ) can be built upon to achieve a) full abstraction
of the trace T and b) a procedure for checking equivalences ≈ct and ≈ft .
5 Procedure for deciding trace equivalence
We shall now describe a procedure for deciding trace equivalence. At a high level, this consists of two steps.
1. A saturation procedure which constructs a set of simple statements from the set seed(T ) which we will
call solved statements. The saturation procedure ensures that the set of solved statements is a complete
abstraction of T .
2. Given two processes P and Q, we saturate the set of seed statements for traces of P and Q and then use
the solved statements to decide whether P and Q are trace equivalent.
We shall now give the details of the procedure. We start by the saturation procedure.
5.1 Knowledge bases and saturation
The saturation procedure manipulates a set of statements called a knowledge base:
Definition 15. Given a statement f = H ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn,
– f is said to be solved if for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Bi = k`1,...,`ji (Xi, xi) for some variables xi ∈ X , Xi ∈ Y.
– f is said to be well-formed if one of the following holds:
1. f is not solved.
2. f is a solved reachability, equational and reachable identity statement.
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3. f is a solved deduction such that if H = k`1,...,`k(R, t) then t 6∈ X .
A set of well-formed statements is called a knowledge base. If K is a knowledge base, we define Ksolved =
{f ∈ K | f is solved } to be the knowledge base restricted to the solved statements.
Given an initial knowledge base K, the saturation procedure produces another knowledge base sat(K). The
saturation procedure proceeds as follows. First new statements are generated and then the knowledge base is
updated with the new statements. This two-step process continues until a fixed-point is achieved. We describe
the two steps in the procedure.
Generating new statements Given a knowledge base K, new statements f are generated by applying the rules
in Figure 3. Each of the rule generates a new statement h. The rule Resolution applies the standard rule of
resolution from first-order logic to an unsolved and a solved deduction statement and allows us to propogate
constraints imposed from a partial execution of a trace to its possible extensions. The rule Equation allows
us to derive new identities on recipes that may be imposed by the execution of the protocol. The rule Test
allows us to conclude which identities necessarily hold in an execution of the protocol. Once the statement
h is generated, we update the knowledge base K with h. The process of updating K with h, denoted K ⊕ h,
is explained below.
Resolution
f ∈ K, g ∈ Ksolved, f =
(





′)⇐ Bn+1, . . . , Bm
)
σ = mgu(ku(X, t), kw(R, t
′)) t 6∈ X
K := K ⊕ h where h =
(
(H ⇐ B1, . . . , Bm)σ
)
Equation
f, g ∈ Ksolved,
f =
(





′, t′)⇐ Bn+1, . . . , Bm
)
σ = mgu(ku( , t), ku′( , t
′))
K := K ⊕ h where h =
(
(iu′v′(R,R
′)⇐ B1, . . . , Bm)σ
)
Test
f, g ∈ Ksolved, f =
(
iu(R,R




ru′v′ ⇐ Bn+1, . . . , Bm
)
σ = mgu(u, u′)
K := K ⊕ h where h =
(
(riu′v′(R,R
′)⇐ B1, . . . , Bm)σ
)
Fig. 3: Saturation rules
Update The first step while updating the knowledge base by f is to convert f into a canonical form.
Definition 16. Given a solved deduction statement f , we define the canonical form of f to be the statement
f⇓ obtained by first applying Rule Rename below as many times as possible and then applying Rule Remove
below as many times as possible:
Rename
H ⇐ ku(X,x), kuv(Y, x), B1, . . . , Bn
(H ⇐ ku(X,x), B1, . . . , Bn){Y 7→ X}
Remove
H ⇐ ku(X,x), B1, . . . , Bn x 6∈ vars(H)
H ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
For any other type of statement f , the canonical form f⇓ is defined to be equal to f .
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It is easy to see that any statement f can be converted into a canonical form. After a canonical form has
been obtained, we perform another check before f⇓ can be added to the knowledge base. This check ensures
that we do not add unnecessary knowledge statements which could otherwise entail non-termination (see
Example 11 below).
Definition 17. The set of consequences of a knowledge base K, denoted conseq(K), is the smallest set
such that
Axiom
kuv(R, t)⇐ ku(R, t), B1, . . . , Bm ∈ conseq(K)
Res
ku(R, t)⇐ B1, . . . , Bn ∈ K σ a substitution
B1σ ⇐ C1, . . . , Cm ∈ conseq(K) . . . Bnσ ⇐ C1, . . . , Cm ∈ conseq(K)
kuv(R, t)σ ⇐ C1, . . . , Cm ∈ conseq(K)
Given a knowledge base K and a statement f , the update of K by f , denoted K ⊕ f , is defined to be
K ∪ {f⇓} if the head of f is not of the form k`1,...,`k(R, t). Otherwise, let
f⇓ = k`1,...,`k(R, t)⇐ k`1,...,`i1 (X1, t1), . . . , k`1,...,`in (Xn, tn)
and
K ⊕ f =

K ∪ {f⇓}
if f is solved and for any R′ we have that
k`1,...,`k(R
′, t)⇐ {k`1,...,`ij (Xj , tj)}j∈{1,...,n}} 6∈ K ′
K ∪ {i`1,...,`k(R,R′)⇐ {k`1,...,`ij (Xj , tj)}j∈{1,...,n}}
if f is solved and R′ is such that
k`1,...,`k(R
′, t)⇐ {k`1,...,`ij (Xj , tj)}j∈{1,...,n}} ∈ K ′
K ∪ {f⇓} if f is not solved
where K ′ = conseq(Ksolved).
Please note that update is not a function, namely that there may be several R′, i1, . . . , in such that
k`1,...,`k(R
′, t) ⇐ k`1,...,`i1 (X1, t1), . . . , k`1,...,`in (Xn, tn) ∈ conseq(Ksolved). However, we need to compute
only one such R′, i1, . . . , in.
Initial knowledge base One question that naturally arises is what is the initial knowledge base for the
saturation procedure. Given a trace T , the initial knowledge base for the saturation procedure is defined as
follows.
Definition 18. Given a set of statements S, the initial knowledge base associated to S, denoted Ki(S), is
defined to be the empty knowledge base updated by the set S, i.e., Ki(S) = (((∅ ⊕ f1) ⊕ f2) . . . f`) where
f1, . . . , f` is an enumeration of the statements in S. If T is a ground trace, we write Ki(T ) for Ki(seed(T )).
Please observe that Ki(T ) depends on the order in which statements in seed(T ) are updated. The exact
order, however, is not important and our results hold regardless of the order chosen. The saturation procedure
takes Ki(T ) as an input and produces a knowledge base sat(Ki(T )). The reason for choosing Ki(T ) instead of
seed(T ) as the starting point of the saturation procedure is that seed(T ) may not be a knowledge base (recall
that a knowledge base is a set of well-formed statements). For instance, given a trace T = in(c, x).out(c, x)
we have that kin(c,x).out(c)(w1, x) ⇐ k(X,x) ∈ seed(T ). The set Ki(T ) is, however, a knowledge base. This
is an immediate consequence of the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If K is a knowledge base and f is a statement then K ⊕ f is a knowledge base.
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Proof. We first observe that if a statement f is well-formed then K ⊕ f is a knowledge base, as equational
statements are well-formed and the canonical form preserves well-formedness, i.e. if f is well-formed then f⇓
is well-formed as well.
If a statement f is not well-formed, then it is a solved statement of the form
ku(R, x)⇐ B1, . . . Bn
By Definition 13, ku′(X,x) ∈ B1, . . . , Bn where u′ is a prefix of u. By rule Axiom
ku(X,x)⇐ B1, . . . , Bn ∈ conseq(K)
and therefore we have that K ⊕ f = K ∪ {iu(R,X)⇐ B1, . . . , Bn} which is a knowledge base as equational
statements are well-formed.
Example 10. Continuing Example 9 on the trace
T = in(c, x).[fst(x)
?
= a].out(c, h(s, snd(x))).out(c, s)
we have that Ki(seed(T )) = seed(T ). After saturating the initial knowledge base the set sat(Ki(T ))solved
contains in particular the following additional solved statements:
kin(c,pair(a,x)).test.out(c)(w1, h(s, x))⇐ k(X,x) (14)
kw(w2, s)⇐ k(X,x) (15)
rw ⇐ k(X,x) (16)
iw(w1, h(w2, X2))⇐ k(X1, x), k(X2, x), kw(X3, x) (17)
riw(w1, h(w2, X2))⇐ k(X1, x), k(X2, x), kw(X3, x), k(X1, x) (18)
where w = in(c, pair(a, x)).test.out(c).out(c).
Statement (14) is obtained by first applying Resolution on statements (5) and (12) (defined in Exam-
ple 9) yielding
kin(c,pair(a,x)).test.out(c)(w1, h(s, x))⇐ k(Y, a), k(X,x)
Applying again Resolution on the above statement and statement (7) we obtain (14). Statements (15) and
(16) are obtained in a similar way.
To obtain statement (17) we apply Equation on statements (14) and (13) yielding
iw(w1, h(Y1, Y2))⇐ k(X,x), kw(Y1, s), kw(Y2, x)
Applying Resolution on this statement and statement (15) yields (17).
Statement (18) is obtained by applying Test on statements (16) and (17).
Example 11. We now present a second, contrived example that illustrates the need of computing an update
based on our set of consequences. Consider the signature F = {f, g, h} where ar(f) = ar(g) = 2, ar(h) = 1,
the (subterm convergent) rewrite rule
g(f(f(x1, h(x2)), y), f(f(z, h(y)), x1))→ f(z, h(y))
and the trace
T = out(c, h(s)).in(c, x).out(c, f(x, s))
The initial knowledge base contains the following deduction statements.
kout(c)(w1, h(s))⇐ (19)
kout(c).in(c,x).out(c)(w2, f(x, s))⇐ kout(c)(X,x) (20)
kwi(h(X), h(x))⇐ kwi(X,x) (21)
kwi(f(X1, X2), f(x1, x2))⇐ kwi(X1, x1), kwi(X2, x2) (22)
kwi(g(X1, X2), g(x1, x2))⇐ kwi(X1, x1), kwi(X2, x2) (23)
kwi(g(X1, X2), f(z, h(y)))⇐ kwi(X1, f(f(x1, h(x2)), y)), kwi(X2, f(f(z, h(y)), x1)) (24)
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for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 where w = out(c).in(c, x).out(c) and wi denotes the prefix of w of size i. Moreover we write
wi(t) for wi(t){x 7→ t}.
Applying Resolution to statement (24, i = 3) and (20) we obtain the statement
kw3(f(x1,h(x2)))(g(w2, X2), f(z, h(s)))⇐ kw1(X, f(x1, h(x2))),
kw3(f(x1,h(x2)))(X2, f(f(z, h(s)), x1))

















Applying twice Resolution with statement (19), and taking the canonical form we obtain
kw3(f(x1,h(s)))(g(w2, f(f(X2, w1), X1)), f(z, h(s)))⇐ kw1(X1, x1), kw3(f(x1,h(s)))(X2, z) (25)
As
kw3(f(x1,h(s)))(f(X2, w1), f(z, h(s)))⇐ kw1(X1, x1), kw3(f(x1,h(s)))(X2, z)
is a consequence of the previous solved statements (in particular of (19) and (22)) the update will add the
equational statement
iw3(f(x1,h(s)))(g(w2, f(f(X2, w1), X1)), f(X2, w1))⇐ kw1(X1, x1), kw3(f(x1,h(s)))(X2, z)
Suppose we would have added directly statement (25). In that case we could again apply Resolution to









kw3(X2, f(f(z, h(h(s))), x1))
Repeatedly applying Resolution as before we can obtain the statement
kw3(f(x1,h(s)))(R, f(z, h(h(s)))))⇐ kw1(X1, x1), kw3(f(x1,h(s)))(X2, z)
which is similar to statement (25) but with an additional application of h. (We omit the precise form of R
for readability.) We see that we could procede indefinitely to produce statements of the form
kw3(f(x1,h(s)))(R
n, f(z, (hn(s))))⇐ kw1(X1, x1), kw3(f(x1,h(s)))(X2, z)
demonstrating the need of verifying whether a statement is already a consequence or not.
Soundness and completeness of the saturation procedure We shall now show that the set of solved
statements in sat(Ki(T )) is a sound and complete abstraction of a trace T . We need one more definition
which extends H(K) and allows us to establish that sat(Ki(T )) is a complete abstraction of T.
Definition 19. Let K be a set of statements. We define He(K) to be the smallest set of ground terms such
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We have that the set of solved statements produced by the saturation procedure is a sound and complete
abstraction of the trace T (see Appendix C for the proof):
Theorem 3. Let T be a ground trace and let K = sat(Ki(T )).
– (Soundness.) For any f ∈ K ∪He(K), T |= f .
– (Completeness.) If (T, ∅) L1,...,Ln−−−−−−→ (S, ϕ) then
1. rL1ϕ↓,...,Lnϕ↓ ∈ He(Ksolved).
2. if ϕ `R t then kL1ϕ↓,...,Lnϕ↓(R, t↓) ∈ He(Ksolved).
3. if ϕ `R t and ϕ `R′ t, then iL1ϕ↓,...,Lnϕ↓(R,R′) ∈ He(Ksolved).
Effectiveness of the saturation procedure We have shown that the set of solved statements in sat(Ki(T ))
form a sound and complete abstraction for the trace T . However, the set sat(Ki(T )) may, a priori, not be
computable for several reasons.
– As the set of public names M is infinite, the set seed(T ) for a ground trace T is infinite as well.
– For the update rule, we have to check that given a knowledge base K, a term t, labels `1, . . . , `k, indices
1 ≤ i1, . . . in,≤ k, variables x1, . . . , xn ∈ X and recipe variables X1, . . . , Xn ∈ Y, whether
∃R. k`1,...,`k(R, t)⇐ k`1,...,`i1 (X1, x1), . . . , k`1,...,`in (Xn, xn) ∈ conseq(Ksolved).
Furthermore, if the check succeeds then we have to compute one such R.
– The saturation procedure may itself not terminate even if the initial knowledge base is finite.
We now address each of these three reasons.
Firstly, we show that we only need to consider the saturation of the set Ki(seed(T,MT )) where MT
is the (finite) set of public names occurring in T . The set sat(Ki(T )) can then be computed from the set
sat(Ki(seed(T,MT ))) by adding the set of clauses KuselessM,R which is not required for the saturation and is
defined as follows.
Definition 20. Given a set of public names M ⊆M and a set of solved reachability statements R we define
KuselessM,R = {k(m,m)⇐}m∈M ∪ {i(m,m)⇐}m∈M∪
{riu(m,m)⇐ B1, . . . Bn | m ∈M, ru ⇐ B1, . . . Bn ∈ R}
The following is proved in Appendix D:
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Lemma 1. Let T be a trace and MT ⊆M be the public names occurring in T . Then
sat(Ki(T )) = sat(Ki(seed(MT , T ))) ∪KuselessM,R
where R is the set of solved reachability statements in sat(Ki(seed(T,MT ))).
Since the set Ki(seed(T,MT )) is finite, this means that all intermediate knowledge bases in the saturation
procedure are finite.
Secondly, we show that the update step can be computed if we only have a finite number of statements
in the knowledge base (see Appendix D for the proof):
Lemma 2. Given a finite set of solved statements K, term t, labels `1, . . . , `k, indices 1 ≤ i1, . . . in ≤
k, variables x1, . . . , xn ∈ X and recipe variables X1, . . . , Xn ∈ Y, it is decidable if there is an R such
that k`1,...,`k(R, t)⇐ k`1,...,`i1 (X1, x1), . . . , k`1,...,`in (Xn, xn) ∈ conseq(Ksolved). If the answer to the decision
procedure is “Yes”, then we can compute one such R.
Thirdly, we show that our procedure terminates for the class of subterm convergent rewrite systems
(Definition 3). It has been shown in [6] that deducibility is undecidable for convergent optimally reducing
rewrite systems. As observed in [1] static equivalence is even harder to decide, as soon as the signature
may contain a free symbol (which does not change the statement that the rewrite system is convergent and
optimally reducing). As our algorithm would allow to decide static equivalence as a particular case we cannot
expect a general termination result. However, we prove that the saturation procedure does terminate for the
class of subterm convergent rewrite systems (see Appendix D for the proof):
Theorem 4. Let T be a ground trace and S = seed(T ). For a subterm convergent rewrite system the com-
putation of sat(Ki(S)) terminates in a finite number of steps.
We remark that the saturation is nevertheless sound and complete for the more general class of convergent
rewrite systems for which the finite variant property holds. Indeed, the procedure may also terminate on
protocols that rely on rewrite systems that are not subterm convergent. This is demonstrated in our case
studies when analysing protocols using blind signatures and trapdoor commitment schemes.
5.2 Algorithm
In this section we describe an algorithm to decide trace inclusion for determinate processes. In Figure 4,
we describe the checks Reachability and Identity which allow us to test whether a trace–represented
by the set K of solved statements in the saturated knowledge base associated to this trace–is included in a
determinate process P (see Appendix E for the proof):
Theorem 5. Let T be a ground trace, P a ground process and K = (sat(Ki(T )))solved. We have that
– if T vct P then Reachability(K,P ) and Identity(K,P ) hold.
– if P is determinate and Reachability(K,P ) and Identity(K,P ) hold
then T vct P .
Note that performing the tests requires deciding if, given t, and w, kw(R, t) ∈ H(K) for some recipe R for
a knowledge base K containing only solved statements. It is easy to see that this is equivalent to checking if(
kw(R, t)⇐
)
∈ conseq(K) and we have already shown that there is an effective procedure for this (which
finds an R if such an R exists).
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Reachability(K,P )
For all rl1,...,ln ⇐ {kwi(Xi, xi)}i∈{1,...,m} ∈ K do
let c1, . . . , ck be fresh public names
such that σ : vars(l1, . . . , ln)→ {c1, . . . , ck} is a bijection
if for all i s.t. li = in(di, ti) we have that kl1σ,...,li−1σ(Ri, tiσ) ∈ H(K) then
let Mi =
{
li if li ∈ {test, out(c) | c ∈ C}
in(di, Ri) if li = in(di, ti)





′)⇐ {kwi(Xi, xi)}i∈{1,...,m} ∈ K do
let c1, . . . , ck be fresh public names
such that σ : vars(l1, . . . , ln)→ {c1, . . . , ck} is a bijection
if for all i s.t. li = in(di, ti) we have that kl1σ,...,li−1σ(Ri, tiσ) ∈ H(K) then
let Mi =
{
li if li ∈ {test, out(c) | c ∈ C}
in(di, Ri) if li = in(di, ti)
check that (P, ∅) M1,...,Mn======⇒ (T ′, ϕ) and (Rω = R′ω)ϕ
where ω = {Xi 7→ xiσ}
endif
enddo
Fig. 4: Tests for checking T vct P
Example 12. We continue Example 10. Let
T = in(c, x).[fst(x)
?
= a].out(c, h(s, snd(x))).out(c, s)
and
T ′ = in(c, x).[fst(x) ?= a].out(c, h(s, snd(x))).out(c, s′).
The equivalence T ≈ft T ′ models real-or-random secrecy of s. Our algorithm can be used to show that
T 6vft T ′. In particular Identity(K,P ) does not hold. Indeed, as shown in Example 10, we have that
riw(w1, h(w2, X2))⇐ k(X1, x), k(X2, x), kw(X3, x), k(X1, x) ∈ sat(Ki(T ))solved
where w = in(c, pair(a, x)).test.out(c).out(c). Let σ = {x 7→ c1}. We have that k(pair(a, c1), pair(a, c1) ∈
H(K) and
(T ′, ∅) in(c,pair(a,c1)).test.out(c).out(c)=====================⇒ (, ϕ)
where ϕ = {w0 7→ h(s, c1), w1 7→ s′}. However, (w0 6= h(w1, c))ϕ demonstrating that real-or-random secrecy
does not hold.
6 Prototype and case studies
6.1 The AKiSs prototype
We implemented the procedure for checking equivalence in a prototype, AKiSs (Active Knowledge in
Security protocols). AKiSs is written in OCaml and has about 2000 lines of source code, including code
for computing complete sets of finite variants and complete sets of equational unifiers. We used AKiSs to
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verify the equivalences in Examples 7 and 8. Using AKiSs we were able to verify strong secrecy for Denning-
Sacco-Blanchet [18] and Needham-Schroeder-Lowe (NSL) [50], resistance to guessing attacks in the EKE
protocol [16], and, more interestingly, anonymity of the FOO [45] and Okamoto [52] electronic voting proto-
cols.5 To our knowledge, AKiSs is the only tool that can verify FOO and Okamoto completely automatically.
We discuss each of these examples in more details below. In [8] the tool has also been extended to verify a
property called everlasting privacy that appears in electronic voting. Several other protocols were analysed
in this context. AKiSs along with all the discussed examples is available on:
http://akiss.gforge.inria.fr
To ease protocol specification, the process calculus syntax used for specifying protocol we allow for an
operator interleave, denoted ‖, which models parallel composition of processes and an operator sequence,
denoted ;, for modeling protocols structured in phases. These constructs are merely syntactic sugar and are
defined as follows. Given processes P and Q we define P ;Q as the sequential composition of each trace in P
with each trace in Q, i.e.,
P ;Q = {T1.T2 | T1 ∈ P, T2 ∈ Q}
Let  denote the empty sequence, a1, a2 be actions and T, T1, T2 traces. The parallel composition of two
traces is the process defined inductively as
T ‖  =  ‖ T = T
a1.T1 ‖ a2.T2 = {a1; (T1 ‖ a2.T2), a2; (a1.T1 ‖ T2)}
The parallel composition is then naturally lifted to process, i.e., P ‖ Q = ∪T1∈P,T2∈Q T1 ‖ T2.
The ‖ operator reflects the usual notion of parallel composition in process calculi. One may note that the
number of possible interleavings (and hence generated traces) is exponential. We can however slightly lower
this number due to the fact that test actions are silent, i.e., unobservable. We therefore define an optimised
interleaving operator ‖o which generates fewer interleavings. In practice this gain is substantial on several
examples. In the following we let τ (and decorations of τ) range over test actions, i.e. actions of the form
[s
?
= t] for some terms s, t. α (and decorations of α) range over input and output actions. The optimized
parallel composition of two traces is the process defined inductively as
τ1 . . . τn ‖o T = T.τ1 . . . τn
τ1 . . . τn.α.T ‖o τ ′1 . . . τ ′m.α′.T ′ =
{
τ1 . . . τn.α; (T ‖o τ ′1 . . . τ ′m.α′.T ′),
τ ′1 . . . τ
′
m.α
′; (τ1 . . . τn.α.T ‖o T ′)
}
Intuitively we consider sequences of silent actions together with the following visible action as atomic. We
will now show that this is indeed a sound optimization when checking trace equivalence by showing that
P1 ‖ P2 ≈t P1 ‖o P2 (see Appendix F for a proof).
Proposition 3. Let T1, T2 be two ground traces.
(T1 ‖ T2) l1,...lk====⇒ (T, ϕ) iff (T1 ‖o T2) l1,...lk====⇒ (To, ϕ)
From this proposition it is easy to conclude that (P ‖ Q) ≈t (P ‖o Q).
6.2 Security properties and case studies
We now give more details about our case studies.
5 Please note that as defined in [52], modeling of Okamoto’s protocol requires private channels. As we do not have
private channels in our calculus, we transform the protocol so that every message sent by honest participants on
a private channel is sent encrypted under a key not known to the adversary
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Strong flavors of confidentiality The strong secrecy property was introduced by Blanchet in [18] and we
rephrase it here in our setting. Let P be a protocol with x as the only free variable of P . Then x is said to
be strongly secret if
in(c, x1).in(c, x2).(P{x 7→ x1}) ≈t in(c, x1).in(c, x2).(P{x 7→ x2}).
Intuitively, the attacker cannot distinguish the processes using variables x1 and x2 even though it can choose
arbitrary (public) values for these variables. The definition generalizes to multiple variables in the expected
way. We illustrate this property on a Denning-Sacco-Blanchet protocol. Informally, the protocol can be
described as follows.
A→ B : aenc(sign(pair(pk(ska), pair(pk(skb, k))), ska), pk(skb))
B→ A : enc(x, k)
A sends to B a fresh symmetric session key k together with A’s and B’s public keys. This is signed with A’s
secret key and (asymmetrically) encrypted with B’s public key. Upon receiving this message, B decrypts it,
checks the signature and uses the fresh session key to symmetrically encrypt a secret x. The detailed protocol
model is given in Figure 5. We note that the rewrite system is subterm convergent. We used AKiSs to verify
Rewrite System:
fst(pair(x, y))→ x adec(aenc(x, pk(y)), y)→ x check(sign(x, y), pk(y))→ ok
snd(pair(x, y))→ y dec(enc(x, y), y)→ x msg(sign(x, y))→ x
Processes:
Pi = Setup; (A ‖ Bi) (i ∈ {1, 2})
Setup = out(c, pk(skA)).out(c, pk(ekB)).in(c, x1).in(c, x2)
A = out(c, aenc(sign(pair(pk(skA), pair(pk(ekB), k)), skA), pk(ekB)))










out(c, enc(xi, snd(snd(msg(adec(z, ekB))))))
Fig. 5: Formal description of the protocol by Blanchet
this protocol for strong secrecy of x (with one session of A and B). This protocol is determinate, and hence
we used ≈ct to verify that P1 ≈ct P2. The verification succeeds as expected.
A variant of the protocol [18] consists in letting A also send out a secret y encrypted with k changing
the first message to
A→ B : pair(aenc(sign(pair(pk(ska), pair(pk(skb, k))), ska), pk(skb)), enc(y, k))
In this case the protocol does not respect strong secrecy of x, y as, by choosing x1 = y1 and x2 6= y2, the
attacker can distinguish the two situations by testing the equality of the encryptions of x and y. The detailed
model is given in Figure 6. This attack is again found by AKiSs.
AKiSs also verifies strong secrecy of the nonce generated by the responder in the Needham-Schroeder-
Lowe (NSL) [50] protocol. The NSL protocol is a two-way handshake protocol relying only on public encryp-
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Rewrite System:
fst(pair(x, y))→ x adec(aenc(x, pk(y)), y)→ x check(sign(x, y), pk(y))→ ok
snd(pair(x, y))→ y dec(enc(x, y), y)→ x msg(sign(x, y))→ x
Processes:
Pi = Setup; (Ai ‖ Bi) (i ∈ {1, 2})
Setup = out(c, pk(skA)).out(c, pk(ekB)).in(c, x1).in(c, x2).in(c, y1).in(c, y2)
Ai = out(c, pair(aenc(sign(pair(pk(skA), pair(pk(ekB), k)), skA), pk(ekB))),
enc(y1, k))










out(c, enc(xi, snd(snd(msg(adec(z, ekB))))))
Fig. 6: Formal description of the variant protocol by Blanchet
tion of fresh nonces and can be informally described as follows.
A→ B : aenc(pair(na, A), pk(skb))
B→ A : aenc(pair(nb, pair(na, B)), pk(ska))
A→ B : aenc(pair(nb), pk(skb))
Once again, the modelling of NSL leads to a subterm convergent rewrite system and determinate processes.
We therefore used ≈ct for our verification. The detailed model is given in Figure 7.
Rewrite System:
fst(pair(x, y))→ x snd(pair(x, y))→ y adec(aenc(x, pk(y), z), y)→ x
Processes:
Pi = Setup; (A ‖ Bi) (i ∈ {1, 2})
Setup = out(c, pk(skA)).out(c, pk(ekB)).out(c, skD)in(c, x1).in(c, x2)
A = out(c, aenc(pair(na, a), pk(skD), r1)).
in(c, y).[snd(snd(adec(y, skA))) = d].
out(c, aenc(fst(snd(adec(y, skA))), pk(skD), r2))
Bi = in(c, z).[snd(adec(z, skB)) = a].
out(c, aenc(pair(fst(adec(z, skB)), pair(x1, b)), pk(skA), r3))
Fig. 7: Formal description of the NSL protocol
This model includes a session of the initiator who is willing to engage with any participant (including the
attacker to allow man-in-the-middle attacks) and a session of B who is willing to engage a session with A.
Note that if B was willing to start a session with an arbitrary initiator the secrecy of nb would be trivially
broken in a session with the attacker. (In a more complex model one could of course add additional sessions
for B with an arbitrary initiator.) We note that for the verification of NSL, one needs to explicitly model
randomness for asymmetric encryption since the protocol is insecure if deterministic asymmetric encryption
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is used. Indeed, as the attacker may choose the value of nb he could simply recompute the last message and
compare it with the message sent by the initiator.
We also used AKiSs to verify the above protocols for real-or-random secrecy. Let P be a protocol and
n ∈ names(P ). Then n is said to be real-or-random secret if
P ; out(c, n) ≈t P ; out(c, n′)
where n′ is a fresh name, i.e. a name that does not appear in P . Real-or-random secrecy is particularly useful
to model resistance to oﬄine guessing attacks in password protocols [14]. Intuitively, an oﬄine guessing
attacks works in two phases. In the first (online) phase, the attacker interacts with the protocol P in an
arbitrary way. In a second (oﬄine) phase, the attacker tries all possible passwords against the data recorded
in the first phase. Our property states that the attacker cannot distinguish the case where he tests the real
password (n) from the case where he tests a wrong password (n′). We show that the EKE protocol [16] is
resistant to oﬄine guessing attacks. The protocol can be described informally as follows:
A→ B : enc(pk(k)), w)
B→ A : enc(aenc(r, pk(k)), w)
A→ B : enc(na, r)
B→ A : enc(〈na, nb〉, r)
A→ B : enc(nb, r)
In the first step A generates a new private session key k and sends the corresponding public key pk(k) to B,
encrypted (using symmetric encryption) with the shared password w. Then, B generates a fresh symmetric
session key r, which he encrypts (using asymmetric encryption) with the previously received public key pk(k).
Finally, he encrypts the resulting ciphertext with the password w and sends the result to A. The last three
steps perform a handshake to avoid replay attacks. Using AKiSs we have shown that the protocol resists to
oﬄine guessing attacks on the password w. As EKE is modelled by a subterm convergent rewrite system and
determinate processes, we used the ≈ct relation. The detailed description of our model is given in Figure 8.
Rewrite System:
fst(pair(x, y))→ x adec(aenc(x, pk(y), z), y)→ x
snd(pair(x, y))→ y dec(enc(x, y), y)→ x
Processes:
P1 = (A ‖ B);out(c, w)
P2 = (A ‖ B);out(c, w′)
A = out(c, enc(pk(k), w)).
in(c, x1).
out(c, enc(na, adec(dec(x1, w), k))).
in(c, x2).[fst(dec(x2, adec(dec(x1, w), k)))
?
= na].
out(c, snd(dec(x2, adec(dec(x1, w), k)))).
B = in(c, y1).
out(c, enc(aenc(r, dec(y1, w), rb), w)).
in(c, y2).
out(c, enc(pair(dec(y2, r), nb), r)).
Fig. 8: Formal description of the EKE protocol
Anonymity for electronic voting protocol A voting protocol must respect voter privacy: the adversary should
not be able to learn how each voter voted.AKiSs can automatically verify voter privacy in the FOO electronic
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voting protocol [45] and the Okamoto protocol [52]. Voter privacy is naturally modelled as an equivalence
property [39,13]: it is not possible to distinguish the situation where honest voter A votes ‘yes’ and honest B
votes ‘no’ from the situation that A votes ‘no’ and B votes ‘yes’. Note that our modelling of the protocols,
that we make precise below, is exactly the same as in [39]. We assume that only voters A and B are honest
while all other entities are dishonest. An arbitrary number of dishonest voters are however subsumed by the
attacker and need not be modelled directly.
We now briefly describe the two protocols. The FOO protocol relies on blind signatures and a commitment
function. The rewrite system is specified in Figure 9. We note that the rewrite system is not subterm
convergent, but it is optimally reducing. The protocol consists of 3 phases informally described as follows.
Phase 1 :
V→ A : sign(blind(commit(v, r), b), skV ))
A→ V : sign(blind(commit(v, r), b), skA))
Phase 2 :
V→ C : sign(commit(v, r), skA)
Phase 3 :
V→ C : r
In the first phase, the voter V commits to his vote v which he blindly signs and sends to the election
administrator A. A checks eligibility of V and then signs the blinded commitment. Blinding the commitment
ensures that A cannot trace the ballot. V unblinds the signature and obtains a ballot which is signed by A.
In the second phase, V submits the signed ballot to a collector C who publishes all the submitted ballots
on a public bulletin board. Finally, in the 3rd phase, V submits the random r which allows to open the
commitment to C who again publishes this value on the bulletin board. The election can now be tallied by
any observer. The detailed model is given in Figure 9. Note that only two honest voters need to be modelled
for showing anonymity. All remaining voters and election authorities are subsumed by the adversary. The
processes AyesBno and AnoByes model the situation where these two honest voters have swapped their vote.
The protocols do not lead to determinate processes. Therefore, we proved the relation AyesBno ≈ft AnoByes.
Rewrite System:
open(commit(x, y), y)→ x check(sign(x, y), pk(y))→ x




Setup = out(c, pk(skA)).out(c, pk(skB))
V -Phase1 = out(V, sign(blind(commit(v, r), b), sk)).
in(A, x).[check(x, pk(skA))
?
= blind(commit(v, r), b)]
V -Phase2 = out(C, unblind(x, b))
V -Phase3 = out(C, r)
AB = (V -Phase1{va/v,skA /sk,ra /r,ba /b,xa /x, } ‖
V -Phase1{vb/v,skB /sk,rb /r,bb /b,xb /x, });
(V -Phase2{ba/b,xa /x} ‖ V -Phase2{bb/b,xb /x});
(V -Phase3{ra/r} ‖ V -Phase3{rb/r})
AyesBno = AB{yes/va ,no /vb}
AnoByes = AB{no/va ,yes /vb}
Fig. 9: Formal description of the FOO protocol
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We will not give a detailed description of the Okamoto protocol and refer the reader to [39]. The protocol
is a variant of the FOO protocol which aims at achieving receipt-freeness. To avoid vote-selling, a voter should
not be able to provide a receipt of how he voted to a potential coercer. In the FOO protocol this is possible
by sending all private names to a coercer. The main tool to avoid this problem in the Okamoto protocol
is the use of trapdoor commitment functions. These functions allow to change the value of committed vote
using a secret value called the trapdoor. Following [29] we model trapdoor commitment by the following
rewrite system:
open(tdcommit(x, y, z), y)→ x tdcommit(x, f(x1, y, z, x), z)→ tdcommit(x1, y, z)
open(tdcommit(x, y, z), f(x, y, z, x1))→ x1 f(x1, f(x, y, z, x1), z, x2)→ f(x, y, z, x2)
Intuitively, a trapdoor commitment tdcommit(x, y, z) commits to x using the key y and trapdoor z. The
commitment can be opened using key y to x. However, knowing the trapdoor z one may compute an
alternate key f(x1, y, z, x) which opens the commitment tdcommit(x, y, z) to x1 rather than x. This rewrite
system is again optimally reducing but not subterm convergent and out of the scope of most tools, even in
the simpler case of a passive adversary. The only result we are aware of that can verify protocols for the case
of passive adversary and which uses trapdoor commitments is [29]. As for the FOO protocol we used the
relation ≈ft to prove anonymity.
To our knowledge, no other tool can handle the above two protocols automatically. We are aware of two
other attempts for verifying the FOO protocol. Using ProVerif [18], Delaune et al. [40], verify a transformation
of the protocol. However, the soundness of this transformation has never been proven. Chothia et al. [27]
verify a different notion of anonymity (also based on process equivalence) using the µCRL tool. However,
the attacker they consider is only an observer that cannot interact with the protocol participants, yielding
only a finite state system.
Efficiency On a standard modern laptop, AKiSs takes a few seconds to carry out the above verification,
except for the verification of the Okamoto protocol which takes about 30 seconds. Most of the computa-
tional effort goes into the saturation of the traces. Interleaving individual roles of a protocol introduces an
exponential blowup on the number of traces and saturations to perform. However, we believe that we can
scale to larger protocols and more sessions by parallelizing the saturation of these traces (e.g. on clusters of
machines). An implementation performing saturations in parallel is currently in progress.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we present a novel procedure for verifying equivalence properties for a bounded number of
sessions of cryptographic protocols. The procedure has been implemented in a tool which is able to handle
examples which are out of the scope of existing tools.
There are several directions for future work. The implementation of the tool should be optimized and we
plan to analyze more examples coming from electronic voting, RFID protocols and auction protocols which
all have requirements stated in terms of equivalences.
We would also like to extend the procedure to be able to take disequalities into account. On the one hand,
disequalities will allow to verify processes with else branches which are important in a number of practical
examples. On the other hand, characterizing disequalities in our decision procedure would allow to directly
decide trace equivalence based on static equivalence (rather than static inclusion). Another direction would
be to extend the procedure to allow AC operators in order to treat protocols based on exclusive-or and
Diffie-Hellman exponentiations.
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A Optimally reducing convergent rewrite theories and static equivalence
In this section, we shall sketch the proof of undecidability of static equivalence for equational theories when
the equational theory form an optimally reducing convergent rewrite system. We shall first show that the
deducibility relation is undecidable. Then we can use the results of [1] to conclude that checking static
equivalence is also undecidable.
Lemma 3. Given a signature F , an optimally reducing convergent rewrite system R over F , a frame ϕ that
maps elements of W to elements of TF,N ,M and a term t ∈ TF,N ,M, the problem of checking whether there
exists a recipe r ∈ TF,M,W such that ϕ `r t is undecidable.
Proof. (Sketch.) We shall reduce the problem of checking whether a 2-counter deterministic Minsky ma-
chine halts on empty inputs to our problem. Recall that a 2-counter Minsky Machine is tuple CM =









– Q is a finite set of control states.
– qs ∈ Q is the initial state.
– qf ∈ Q is the final state.
– δiinc ⊆ Q×Q is the increment of counter i for i = 1, 2.
– δijzdec ⊆ Q×Q×Q is the conditional jump of counter i for i = 1, 2.
CM is said to be deterministic if from each state q, there is at most transition out of q. The semantics
of CM is defined in terms of a transition system (Conf, (qs, 0, 0),→) where Conf = Q×N×N is the set of
configurations, (qs, 0, 0) is the initial configuration and → is defined as follows:
(q, i, j)→ (q′, i+ 1, j) if (q, q′) ∈ δ1inc,
(q, i, j)→ (q′, i, j + 1) if (q, q′) ∈ δ2inc,
(q, i, j)→ (q′, i, j) if i = 0 and (q, q′, q′′) ∈ δ1jzdec,
(q, i, j)→ (q′′, i− 1, j) if i 6= 0 and (q, q′, q′′) ∈ δ1jzdec,
(q, i, j)→ (q′, i, j) if j = 0 and (q, q′, q′′) ∈ δ2jzdec, and
(q, i, j)→ (q′′, i, j − 1) if j 6= 0 and (q, q′, q′′) ∈ δ2jzdec.
A sequence of configurations s0, s1, . . . sk is said to be a computation of CM is s0 = (qs, 0, 0) and si → si+1
for i = 0, 1, . . . k− 1. A computation s0, s1, . . . sk is sad to be a halting computation of CM if sk = (qf , 0, 0).
The halting problem asks given a 2-counter machine CM if there is a halting computation of CM.
Now, given a deterministic 2-counter CM = (Q, qs, qf , δ1inc, δ2inc, δ1jzdec, δ2jzdec), we construct F ,R, ϕ, t as
follows. For each q ∈ Q, F will consist of a 0-ary symbol q. In addition, F will consist of a 4-ary symbol
h, a 0-ary symbol Z, a unary symbol s and a unary symbol Run. Intuitively a term h(q, x, y, w) will stand
for a configuration of the counter machine CM with q as the control state, x and y as the contents of the
two counters and w some auxiliary information. The term Z will stand for the natural number 0. The term
s(x) will stand for increment of counter x. Finally Run(·) will encode a command to execute one step of the
counter machine.
The rewrite system R consists of the following rewrite rules:
Run(h(q, x, y, w)) → h(q′, s(x), y, w) if (q, q′) ∈ δ1inc.
Run(h(q, x, y, w)) → h(q′, x, s(y), w) if (q, q′) ∈ δ2inc.
Run(h(q, Z, y, w)) → h(q′, Z, y, w) if (q, q′, q′′) ∈ δ1jzdec.
Run(h(q, s(x), y, w))→ h(q′′, x, y, w) if (q, q′, q′′) ∈ δ1jzdec.
Run(h(q, x, Z,w)) → h(q′, x, Z, w) if (q, q′, q′′) ∈ δ2jzdec.
Run(h(q, x, s(y), w))→ h(q′′, x, y, w) if (q, q′, q′′) ∈ δ2jzdec.
R can be shown to be convergent and optimally reducing. Fix a secret name n ∈ N and let ϕ = {w1 7→
h(qs, Z, Z, n) } and let t be h(qf , Z, Z, n). Now, it can be shown that for each configuration (q, i, j) of CM there
is a computation s0, s1, . . . sk such that sk = (q, i, j) iff there is a recipe rq such that ϕ `rq h(q, si(Z), sj(Z), n).
It follows that there is is an recipe r such that ϕ `r t if and only if CM halts.
30
It is shown in [1] that given a signature F and a rewrite system R, the problem of checking whether a
term is deducible from a frame can be reduced to the problem of checking of static equivalence of two frames
by just adding one unary function symbol to the signature, while keeping the same equational rewrite system
R over the extended signature. This yields:
Corollary 1. Given a signature F , an optimally reducing convergent rewrite system R over F , frame ϕ1
and varphi2 that map elements of W to elements of TF,N ,M, the problem of checking whether ϕ1 ≈s ϕ2 is
undecidable.
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B Proof of Theorem 2: Soundness and completeness of the set of seed
Statements
We prove soundness (see Lemma 4 and Proposition 4) and completeness (see Lemma 5) for the set of seed
statements.
Lemma 4 (Soundness of the set of seed statements). Let T be a ground trace. For any statement f
in the set of seed statements seed(T ) we have that T |= f .
Proof. We suppose the same naming conventions for T as in the definition of the set of seed statements (see
Section 4.1). We prove that for each statement f ∈ seed(T ) we have that T |= f . There are four kinds of
seed statements (see Figure 2) which we consider one-by-one.
1. Let m be such that 0 ≤ m ≤ n, let σ and τ be substitutions such that σ ∈ mguR({sk = tk}k∈TestT (m))
and τ ∈ variants(l1σ, . . . , lmσ). We show that
f =
(
(r`1στ↓,...,`mστ↓ ⇐ {k`1στ↓,...,`j−1στ↓(Xj , xjστ↓)}j∈RcvT (m))
)
is a statement that is true in T .
Let ω be an arbitrary substitution grounding for f . Assume furthermore that T |= (k`1στ↓,...,`j−1στ↓(Xj , xjστ↓))ω
for all j ∈ RcvT (m). We show that T |= (r`1στ↓,...,`mστ↓)ω. In fact we will show a stronger statement. In
particular, we show that
T |= (r`1στ↓,...,`pστ↓)ω
for all 0 ≤ p ≤ m. We proceed by induction on p.
Base case: p = 0. We have (r`1στ↓,...,`pστ↓)ω = r. and T |= (r`1στ↓,...,`pστ↓)ω trivially.
Inductive case: p > 0. We assume that T |= (r`1στ↓,...,`p−1στ↓)ω and we show that T |= (r`1στ↓,...,`pστ↓)ω
by case analysis on ap. Before, we do the case analysis, let us first fix some notations.
Let T1 = T and ϕ1 = ϕ. As T |= (r`1στ↓,...,`p−1στ↓)ω, we have that there exist L1, . . . , Lp−1 such that
(Ti, ϕi)
Li−→ (Ti+1, ϕi+1)
and Liϕi =R `iστ↓ω for all 1 ≤ i < p, where Ti = (ai. . . . .an){xj 7→ xjστ↓ω}j∈RcvT (i− 1) and where ϕi
extends ϕi−1 (for all 1 < i ≤ p). We can now do the case analysis.
(a) if ap = out(cp, tp), then `p = out(cp) by definition. Let Tp+1 = (ap+1. . . . .an){xj 7→ xjστ↓ω}j∈RcvT (p)
and let ϕp+1 = ϕp ∪ {wdom(ϕp)+1 7→ tpστ↓ω}. Let Lp = out(cp). By the definition, we have that
(Tp, ϕp)
Lp−−→ (Tp+1, ϕp+1),
which is was we wanted to prove.
(b) if ap = [sp
?
= tp], then `p = test. Let Tp+1 = (ap+1. . . . .an){xj 7→ xjστ↓ω}j∈RcvT (p) and let ϕp+1 =
ϕp.




as we wanted to prove.
(c) If ap = in(cp, xp), we know that p ∈ RcvT (p). Let Tp+1 = (ap+1. . . . .an){xj 7→ xjστ↓ω}j∈RcvT (p)
and let ϕp+1 = ϕp. As p ∈ RcvT (p), we have that T |= (k`1στ↓,...,`p−1στ↓(Xp, xpστ↓))ω (this is an
antecendent of f). Therefore ϕp `Xpω xpστ↓ω and, by letting Lp = in(cp, xpστ↓ω), we obtain by the
definition of −→ that
(Tp, ϕp)
Lp−−→ (Tp+1, ϕp+1),
which is what we wanted to prove.
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We have shown that T |= (r`1στ↓,...,`pστ↓)ω.
2. Let m ∈ SendT (n), σ ∈ mguR({sk = tk}k∈TestT (m)) and τ ∈ variants(tm). We show that the statement
f =
(
(k`1στ↓,...,`mστ↓(w|SendT (m)|, (tmστ) ↓)⇐ {k`1στ↓,...,`j−1στ↓(Xj , xjστ↓)}j∈RcvT (m))
)
holds in T .
Let ω be a substitution grounding for f . We assume that
T |= (k`1στ↓,...,`j−1στ↓(Xj , xjστ↓))ω
for all j ∈ RcvT (m) and we show that T |= (k`1στ↓,...,`mστ↓(w|SendT (m)|, (tmστ) ↓))ω.
Let Ti = (ai. . . . .an){xj 7→ xjστω}j∈RcvT (i−1) and ϕi = ∪1≤j≤|SendT (i−1)|{wj 7→ to(j)στω}, where o(j) =
min{x | |SendT (x)| = j}, i.e. o(j) denotes the index of the jth send action.
We distinguish two cases:
(a) if there exist L1, . . . , Lm such that (T1, ϕ1)
L1−−→ (T2, ϕ2) L2−−→ . . . Lm−−→ (Tm+1, ϕm+1) and Liϕi =R
liστ↓ω for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we have that
ϕm(w|SendT (m)|) = to(|SendT (m)|)στω = tmστω
and we have that ϕ `w|SendT (m)| tmστω and therefore ϕ `w|SendT (m)| (tmστ)↓ω which implies that
T |= (k`1στ↓,...,`mστ↓(w|SendT (m)|, tmστ↓))ω.
(b) otherwise, we trivially have that T |= k`1στ↓,...,`mστ↓(w|SendT (m)|, (tmστ) ↓)ω.
We have shown that T |= f .




trivially holds because ∅ `c c.
4. Let g be a function symbol of arity k and let σ ∈ variants(g(x1, . . . , xk)). We show that the statement
f =
(
k(g(X1, . . . , Xk), g(x1, . . . , xk)σ↓)⇐ {k(Xj , xjσ↓)}j∈{1,...,k}
)
is true in T .
Let ω be an arbitrary substitution grounding for f . We assume that T |= k(Xj , xjσ↓)ω for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k
and we show that
T |= (k(g(X1, . . . , Xk), g(x1, . . . , xk)σ↓))ω.
We have that
∅ `Xjω xjσ↓ω
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k by our hypothesis. But this implies
∅ `g(X1ω,...,Xkω) g(x1σ↓ω, . . . , xkσ↓ω) =R g(x1, . . . , xk)σ↓ω
which immediately implies that T |= (k(g(X1, . . . , Xk), g(x1, . . . , xk)σ↓))ω.
We have shown that T |= f .
We have shown for every statement f ∈ seed(T ) that T |= f . uunionsq
Proposition 4 (Soundness of H( )). Let T be a ground trace and K be a set of statements such that for
all f ∈ K we have that T |= f . Then for all f ∈ H(K) we also have that T |= f .
Proof. The proof of this proposition is a straightforward induction on the size of the smallest proof of
f ∈ H(K).
Base case The proof of f ∈ H(K) is obtained by applying the rule Simple Consequence. We have that
f ′ = (H ⇐ ) ∈ K and f = f ′σ where σ is a substitution grounding for f ′. As f ′ ∈ K, by hypothesis, T |= f ′.
Hence, as all variables in f ′ are universally quantified, T |= f ′σ.
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Inductive case We proceed by case distinction on the last rule which has been applied.
– Simple Consequence: We have that f ′ = (H ⇐ B1 . . . Bn) ∈ K, σ is a substitution grounding for
f ′ such that f = Hσ and Biσ ∈ H(K) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. As H ⇐ B1 . . . Bn ∈ K we have by hypothesis
that T |= H ⇐ B1 . . . Bn and hence T |= (H ⇐ B1 . . . Bn)σ. By induction hypothesis we also have that
T |= Biσ. Hence, we conclude that T |= Hσ.
– ExtendK: We have that ku(R, t) ∈ H(K). By induction hypothesis T |= ku(R, t). It follows from the
semantics of k that T |= kuv(R, t).
Lemma 5 (Completeness of the set of seed statements). Let T and S be traces and let ϕ be a frame.
If (T, ∅) L1,...,Ln−−−−−−→ (S, ϕ) then
(A) rL1ϕ↓,...,Lnϕ↓ ∈ H(seed(T ));
(B) if ϕ `R t then kL1ϕ↓,...,Lnϕ↓(R, t↓) ∈ H(seed(T )).
Proof. We prove the two statements by induction on n. We assume that the two statements hold for any
index less than n and we prove them for n. As (T, ∅) L1,...,Ln−−−−−−→ (S, ϕ), we have that
– there exists ω such that (L1ϕ↓, . . . , Lnϕ↓) = (`1, . . . , `n)ω,
– skω =R tkω for all k ∈ TestT (n).
We prove each of statements in turn:
(A) As skω =R tkω for all k ∈ TestT (n), by the definition of mguR there exists σ ∈ mguR({sk ?= tk}k∈TestT (n))
such that:
(a) dom(σ) ⊆ X,
(b) skσ =R tkσ for all k ∈ TestT (n) and
(c) ω[X] =R (σpi)[X] for some substitution pi
where X = vars({sk, tk}k∈TestT (n)).
It follows that (`1, . . . , `n)ω↓ = (`1, . . . , `n)σpi↓ for some substitution pi. By the definition of variants((`1, . . . , `n)σ),
there exists τ ∈ variants((`1, . . . , `n)σ) such that (`1, . . . , `n)σpi↓ = (`1, . . . , `n)στ↓τ ′ for some substitu-
tion τ ′. By the definition of seed(T ), we have that
f =
(
r`1στ↓,...,`nστ↓ ⇐ k`1στ↓,...,`j−1στ↓(Xj , xjστ↓)j∈RcvT (n)
)
∈ seed(T ).
Let τ ′′ be the substitution that extends τ ′ by {Xj 7→ Rj}j∈RcvT (n) where Rj are recipes for xjω.
We have by the induction hypothesis that each antecedent of fτ ′′ is in H(seed(T )). Therefore
r`1στ↓τ ′′,...,`nστ↓τ ′′ = r`1στ↓τ ′,...,`nστ↓τ ′ ∈ H(seed(T )).
(B) By induction on R, we show that:
kL1ϕ↓,...,Lnϕ↓(R,Rϕ↓) ∈ H(seed(T ))




is in the set of seed state-
ments by definition, we have that k(R,Rϕ↓) = k(c, c) ∈ H(seed(T )) by definition and therefore
kL1ϕ↓,...,Lnϕ↓(R,Rϕ↓) ∈ H(seed(T )) by the ExtendK rule.
(b) If R = wj , let m be the smallest index such that |SendT (m)| = j (i.e. m is the index of the action am
that output the content of wj) and let tm be the term such that am = out(c, tm) for some channel
c.
As for item A, we choose σ ∈ mguR({sk ?= tk}k∈TestT (m)) such that (`1, . . . , `n)ω↓ = (`1, . . . , `n)σpi↓
for some substitution pi. Let τ ∈ variants((`1, . . . , `m, tm)σ) and τ ′ be substitutions such that
(`1, . . . , `m, tm)ω = (`1, . . . , `m, tm)στ↓τ ′.
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We have by the definition of the seed knowledge base that
h =
(
k`1στ↓,...,`mστ↓(wj , tmστ↓)⇐ {k`1στ↓,...,`k−1στ↓(Xk, xkστ↓)}k∈RcvT (m)
)
∈ seed(T ).
For k ∈ RcvT (m) we let Rk be recipes of xkστ↓τ ′ =R xkω in the smallest possible prefix of ϕ. Let
τ ′′ = τ ′ ∪ {Xk 7→ Rk}k∈RcvT (m). We have that the antecedents of hτ ′′ are in H(seed(T )) by the
induction hypothesis. Therefore
k`1στ↓τ ′′,...,`mστ↓τ ′′(wj , tmστ↓τ ′′)
= k`1στ↓τ ′,...,`mστ↓τ ′(wj , tmστ↓τ ′)
= k`1ω↓,...,`mω↓(wj , tmω↓) ∈ H(seed(T )).
But (`1, . . . , `m)ω↓ is a prefix of w = (`1, . . . , `n)ω↓ and therefore by theExtendK rule kw(wj , tmω↓) =
kw(Rj , Rjϕ↓) ∈ H(seed(T )), which is what we had to prove.
(c) If R = f(R1, . . . , Rk), let τ ∈ variants(f(y1, . . . , yk)) and τ ′ be such that Rϕ↓ = (f(y1, . . . , yk)τ)↓τ ′.
By the definition of the seed knowledge base, we have that the statement
g =
(
k`1,...,`n(f(Y1, . . . , Yk), f(y1, . . . , yk)τ↓)⇐ {k`1,...,`n(Yj , yjτ↓)}j∈{1,...,k}
)
∈ seed(T ).
Let τ ′′ = ω ∪ τ ′ ∪ {Yj 7→ Rj}j∈{1,...,k}. We have that all antecedents of gτ ′′ are in H(seed(T )) by
the induction hypothesis. Therefore, the head of gτ ′′ is also in H(seed(T )).
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C Soundness and completeness of saturation: Proof of Theorem 3
C.1 Soundness of saturation
In this section, we prove the soundness part of Theorem 3. Soundness is an immediate consequence of
Lemma 6, Lemma 8, Lemma 12, Lemma 9, Lemma 10, Lemma 11 and Lemma 13 proved below.
Lemma 6 (Soundness of canonicalization). Let T be a ground trace. If T |= f then T |= f⇓.
Proof. We will show that each canonicalization rule is sound:
1. For the Rename rule, consider a statement
f =
(
H ⇐ kt1,...,tk(X,x), kt1,...,tl(Y, x), B1, . . . , Bn
)
where k ≤ l and we show that if T |= f then T |= g where
g =
(
(H ⇐ kt1,...,tk(X,x), B1, . . . , Bn){Y 7→ X}
)
Let τ be a grounding substitution for g such that T |= kt1,...,tk(X,x){Y 7→ X}τ ,B1{Y 7→ X}τ, . . . , Bn{Y 7→
X}τ . We show that if T |= f then T |= H{Y 7→ X}τ .
Let τ ′ be a substitution identical to τ , except for τ ′(Y ) = τ(X). We will show that all the antecedents
in fτ ′ are true in T .
Indeed, kt1,...,tk(X,x)τ
′ = kt1,...,tk(X,x){Y 7→ X}τ holds by hypothesis. As k ≤ l and T |= kt1,...,tk(X,x)τ ′,
we also have that T |= kt1,...,tl(X,x)τ ′ = kt1,...,tl(Y, x)τ ′. Furthermore T |= B1τ ′ = B1{Y 7→ X}τ, . . . , Bnτ ′ =
Bn{Y 7→ X}τ by hypothesis. As T |= f , and all antecedents of fτ ′ are true in T , we obtain that T |= Hτ ′.
But Hτ ′ = H{Y 7→ X}τ and therefore we have that T |= H{Y 7→ X}τ . As we have chosen τ arbitrarily,
it follows that T |= g.
2. For the Remove rule, consider a solved statement
f =
(
H ⇐ kt1,...,tk(X,x), B1, . . . , Bn
)
such that the rule Rename does not apply to f and such that x 6∈ vars(H). We show that if T |= f then
T |= g where
g =
(
H ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
)
Let τ be an arbitrary substitution such that T |= B1τ, . . . , Bnτ . We will show that T |= Hτ and hence
T |= g.
Let (T1, ϕ1) = (T, ∅). We distinguish between two cases:
(a) If (T1, ϕ1)
L1−−→ (T2, ϕ2) L2−−→ . . . Lk−−→ (Tk+1, ϕk+1) such that Liϕi = tiτ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, we consider
the substitution τ ′ to be identical to τ except for τ ′(x) = (Xτ)ϕk+1.
As x 6∈ vars(H) and because f is solved and the rule Rename does not apply, we have that x 6∈
vars(B1, . . . , Bn) and therefore T |= B1τ ′ = B1τ, . . . , Bnτ ′ = Bnτ .
Furthermore, we have that T |= kt1,...,tk(X,x)τ ′ by the definition of k.
As all antecedents of fτ ′ are true in T and T |= f , it follows that T |= Hτ ′. But Hτ = Hτ ′ since
x 6∈ vars(H) and therefore T |= Hτ .
(b) Otherwise, we trivially have that T |= kt1,...,tk(X,x)τ . We have that all antecedents of fτ are true
in T and therefore, as T |= f , it follows that T |= Hτ .
We have shown that T |= g, therefore the rule Remove is sound.
We have shown that both rules for computing the canonical form are sound and therefore T |= f⇓
whenever T |= f . uunionsq
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Lemma 7 (Monotonicity of k). Let T be a ground trace. If T |= ku(R, t) then T |= kuv(R, t).
Proof. Immediate by the semantics of k.
Lemma 8 (Soundness of the consequence). Let T be a ground trace and K a knowledge base. If for all
f ∈ K we have that T |= f , then for all f ∈ conseq(K) we have that T |= f .
Proof. We show that both inference rules are sound.
For the Axiom rule, soundness follows immediately from Lemma 7.
For the Res rule, let f =
(




Biσ ⇐ C1, . . . , Cm
)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n be
statements such that T |= f and T |= gi (1 ≤ i ≤ n). We will show that T |=
(
ku(R, t)σ ⇐ C1, . . . , Cm)
by letting τ be a substitution such that T |= C1τ, . . . , Cmτ and proving that T |= ku(R, t)στ . Indeed, as
T |= C1τ, . . . , Cmτ and as T |= gi (1 ≤ i ≤ n), we have that T |= Biστ (1 ≤ i ≤ n). But T |= f and therefore
T |= ku(R, t)στ as well. By monotonicity of k (Lemma 7) we conclude that T |= kuv(R, t)στ .
Lemma 9 (Soundness of the Resolution saturation rule). Let T be a ground trace and f , g and h be
defined as in the Resolution rule. If T |= f and T |= g then T |= h.
Proof. We consider the following statements:
f =
(









(H ⇐ B1, . . . , Bm)σ
)
with j ≤ i and where σ = mgu(k`′1,...,`′j (R, t′), k`1,...,`j (X, t)). We will show that if T |= f and T |= g then
T |= h.
Indeed, let τ be an arbitrary substitution grounding for h and assume that T |= B1στ, . . . , Bmστ . We will
show that T |= Hστ . As T |= Bn+1στ, . . . , Bmστ and because T |= g, we have that T |= k`′1,...,`′j (R, t′)στ .
But k`′1,...,`′j (R, t
′)στ = k`1,...,`j (X, t)στ as σ = mgu(k`′1,...,`′j (R, t
′), k`1,...,`j (X, t)). As j ≤ i, it follows by
Lemma 7 that T |= k`1,...,`i(X, t)στ as well. As all antecedents of fστ are true in T and because T |= f , we
have that T |= Hστ . As τ was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that T |= h. uunionsq
Lemma 10 (Soundness of the Equation saturation rule). Let T be a ground trace and f , g and h be
defined as in the Equation rule. If T |= f and T |= g then T |= h.
Proof. We consider the following statements:
f =
(










′)⇐ B1, . . . , Bm)σ
)
where σ = mgu(ku(R, t), ku′(R, t
′)).
We will show that if T |= f and T |= g then T |= h. Let τ be an arbitrary substitution grounding for h.
We assume that T |= B1στ, . . . , Bmστ and we show that T |= iu′v′(R,R′)στ . As T |= B1στ, . . . , Bnστ
and because T |= f we have that T |= ku(R, t)στ . But ku(R, t)στ = ku′(R, t′)στ by choice of σ =
mgu(ku(R, t), ku′(R, t
′)) and therefore T |= ku′(R, t′)στ . By monotonicity of k (Lemma 7) we also have that
T |= ku′v′(R, t′)στ . As T |= Bn+1στ . . . , Bmστ and because T |= g we also obtain that T |= ku′v′(R′, t′)στ .
As T |= ku′v′(R, t′)στ and T |= ku′v′(R′, t′)στ , we have by definition that T |= iu′v′(R,R′)στ .
We have shown that the head of hτ is true in T . As τ was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that h holds in
T . uunionsq
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Lemma 11 (Soundness of the Test saturation rule). Let T be a ground trace and f, g, h be statements
as in the Test saturation rule. If T |= f and T |= g then T |= h.













′)⇐ B1, . . . , Bm)σ
)
where σ = mgu(u, u′).
Let τ be an arbitrary substitution grounding for h. We assume that T |= B1στ, . . . , Bmστ and we show
that T |= riu(R,R′)τ . Indeed, as T |= B1στ, . . . , Bnστ and as T |= f , we have that T |= iu(R,R′)στ . As
T |= Bn+1στ, . . . , Bmστ and as T |= g, we have that T |= ru′v′στ .
But σ = mgu(u, u′) and therefore uστ = u′στ . Hence, we immediately obtain T |= riu′v′(R,R′)στ , which
is what we wanted. As τ was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that T |= h.
Lemma 12 (Soundness of the update). Let T be a ground trace and K a knowledge base. If for all
f ∈ K we have that T |= f and if T |= g, then for any f ∈ (K ⊕ g) we have that T |= f .
Proof. If K ⊕ g = K ∪ {g⇓}, we immediately conclude by Lemma 8. Otherwise, it must be that
g⇓ =
(
k`1,...,`k(R, t)⇐ k`1,...,`i1 (X1, x1), . . . , k`1,...,`in (Xn, xn)
)










′, t)⇐ k`1,...,`i1 (X1, x1), . . . , k`1,...,`in (Xn, xn)
)
∈ conseq(Ksolved).
It is sufficient to show that T |= h. As Ksolved ⊆ K, it immediately follows that g′ ∈ conseq(K) and, by
Lemma 8, T |= g′. We now show that T |= h. Let τ be an arbitrary substitution grounding for h such that the
antecedents of hτ are true in T . As the antecedents of hτ are the same as the antecedents of g⇓τ and those
of g′τ , and as T |= g↓ (by Lemma 6) and T |= g′ we have that T |= k`1,...,`k(R, t)τ and T |= k`1,...,`k(R′, t)τ .
But this immediately implies that T |= i`1,...,`k(R,R′)τ (the head of hτ). As τ was chosen arbitrarily, it
follows that T |= h. uunionsq
Lemma 13. Let T be a ground trace and K a knowledge base such that for all f ∈ K we have that T |= f .
Then for all H ∈ He(K) we also have that T |= H.
Proof. This result is proved by structural induction on the proof tree witnessing the fact that H ∈ He(K).
uunionsq
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C.2 Completeness of saturation
In this section, we prove the completeness part of Theorem 3. The first two items of the completeness are
immediate consequences of Theorem 2 and Lemma 20 proved below. The third item follows from the second
item, direct applications of the definition of He, Corollary 2 (proved below) and applications of the Sym and
Tran rules.
Proposition 5. Let K be a knowledge base, f =
(
kuv(R, t) ⇐ C1, . . . , Cm
)
a statement such that f ∈
conseq(K) and τ a substitution that is grounding for f such that Ciτ ∈ H(K) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then
kuv(R, t)τ ∈ H(K).
Proof. By induction on the proof tree of f ∈ conseq(K).
– If the Axiom rule was used, we have that Ci = ku(R, t) for some i and, by hypothesis, Ciτ ∈ H(K). We
conclude using the ExtendK rule.
– If the Res rule was used, we have that there exists
(
ku′(R
′, t′) ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
)
∈ K and a substitu-
tion σ such that ku(R, t) = ku′(R
′, t′)σ and Biσ ⇐ C1, . . . , Cm ∈ conseq(K) (1 ≤ i ≤ n). By the
induction hypothesis, we have that Biστ ∈ H(K). As
(
ku′(R
′, t′) ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
)
∈ K, it follows that
ku′(R
′, t′)στ = ku(R, t)τ ∈ H(K). We conclude using the ExtendK rule.
Proposition 6. Let K be a knowledge base. If kw(R, t) ∈ He(K) and iw(R,R′) ∈ He(K), then kw(R′, t) ∈
He(K).
Proof. As kw(R, t) ∈ He(K), we claim that there exist R′′ such that
kw(R
′′, t) ∈ H(K) (26)
and such that iw(R,R
′′) ∈ He(K). This can be shown as follows. There are two possible ways to conclude
that kw(R, t) ∈ He(K):
1. kw(R, t) ∈ H(K) itself. In that case we can take R” to be R itself. Note that iw(R,R) ∈ He(K) thanks
to the Refl rule.
2. The fact that kw(R, t) ∈ H(K) is derived using Equational Consequence rule. In this case, the claim
follows from the definition of the Equational Consequence rule.
But iw(R,R
′) ∈ He(K) and therefore, by the symmetry and transitivity of iw( , ), we have that
iw(R
′′, R′) ∈ He(K). (27)
Using Equations 26 and 27, we immediately obtain by the definition of He that kw(R′, T ) ∈ He(K).
Definition 21. When H ∈ H(K) we define S(H,K) to be the size of the smallest proof tree of H ∈ H(K).
Definition 22. We write w v w′ whenever w is a prefix of w′: i.e. there exists `1, . . . , `n such that w′ =
`1, . . . , `n and w = `1, . . . , `m for some 0 ≤ m ≤ n.
Proposition 7. Let K be a knowledge base. If kw(R, t) ∈ H(K) (resp. iw(R,S) ∈ H(K)) then there exist
a statement f =
(
kw′(R
′, t′) ⇐ B1, . . . , Bm
)
∈ K (resp. f =
(
iw′(R
′, S′) ⇐ B1, . . . , Bm
)
∈ K) and a
substitution σ such that R′σ = R, t′σ = t (resp. S′σ = S), w′σ v w, Biσ ∈ H(K) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m and∑
1≤i≤m S(Biσ,K) < S(kw(R, t),K).
Proof. We prove the proposition by induction on the smallest proof tree of H = kw(R, t) ∈ H(K) (resp.
H = iw(R,S) ∈ H(K)). We proceed by case distinction on the last proof rule that has been applied.
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– Simple Consequence: In this case we have that there exist a statement f =
(
H ′ ⇐ B1, . . . , Bm
)
∈ K
and a substitution σ such that H ′σ = H, Biσ ∈ H(K) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m and
∑
1≤i≤m S(Biσ,K) + 1 =
S(kw′(R′, t′)σ,K). Hence we directly conclude.
– ExtendK: In this case H = kw(R, t) and we have that w = uv for some u, v and ku(R, t) ∈ H(K).
By induction hypothesis, we have that there exists f = ku′(R
′, t′) ⇐ B1, . . . , Bm ∈ K and σ such that
R′σ = R, t′σ = t, u′σ v u, Biσ ∈ H(K) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m and
∑
1≤i≤m S(Biσ,K) < S(kw(R, t),K).
As u v w, we also have that u′σ v w. Moreover, S(kw(R, t) ∈ H(K)) = S(ku(R, t) ∈ H(K)) + 1
>
∑
1≤i≤m S(Biσ,K) which allows us to conclude.
Lemma 14. Let K be a saturated knowledge base and f ∈ K be a statement
f =
(
H ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
)
where H is either iw(R,R
′), riw(R,R′) or rw. If σ is a substitution grounding for f such that Biσ ∈ H(Ksolved)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n then we have that
Hσ ∈ H(Ksolved).
Proof. We prove the lemma for the case where H = iw(R,R
′). The proof for the two other cases is similar.
Let G = ∑i∈{1,...,n} S(Biσ,Ksolved). We prove the lemma by induction on G. If f is a solved statement, the
conclusion is immediate by the definition of H.
Otherwise, if f is not a solved statement, there exists some Bj (1 ≤ j ≤ n) such that Bj = kwj (Xj , tj)
and tj 6∈ X .







j)⇐ Bn+1, . . . , Bm
)
∈ Ksolved
and a substitution σ′ grounding for g such that Bn+1σ′, . . . , Bmσ′ ∈ H(Ksolved), R′jσ′ = Xjσ, t′jσ′ = tjσ,
u′jσ
′ = ujσ and S(Bjσ) >
∑
i∈{n+1,...,m} S(Biσ′).
As ω = σ ∪ σ′ is a unifier of H ′ = ku′j (R′j , t′j) and kuj (Xj , tj), it follows that the two terms are unifiable.
Let τ = mgu(H ′, kuj (Xj , tj)) denote their most general unifier. As K is saturated, it follows that the




′)⇐ B1, . . . , Bj−1, Bj+1, . . . , Bm
)
τ
must be in K (by the update function, equational statements are added to the knowledge base).
As ω is a unifier of H ′ and kuj (Xj , tj) and as τ = mgu(H
′, kuj (Xj , tj)), it follows that there exists ω
′
such that ω = τω′. We have that ω′ is a substitution grounding for h, that
Biτω
′ ∈ H(Ksolved)
for i ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1, j + 1, . . . ,m} and that ∑i∈{1,...,j−1,j+1,...,m} S(Biτω′) ≤ G − 1.
Therefore we can apply the induction hypothesis to h and ω′ and conclude.
Lemma 15. Let K be a saturated knowledge base. If ru ∈ H(Ksolved), iu′(R,R′) ∈ H(Ksolved) and u′ v u,
then riu(R,R
′) ∈ H(Ksolved).
Proof. As ru ∈ H(Ksolved), there exists a solved statement f =
(
rv ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
)
∈ Ksolved and a substitu-
tion σ grounding for f such that Biσ ∈ H(Ksolved) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and such that u = vσ.
As iu′(R,R
′) ∈ H(Ksolved), there exists by Proposition 7 a solved statement g =
(
iw(T, T
′)⇐ Bn+1, . . . , Bm
)
and a substitution τ grounding for g such that Biτ ∈ H(Ksolved) for all n + 1 ≤ i ≤ m and such that
u w u′ w wτ , R = Tτ and R′ = T ′τ .
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As vσ = u w wτ , it follows that v = v0v1 such that v0 and w are unifiable (σ ∪ τ is such a unifier). Let
ω = mgu(v0, w) and let pi be such that σ ∪ τ = ωpi.
As the knowledge base is saturated, the Test saturation rule must have fired for f and g and therefore




′)⇐ B1, . . . , Bm)ω
)
.
But as h is not a deduction statement, the update must have simply added h to K and therefore h ∈ K.
We have that Biωpi = Biσ ∈ H(Ksolved) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and that Biωpi = Biτ ∈ H(Ksolved) for
all n + 1 ≤ i ≤ m. By applying Lemma 14 to the statement h and the substitution pi, we obtain that
riv(T, T
′)ωpi = riu(R,R′) ∈ H(Ksolved). uunionsq
Lemma 16. Let K be a saturated knowledge base. If ku(R, t) ∈ H(Ksolved) and kuv(R′, t) ∈ H(Ksolved) then
iw(R,R
′) ∈ H(Ksolved) for some w v uv.




kw(S, s)⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
)
∈ Ksolved
and a substitution σ grounding for f such that Biσ ∈ H(Ksolved) (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and kw(S, s)σ = ku′(R, t) for
some u′ v u a prefix of u.
Similarly, as kuv(R




′, s′)⇐ B′1, . . . , B′m
)
∈ Ksolved
and a substitution σ′ grounding for f ′ such that B′iσ ∈ H(Ksolved) (1 ≤ i ≤ m) and kw′(S′, s′)σ′ = ku′′(R′, t)
for u′′ v uv a prefix of uv.
We have that wσ v u, which trivially implies wσ v uv. We also have w′σ′ v uv. Let w = `′1, . . . , `′p and
w′ = `′′1 , . . . , `
′′
q . Suppose q ≤ p, the other case being symmetric. We have that (`′1, . . . , `′q)σ = (`′′1 , . . . , `′′q )σ′.
We have that σ∪σ′ is a unifier of k`′1,...,`′q ( , s) and k`′′1 ,...,`′′q ( , s′), it follows that τ = mgu(k`′1,...,`′q ( , s), k`′′1 ,...,`′′q ( , s′))




′)⇐ B1, . . . , Bn, B′1, . . . , B′m
)
τ ∈ K
resulting from applying the Equation saturation rule to f and f ′ is in K (Note that since h is an equational
statement, h⇓ = h).
As σ ∪ σ′ is a unifier of k`′1,...,`′q ( , s) and k`′′1 ,...,`′′q ( , s′) and as τ = mgu(k`′1,...,`′q ( , s), k`′′1 ,...,`′′q ( , s′)), it
follows that there exists ω such that σ ∪ σ′ = τω.
We have that ω is grounding for h and that B1τω, . . . , Bnτω,B
′
1τω, . . . , B
′
mτω ∈ H(Ksolved). Therefore,




As (`′1, . . . , `
′
p)σ is a prefix of uv we conclude.
Corollary 2. Let K be a saturated knowledge base. If ku(R, t) ∈ H(Ksolved) and kuv(R′, t) ∈ H(Ksolved) then
iuv(R,R
′) ∈ He(Ksolved).
Proof. The corollary follows from Lemma 16 by the Extend rule of the definition of He.
Lemma 17. Let K be a saturated knowledge base, let
f =
(
kw(R, t)⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
)
be a statement such that f⇓ ∈ Ksolved and let σ be a substitution grounding for f such that Biσ ∈ H(Ksolved)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then we have that
(kw(R, t))σ ∈ He(Ksolved).
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Proof. We prove this by induction on the number of canonicalization steps.
If f is already in canonical form, then the conclusion is immediately true by definition of H. Otherwise,
there must be a canonicalization rule which can be applied to f . We distinguish between two cases:
1. If the Rename canonicalization rule can be applied, then f must be of the form:
f =
(
kw(R, t)⇐ ku(X,x), kuv(Y, x), B3, . . . , Bn
)
.
Let us consider the statement f ′ obtained by applying Rename to f :
f ′ =
(
kw(R, t)⇐ ku(X,x), B3, . . . Bn
)
{Y 7→ X}.
By the definition of a statement, Y has at most one occurence in B1, . . . , Bn and therefore we have that
(B1, B3, . . . Bn){Y 7→ X} = (B1, B3, . . . , Bn). Therefore (B1, B3, . . . Bn){Y 7→ X}σ = (B1, B3, . . . , Bn)σ.
We can therefore apply the induction hypothesis on f ′ and σ to obtain that
kw(R, t){Y 7→ X}σ ∈ He(Ksolved). (28)
But ku(X,x)σ ∈ H(Ksolved) and kuv(Y, x)σ ∈ H(Ksolved). By Corollary 2, we have that
iuv(X,Y )σ ∈ He(Ksolved). (29)
From Equation 28 and Equation 29 and as uv is a prefix of w by the definition of a statement, we
conclude by Proposition 6 that
kw(R, t)σ ∈ He(Ksolved).
2. If the Remove canonicalization rule can be applied, then f must be of the form:
f =
(
kw(R, t)⇐ ku(X,x), B2, . . . , Bn
)
.
Let f ′ be the statement obtained from f by applying Remove. We have that
f ′ =
(
kw(R, t)⇐ B2, . . . , Bn
)
.
By applying the induction hypothesis on f ′ and σ, we immediately obtain our conclusion:
kw(R, t)σ ∈ He(Ksolved).
Lemma 18. Let K be a saturated knowledge base, let
f =
(
kw(R, t)⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
)
be a statement such that f⇓ =
(
kw(R
′, t) ⇐ C1, . . . , Cm
)












′′, R′)⇐ C1, . . . , Cm
)
∈ Ksolved.
Let σ be a substitution grounding for f such that Biσ ∈ H(Ksolved) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then we have that
(kw(R, t))σ ∈ He(Ksolved).
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Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the number of steps to reach the canonical form.
If f is already in canonical form we have that B1, . . . , Bn = C1, . . . , Cm and, by applying Proposition 5
to g and σ, we have that
kw(R
′, t)σ ∈ H(Ksolved).
Furthermore, as h ∈ Ksolved and as all antecedents B1σ, . . . , Bnσ = C1σ, . . . , Cmσ of hσ are in H(Ksolved), we
have that
iw(R
′′, R′)σ ∈ H(Ksolved).
It immediately follows that
kw(R
′′, t)σ ∈ He(Ksolved),
which is what we had the prove.
Otherwise, there must be a canonicalization rule which can be applied to f . We distinguish between two
cases:
1. If the Rename canonicalization rule can be applied, then f must be of the form:
f =
(
kw(R, t)⇐ ku(X,x), kuv(Y, x), B3, . . . , Bn
)
.
Let us consider the statement f ′ obtained by applying Rename to f :
f ′ =
(
kw(R, t)⇐ ku(X,x), B3, . . . Bn
)
{Y 7→ X}.
By the definition of a statement, Y has at most one occurence in B1, . . . , Bn and therefore we have that
(B1, B3, . . . Bn){Y 7→ X} = (B1, B3, . . . , Bn). Therefore (B1, B3, . . . Bn){Y 7→ X}σ = (B1, B3, . . . , Bn)σ.
We can therefore apply the induction hypothesis on f ′ and σ to obtain that
kw(R, t){Y 7→ X}σ ∈ He(Ksolved). (30)
But ku(X,x)σ ∈ H(Ksolved) and kuv(Y, x)σ ∈ H(Ksolved). By Corollary 2, we have that
iuv(X,Y )σ ∈ H(Ksolved). (31)
From Equation 30 and Equation 31 and as uv is a prefix of w by the definition of a statement, we
conclude by Proposition 6 that
kw(R, t)σ ∈ He(Ksolved).
2. If the Remove canonicalization rule can be applied, then f must be of the form:
f =
(
kw(R, t)⇐ ku(X,x), B2, . . . , Bn
)
.
Let f ′ be the statement obtained from f by applying Remove. We have that
f ′ =
(
kw(R, t)⇐ B2, . . . , Bn
)
.
By applying the induction hypothesis on f ′ and σ, we immediately obtain our conclusion:
kw(R, t)σ ∈ He(Ksolved).
Lemma 19. Let K be a saturated knowledge base, let f ∈ K be a statement
f =
(
kw(R, t)⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
)
and let σ be a substitution grounding for f such that Biσ ∈ H(Ksolved) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then we have that
(kw(R, t))σ ∈ He(Ksolved).
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Proof. Let G = ∑i∈{1,...,n} S(Biσ,Ksolved). We prove the lemma by induction on G.
If f is a solved statement, the conclusion is trivial by the definitions of H, He.
Otherwise, there exists some Bj = kwj (Xj , tj) (with 1 ≤ j ≤ n) such that tj 6∈ X .




′, t′)⇐ B′1, . . . , B′m
)
∈ Ksolved,
a substitution σ′ grounding for g such that B′1σ
′, . . . , B′mσ
′ ∈ H(Ksolved), ku′(R′, t′)σ′ = ku(Xj , tj)σ for some
prefix u v wj of wj and S(Bjσ,Ksolved) >
∑
i∈{1,...,m} S(B′iσ′,Ksolved).
As σ ∪ σ′ is a unifier of ku(Xj , tj) and ku′(R′, t′), it follows that τ = mgu(ku(Xj , tj), ku′(R′, t′)) exists.
The substitution σ ∪ σ′ must be an instance of the most general unifier τ . Hence is a substitution ω such
that σ ∪ σ′ = τω.




kw(R, t)⇐ B1, . . . , Bj−1, Bj+1, . . . , Bn, B′1, . . . , B′m
)
τ.
We distinguish two cases:
1. if h is not solved we have that h ∈ K by the update function (as K is saturated).
We can therefore apply the induction hypothesis on h and on the substitution ω to immediately conclude.
2. if h is solved, we distinguish two cases:
(a) either h⇓ ∈ K, in which case we conclude by applying Lemma 17 to h and ω.
(b) or h⇓ =
(
kw(R













′′′, R′′)⇐ C1, . . . , Ck
)
∈ Ksolved
for some R′′′, in which case we conclude by applying Lemma 18.
Proposition 8. If ku(R, t) ∈ He(K) then kuv(R, t) ∈ He(K).
Proof. As ku(R, t) ∈ He(K), it follows that ku(R′, t) ∈ H(K) and iu(R′, R) ∈ He(K) for some R′. By the
ExtendK rule, we have that kuv(R
′, t) ∈ H(K) and by the Extend rule, we have that iuv(R′, R) ∈ He(K).
We conclude by rule Equational Consequence that kuv(R, t) ∈ He(K), which is what we had to show.
Lemma 20. Let S be a set of seed statements and let K = sat(Ki(S)). Then H(S) ⊆ He(Ksolved).
Proof. Let H ∈ H(S). We will prove by induction on the proof tree of H ∈ H(S) that each node of the tree
is in He(Ksolved). We proceed by case distinction on the last rule that has been applied to derive H.
1. ExtendK: we have that H = kw(R, t) and ku(R, t) ∈ H(S) for some prefix u of w, in which case by the
induction hypothesis we have that ku(R, t) ∈ He(Ksolved) and we conclude by Proposition 8.
2. Simple Consequence: there is a statement
f =
(
H ′ ⇐ B′1, . . . , B′n
)
∈ S
and a substitution σ grounding for f such that H = H ′σ and B′iσ ∈ H(S).
By the induction hypothesis, we have that B′iσ ∈ He(Ksolved). W.l.o.g. assume that B′i = kw′i(Xi, t′i). As
B′iσ ∈ He(Ksolved), we have by definition of He that there exist R′i such that
kw′iσ(R
′




i, Xiσ) ∈ He(Ksolved) (33)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
But w′iσ is a prefix of w, where w is such that H = predicatew(. . .) with predicate ∈ {r, k}. Note that




i, Xiσ) ∈ He(Ssolved). (34)
Let σ′ be the substitution defined to be σ except that it maps Xi to R′i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
We will show that H ′σ′ ∈ He(Ksolved). As K was updated by f , there are three cases:
(a) if f ∈ K, we conclude by Lemma 19 or Lemma 14 (depending on the predicate). Moreover, when
predicate = r, we use the fact that H(Ksolved) ⊆ He(Ksolved).
(b) if f⇓ ∈ K and f 6∈ K, in which case f must be a solved deduction statement. In this case, by
Lemma 17, we obtain that H ′σ′ ∈ He(Ksolved).
(c) if f⇓ =
(
kw(R, t)⇐ C1, . . . , Cm
)
and there exists R′ such that(
kw(R
′, t)⇐ C1, . . . , Cm
)
∈ conseq(Ksolved)
and such that (
iw(R,R
′)⇐ C1, . . . , Cm
)
∈ Ksolved.
In this case, we have that H ′σ′ ∈ He(Ksolved) by Lemma 18.
We have shown that H ′σ′ ∈ He(Ksolved). We distinguish several cases depending on predicate:
– predicate = r: In such a case, we have that H ′σ′ = H ′σ = H and we easily conclude.
– predicate = k: In such a case, we have that H ′σ′ = kw(R1σ′, tσ′) for some R1.
We claim that iw(R
1σ,R1σ′) ∈ He(Ksolved). In fact, we claim that for anyR0, we have that iw(R0σ,R0σ′) ∈
He(Ksolved). The proof is by induction on the structure of R0 :
• R0 is a name. Now R1σ = Rσ′ and the claim follows from Refl rule.
• R0 is a variable. There are two sub-cases. The first is that R0 is Xi for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In this
case, the claim follows from Equation 34. The second sub-case is that R0 6= Xi for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
The claim follows from Refl rule.






′) ∈ He(Ksolved) for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m. The claim now follows by Cong
rule.
Since kw(R
1σ′, tσ′) ∈ He(Ksolved) and tσ = tσ′, using Proposition 6, we conclude that kw(R1σ, tσ) ∈
He(Ksolved).
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D Effectiveness of the procedure
D.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We let ⇒ denote the saturation relation. We let ⇒= denote the reflexive closure of ⇒.
Lemma 21. Let K be a knowledge base and M0 ⊆M a set of public names such that names(K) ∩M0 =
∅. Let K1 ⊆ KM0,R where R is the set of solved reach statements in K. If h is a statement such that
names(h) ∩M0 = ∅, then
(K unionmultiK1)⊕ h = (K ⊕ h) unionmultiK1.
Proof. If h is not solved or if it is not a deduction statement, we have that (K unionmultiK1)⊕h = (K unionmultiK1)∪{h} =
(K ∪ {h}) unionmultiK1 = (K ⊕ h) unionmultiK1. If h is a solved deduction statement, let
h⇓ = k`1,...,`k(R, t)⇐ k`1,...,`i1 (X1, x1), . . . , k`1,...,`in (Xn, xn).
We distinguish two cases:
1. either k`1,...,`k(R
′, t) ⇐ k`1,...,`i1 (X1, x1), . . . , k`1,...,`in (Xn, xn) 6∈ conseq((K unionmulti K1)solved) for any R′, in
which case
(K unionmultiK1)⊕ h = (K unionmultiK1) ∪ {h⇓} = (K ∪ {h⇓}) unionmultiK1.
It follows that k`1,...,`k(R
′, t) ⇐ k`1,...,`i1 (X1, x1), . . . , k`1,...,`in (Xn, xn) 6∈ conseq(Ksolved) for any R′
either (since K ⊆ K unionmulti K1). Therefore K ⊕ h = K ∪ {h⇓} and we immediately conclude by replacing
K ∪ {h⇓} by K ⊕ h in the equation above.
2. or k`1,...,`k(R
′, t)⇐ k`1,...,`i1 (X1, x1), . . . , k`1,...,`in (Xn, xn) ∈ conseq((K unionmultiK1)solved) for some R′. In this




′)⇐ {k`1,...,`ij (Xj , xj)}j∈{1,...,n}
)
}.
To conclude we show the following claim.
If names(t) ∩M0 = ∅ and
k`1,...,`k(R
′, t)⇐ k`1,...,`i1 (X1, x1), . . . , k`1,...,`in (Xn, xn) ∈ conseq((K unionmultiK1)solved)
then
k`1,...,`k(R
′, t)⇐ k`1,...,`i1 (X1, x1), . . . , k`1,...,`in (Xn, xn) ∈ conseq(Ksolved)
To proof this claim we proceed by induction on the size of the proof tree of
k`1,...,`k(R
′, t)⇐ k`1,...,`i1 (X1, x1), . . . , k`1,...,`in (Xn, xn) ∈ conseq((K unionmultiK1)solved).
Base case: we need to consider two cases according to which rule has been applied.
– Axiom: the rule does not depend on the knowledge base and we trivially conclude.
– Res: we have that n = 0, i.e., H ⇐ ∈ (K∪K1)solved and Hσ = k`1,...,`k(R′, t). As names(t)∩M0 = ∅
we have that H ⇐ ∈ Ksolved. Hence, k`1,...,`k(R′, t) ∈ conseq(Ksolved).
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Inductive case: We suppose that the proof ends with an application of the Res rule. We have that
H ⇐ B1, . . . , Bm ∈ (K ∪ K1)solved, Biσ ⇐ k`1,...,`i1 (X1, x1), . . . , k`1,...,`in (Xn, xn) ∈ conseq((K unionmulti
K1)solved) and Hσ = k`1,...,`k(R
′, t). Let H = ku(S, t′) and Bi = kui(Yi, yi). As Hσ = k`1,...,`k(R
′, t)
and names(t) ∩M0 = ∅, by inspection of the statements in K1, it must be that H ⇐ B1, . . . , Bm ∈
Ksolved. Moreover, as t
′σ = t we have by hypothesis that t′σ ∩ M0 = ∅ and hence t′ ∩ M0 = ∅. As
yi ∈ vars(t′) we have that yiσ ∩M0 = ∅ and we can apply our induction hypothesis to conclude that
Biσ ⇐ k`1,...,`i1 (X1, x1), . . . , k`1,...,`in (Xn, xn) ∈ conseq(Ksolved) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Hence, as
H ⇐ B1, . . . , Bm ∈ Ksolved
and
Biσ ⇐ k`1,...,`i1 (X1, x1), . . . , k`1,...,`in (Xn, xn) ∈ conseq(Ksolved)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n we conclude that k`1,...,`k(R′, t) ∈ conseq(K).
Lemma 22. Let K be a knowledge base andM0 ⊆M a set of public names such that names(K)∩M0 = ∅.
Let K1 ⊆ KM0,R where R is the set of solved reach statements in K. If
K unionmultiK1 ⇒ K ′′
then K ′′ = K ′ unionmultiK2 with K ⇒= K ′, K2 ⊆ KM0,R′ where R′ is the set of solved reach statements in K ′ and
names(K ′) ∩M0 = ∅.
Proof. We perform a case distinction depending on which saturation rule triggered:





∈ K1 can play the role of g in the Resolution saturation rule
since t′ = m must unify with t 6∈ X. Therefore t must be m, but m 6∈ names(K) by hypothesis and
therefore t cannot be m.
No statement in K1 can play the role of f in the Resolution saturation rule since they have no
antecedents.
Therefore f, g ∈ K and names(h) 6∈ M0. We choose K ′ = K ⊕ h, K2 = K1 and we conclude by
Lemma 21.
2. if rule Equation triggered, we distinguish three cases:




∈ K1 plays the role of f in the Equation saturation rule, we have
that t = m. As t′ unifies with m, we have that either t′ = m or that t′ is a variable. The second
case is not possible since g must be well-formed. Therefore t′ = m. As m 6∈ names(K) by hypothesis
it follows that g ∈ K1 and therefore g = k(m,m). Therefore the resulting statement is i(m,m). We
choose K2 = K1 ∪ {i(m,m)}, K ′ = K to conclude.




∈ K1 plays the role of g, the reasoning is analogous to the case above
(c) otherwise f, g ∈ K. Therefore names(h)∩M0 = ∅. We choose K ′ = K⊕h and K2 = K1 to conclude.





∈ K1 plays the role of f , then g = ru ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn ∈ K. We choose K ′ = K and
K2 = K1 ∪ {riu(m,m)⇐ B1, . . . Bn} to conclude.
(b) otherwise f ∈ K. The statement g must also be in K since g is a reachability statement and K1 does
not contain reachability statements. We choose K ′ = K ⊕ h and K2 = K1 to conclude.
From the above lemma we can immediately conclude that if M0 =M\ names(K) and
K ∪ {k(m,m)}m∈M0 ⇒∗ K ′
and K ′ is saturated, then
K ⇒∗ K ′′
with K ′′ saturated and K ′ = K ′′ ∪ KM0,R′′ where R′′ is the set of solved reach statements in K ′′. This
means that there is no need to keep track of all (an infinite number of) names during the saturation process.
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D.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. The definition of conseq(K) yields a direct recursive algorithm which moreover computes R:
– (Axiom) Check whether t = xj for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. If this is the case return (yes, Xj).
– (Res) Otherwise, guess a (solved) statement ku(R
′, t′) ⇐ ku1(Y1, y1), . . . kuk(Yk, yk) ∈ K and compute
substitution σ such that k`1,...,`k(R
′, t) = ku(R′, t′)σ. Check recursively whether
∃Ri.kui(Ri, yi)σ ⇐ k`1,...,`i1 (X1, x1), . . . , k`1,...,`in (Xn, xn) ∈ conseq(K)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. In that case return (yes, R′[Yi 7→ Ri]1≤i≤n). Otherwise return no.
Termination is ensured because the size of t when checking whether
∃R.k`1,...,`k(R, t)⇐ k`1,...,`i1 (X1, x1), . . . , k`1,...,`in (Xn, xn) ∈ conseq(K)
strictly decreases in each recursive call. Indeed, when ku(R
′, t′) ⇐ ku1(Y1, y1), . . . kuk(Yk, yk) ∈ K we have
that t′ 6∈ X because it is well-formed and yi ∈ vars(t′) by definition of a statement. Hence, |yiσ| < |t′σ| = |t|.
D.3 Termination of the saturation
Throughout this section we suppose that all statements have distinct variables. This can be supposed w.l.o.g.
because all variables are universally quantified. Moreover, we are assuming that the rewriting system is
subterm convergent.
Basic properties
Lemma 23. Let K be a knowledge base. We have:
1. for all substitutions σ, for all f ∈ conseq(K), fσ ∈ conseq(K)
2. for all
(
ku(R, t) ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
) ∈ conseq(K), for all symbolic runs v, (kuv(R, t) ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn) ∈
conseq(K)
3. for all statements H ⇐ ku1v1(R1, t1), . . . , kunvn(Rn, tn), for all predicates kw1(S1, r1), . . . , kwk(Sk, rk),
if
(
H ⇐ ku1v1(R1, t1), . . . , kunvn(Rn, tn)
) ∈ conseq(K) and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (kui(Ri, ti) ⇐
kw1(S1, r1), . . . , kwk(Sk, rk)
) ∈ conseq(K) then (H ⇐ kw1(S1, r1), . . . , kwk(Sk, rk)) ∈ conseq(K).
Proof. We prove the three properties separately.
Property (1): We prove the property by induction on the length of the derivation of f ∈ conseq(K).
Base case, size of the derivation is 1: We have
– either f =
(
kuv(R, t)⇐ ku(R, t), B1, . . . , Bm
)
which implies that fσ =
(
kuσvσ(Rσ, tσ)⇐ kuσ(Rσ, tσ), B1σ, . . . , Bmσ
)
and so fσ ∈ conseq(K) by rule Axiom.





) ∈ K and substitution γ. Since fσ =(
kuv(R, t)γσ ⇐ C1σ, . . . , Cmσ
)
, we directly have that fσ ∈ conseq(K) by rule Res.
Inductive step, size of the derivation bigger than 1: We have that f =
(
kuv(R, t)γ ⇐ C1, . . . , Cm
)
for some(
ku(R, t) ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
) ∈ K and substitution γ such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (Biγ ⇐ C1, . . . , Cm) ∈
conseq(K). By induction hypothesis, we deduce that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (Biγσ ⇐ C1σ, . . . , Cmσ) ∈
conseq(K). Hence we can apply the rule Res which allows us to conclude that fσ ∈ conseq(K).
Property (2): Let v be a symbolic run and f =
(
ku(R, t)⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
)
. We proceed by case distinction
on the last rule applied in the derivation of f ∈ conseq(K).
Rule Axiom: There exist two symbolic runs u1, u2 such that f =
(
ku1u2(R, t) ⇐ ku1(R, t), B1, . . . , Bm
)
which trivially implies that
(
ku1u2v(R, t)⇐ ku1(R, t), B1, . . . , Bm
) ∈ conseq(K).
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Rule Res: There exist two symbolic runs u1, u2, a substitution γ and g =
(
ku1(R
′, t′) ⇐ C1, . . . , Cm
) ∈ K
such that ku1u2(R
′, t′)γ = ku(R, t) and for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
(
Ciγ ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
) ∈ conseq(K). But the
variables of g being distinct from the one of f , we can assume w.l.o.g that the variables of g are distinct from
the one of v. Hence vγ = v which allows us to deduce that
(
ku1u2v(R
′, t′)γ ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
) ∈ conseq(K).
Property (3): We do a proof by induction on the length of the derivation of f =
(
H ⇐ ku1v1(R1, t1), . . . , kunvn(Rn, tn)
) ∈
conseq(K).
Base case, size of the derivation is 1: In such a case, one of the following cases holds:
– Case f =
(
kuv(R, t) ⇐ ku(R, t), B1, . . . , Bn−1
)
: By hypothesis, we know that there exists u′ v u such
that
(
ku′(R, t) ⇐ kw1(S1, r1), . . . , kwk(Sk, rk)
) ∈ conseq(K). Thanks to the second property of this
lemma, we can deduce that
(
kuv(R, t) ⇐ kw1(S1, r1), . . . , kwk(Sk, rk)
) ∈ conseq(K). Hence the result
holds.
– Case H = kuv(R, t)γ for some
(
ku(R, t) ⇐
) ∈ K and substitution γ: From the rule Res, one can infer
that
(
kuv(R, t)γ ⇐ C1, . . . , Ck
) ∈ conseq(K) for all substitutions γ, all symbolic run v and all predicates
C1, . . . , Ck. Hence it holds for
(
kuv(R, t)γ ⇐ kw1(S1, r1), . . . , kwk(Sk, rk)
) ∈ conseq(K).
Inductive step, size of the derivation bigger than 1: In such a case, we have that H = kuv(R, t)γ for some(
ku(R, t)⇐ B1, . . . , Bm
) ∈ K and substitution γ such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (Biγ ⇐ ku1v1(R1, t1), . . . , kunvn(Rn, tn)) ∈
conseq(K). By inductive hypothesis, we deduce that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (Biγ ⇐ kw1(S1, r1), . . . , kwk(Sk, rk)) ∈
conseq(K). Hence by application of ruleRes, we can conclude that kuv(R, t)γ ⇐ kw1(S1, r1), . . . , kwk(Sk, rk)
) ∈
conseq(K) .
In the following we will caracterize the shape of the knowledge base built by applying saturation rules.
Definition 23. We say that a symbolic run `1 . . . `n is initial if:
1. for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, `i = test or `i = out(ci) or `i = in(ci, xi) with xi ∈ X and ci ∈ C and
2. for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, i 6= j implies vars(`i) ∩ vars(`j) = ∅.
Definition 24. Let f =
(
kw(R, t)⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
)
be a statement. We say that f satisfies origination when-
ever there exists u, v such that w = uv and
– v is initial;
– for all x ∈ vars(v), x 6∈ vars(u) and for all kw′(X, r) ∈ {B1, . . . , Bn}, x 6∈ vars(r);
– for all x ∈ vars(u), there exists kw′(X, r) ∈ {B1, . . . , Bn} such that x ∈ vars(r) and x 6∈ vars(w′).
Given a clause f with a knowledge predicate as head, we denote by inst(f) = u and init(f) = v, where u is
chosen to be maximal (in size). We say that a knowledge base satisfies origination when all its clauses with
a knowledge predicate as head satisfy origination.
We first prove that any set of seed statements satisfies origination.
Lemma 24. Let T be a ground trace of size n and M0 a set of public names. The set S = seed(T,M0)
satisfies origination.
Proof. Let us use the notations of Section 4.1. Among seed(T,M0), there are three kinds of Horn clauses
with a knowledge predicate as head:
– h =
(
k`1στ↓,...,`mστ↓(w|S(m)|, tmστ↓) ⇐ {k`1στ↓,...,`j−1στ↓(Xj , xjστ↓)}j∈R(m)
)
where m ∈ Send(n), σ ∈
mguR({sk = tk}k∈T (m)) and τ ∈ variants(`1σ, . . . , `mσ, tmσ). By definition of Rcv(m), we deduce that
for all x ∈ vars(`1στ↓, . . . , `mστ↓), there exists j ∈ Rcv(m) such that x ∈ vars(xjστ↓). Moreover, if we
consider j0 the smallest j such that x ∈ vars(xj0στ↓), we obtain that x 6∈ vars(`1στ↓, . . . , `j0−1στ↓). We




k(c, c)⇐ ) with c ∈M0. In such a case, we trivially have that h satisfies origination with inst(f) = ε
and init(f) = ε.
– h =
(
k`1,...,`m(f(Y1, . . . , Yk), f(y1, . . . , yk)τ↓) ⇐ {k`1,...,`m(Yj , yjτ↓)}j∈{1,...,k}
)
where m ∈ {0, . . . , n}, f
is a symbol function of arity k and τ ∈ variants(f(y1, . . . , yk)). Since `1, . . . , `m is initial, we directly
have that h satisfies origination with inst(h) = ε and init(h) = `1, . . . , `m. uunionsq
Moreover origination is preserved by application of the resolution rule. As defined in Definition 22, we
write w v w′ whenever w is a prefix of w′. We will also write w @ w′ whenever w is a strict prefix of w′.
Lemma 25. Let K be a knowledge base satisfying origination. Let f ∈ K and g ∈ Ksolved and let K ′ be the
knowledge base obtained by updating K by the statement obtained by applying the rule Resolution on f
and g. We have that K ′ satisfies origination.
Proof. On the one hand, if the head of f is not an intruder knowledge predicate then the result trivially
holds since in such a case, K ′ is K, plus a statement whose head is not an intruder knowledge predicate.
On the other hand, let us consider f with an intruder knowledge predicate as head. Since we apply the rule
Resolution on f and g, we know that:
– f =
(





′, t′)⇐ Bn+1, . . . , Bm
)




H ⇐ B1, . . . , Bm
)
θ
– K ′ = K ⊕ h
Let us define uinst = inst(f)θ if inst(g)θ @ inst(f)θ, otherwise we define uinst = inst(g)θ. Moreover, let us
define uinit such that inst(f)init(f)θ = uinstuinit. We now show that h satisfies origination with inst(h) = uinst
and init(h) = uinit.
– Let us focus on the unification of u with w. We know that w = inst(g)init(g). Moreover, u v inst(f)init(f)
and so inst(g)init(g)θ v uinstuinit. Note that if inst(g)θ @ inst(f)θ then uinst = inst(f)θ and so uinit =
init(f)θ. Otherwise, uinst = inst(g)θ and so inst(f)θ is a prefix of uinst. But inst(f)init(f)θ = uinstuinit
hence we deduce that uinit is a suffix of init(f)θ. Thus, in both cases, we have that uinit is a suffix of
init(f)θ.
Moreover, since init(g) and init(f) are both initial, we have w.l.o.g. that uinit is a suffix of init(f) (typically,
we assume that the variables of init(g) are in dom(θ)). Since init(f) is initial then so is uinit. Lastly, since
the variables of init(f) were not occurring in inst(f) nor in the rest of the clause f , and since the variables
of uinit do not appear in the image of θ, we deduce that for all x ∈ vars(uinit), x 6∈ vars(uinst) and for all
ks(Y, p) ∈ {B1θ, . . . , Bmθ}, x 6∈ vars(p).
– Let x ∈ vars(uinst). There exists y ∈ vars(inst(f), inst(g)) and x ∈ vars(yθ) (note that y might be
x). If y ∈ vars(inst(f)) then we deduce that there exists ks(Y, p) ∈ {kuv(X, t), B1, . . . , Bn} such that
y ∈ vars(p) and y 6∈ vars(s). Moreover, if y ∈ vars(inst(g)) then we deduce that there exists ks(Y, p) ∈
{Bn+1, . . . , Bm} such that y ∈ vars(p) and y 6∈ vars(s). Hence, there exists ks(Y, p) ∈ {kuv(X, t), B1, . . . , Bm}
such that y ∈ vars(p) and y 6∈ vars(s). W.l.o.g. let us assume that there is no other variable z and
ks′(Y
′, p′) ∈ {kuv(X, t), B1, . . . , Bm} such that x ∈ vars(zθ), z ∈ vars(p′), z 6∈ vars(s′) and s′ @ s. Hence
y ∈ vars(p) and y 6∈ vars(s) imply that x ∈ vars(pθ) and x 6∈ vars(sθ). If ks(Y, p) ∈ {B1, . . . , Bm}
then the result holds. Hence it remains to consider the case where ks(Y, p) = kuv(X, t). In such a
case, x ∈ vars(tθ) and x 6∈ vars(uvθ). But we know that x ∈ vars(tθ) implies that there exists
ks′(Y
′, p′) ∈ {Bn+1, . . . , Bm} such that x ∈ vars(p′θ). Moreover, we know that uθ = wθ and by definition
of statement, s′θ v wθ. Hence we can deduce that x 6∈ vars(s′θ) and so the result holds.
Finally, we easily see that obtaining the canonical form of h preserves the origination property and conclude
that K ′ satisfies origination.
In the following we say that S is a set of seed statements if S = seed(T ) for some ground trace T .
The following corollary is a direct consequence of Lemmas 24 and 25. Moreover. we say that K is built
from S if all the statements of K can be obtained by applying saturation rules from Figure 3 to Ki(S).
Corollary 3. Let S be a set of seed statements and K a knowledge base built from S. K satisfies origination.
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Initial substitution We first introduce a few notations.
– Given a statement f =
(
ku(R, t)⇐ B1, . . . , Bn
)
, we denote by w(f) the symbolic run u.
– Given a set of seed statements S, we denote by IPC(S) the subset of S corresponding to the protocol
clauses and the public name clauses.
– Given a symbolic run w and an integer n, we denote by w|n the symbolic run prefix of w of size n.
Lemma 26. Let T be ground trace of size n andM0 a set of public names. For all (kw(R, t)⇐ kw1(X1, t1), . . . , kwn(Xn, tn)) ∈
IPC(seed(T,M0)), for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, vars(ti) ⊆ vars(w).




k`1στ↓,...,`mστ↓(w|S(m)|, tmστ↓) ⇐ {k`1στ↓,...,`j−1στ↓(Xj , xjστ↓)}j∈R(m)
)
where m ∈ S(n), σ ∈
mguR({sk = tk}k∈T (m)) and τ ∈ variants(`1σ, . . . , `mσ, tmσ). By definition of R(m), we deduce that
for all j ∈ R(m), lj = in(cj , xj) for some ci. Therefore, ljστ↓ = in(cj , xjστ↓). Hence vars(xjστ↓) ⊆
vars(l1στ↓, . . . , lmστ↓).
– h =
(
k(c, c)⇐ ) with c ∈M0: Trivial.
Given a set of seed statements S, the variables of the deduction statements in IPC(S) correspond intu-
itively to what an attacker can input. It can typically be messages directly received (corresponding to the
application of the application of the resolution rule on two statement of IPC(S)) or messages that he con-
structed (corresponding to the application of the resolution rule on a statement of IPC(S) and a statement
of S r IPC(S)). Therefore, a term of a statement in the knowledge base can be seen as a term obtained of
IPC(S) where some of the variables has been replaced by a term deduced by the attacker. We formalize this
notion of “term obtained from IPC(S)” as follows:
Definition 25. Let S be a set of seed statements. We define an initial substitution and initial subterms
respectively as a pair (w, σ) and a set stIS(S, σ) such that there exist f1, . . . , fn and T with the following
properties:
– w is an initial symbolic run; and
– f1, . . . fn ∈ IPC(S),∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, |w(fi)| ≤ |w|; and
– σ = mgu({(w||w(f1)|,w(f1)); . . . ; (w||w(fn)|,w(fn))} ∪ T ); and
– T ⊆ st(f1, . . . , fn)× st(f1, . . . , fn); and
– vars(img(σ)) ∩ vars(w) = ∅.
– stIS(S, σ) = st(f1, . . . , fn) ∪
⋃
f∈S,vars(f)=∅ st(f)
We denote by IS(S) the set of all initial substitutions for S.
We note that in the definition of stIS(S, σ) the statements f1, . . . , fn are uniquely identified by the
variables in σ as we suppose that all clauses have distinct variables. Moreover, adding all ground clauses to
stIS(S, σ) guarantees that stIS(S, σ) is uniquely defined.
Intuitively, an initial substitution represents the worlds that could be obtained through several appli-
cations of the resolution rule between statements of IPC(S). Hence σ is the most general unifier of worlds
of several statements from IPC(S) ({(w||w(f1)|,w(f1)); . . . ; (w||w(fn)|,w(fn))}). Note that in the resolution
rule, we also unifier terms in the deduction fact. Therefore σ also unifies several subterms of the statements
T ⊆ st(f1, . . . , fn)× st(f1, . . . , fn).
Definition 26. Let S be a set of seed statements. Let (w, σ) ∈ IS(S). We say that a substitution γ completes
(w, σ) if vars(img(γ)) ∩ (vars(w) ∪ vars(IPC(S))) = ∅ and dom(γ) = vars(wσ).
Definition 27. Let S be a set of seed statements, (w, σ) ∈ IS(S) and γ a substitution completing (w, σ).
We say that (w, σ) is maximal for γ in S if for all (w, σ′) ∈ IS(S), for all substitutions γ′ completing (w, σ′)
such that wσγ = wσ′γ′, there exists θ such that σ = σ′θ.
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Using initial substitutions, we will show that the world w of all statements of the knowledge base can be
decomposed as an initial substitution (w0, σ0) and a substitution γ completing it : w = w0σ0γ. Moreover,
we will also show that when a statement kw(R, u) ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn in solved form is added to the knowledge
base then w = w0σ0γ and u = u0σ0γ for some initial substitution (w0, σ0), some substitution γ completing
it and u ∈ stIS(S, σ0). Considering that given S, there is a finite number of initial substitutions and a finite
number of initial subterms, this will help us proving the termination of the algorithm.
Lemma 27. Let S be a set of seed statements and (w, σ) ∈ IS(S). For all t ∈ st(img(σ)), there exists
u ∈ stIS(S, σ) such that uσ = t.
Proof. By definition of IS(S), we have that
σ = mgu({(w||w(f1)|,w(f1)); . . . ; (w||w(fn)|,w(fn))} ∪ T )
with f1, . . . fn ∈ IPC(S), T ⊆ st(f1, . . . , fn)×st(f1, . . . , fn) and vars(img(σ))∩vars(w) = ∅. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
such that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, |w(fi)| ≥ |w(fj)|. We deduce that
σ = σ′0 mgu({(w(fi)||w(f1)|,w(f1)); . . . ; (w(fi)||w(fn)|,w(fn))} ∪ T )
where σ′0 = mgu({(w||w(fi)|,w(fi))}). W.l.o.g., we can consider that dom(σ′0) ⊆ vars(w) and img(σ′0) ⊆
st(fi). This allows us to conclude that σ = σ
′
0 mgu(U0) with U0 ⊆ st(f1, . . . , fn)σ′0× st(f1, . . . , fn)σ′0, and for
all t ∈ st(img(σ′0)), t ∈ st(fi) and tσ′0 = t.
It remains to prove that for all U and σ′, if mgu(U) exists, U ⊆ st(f1, . . . , fn)σ′ × st(f1, . . . , fn)σ′ and
for all t ∈ st(img(σ′)), there exists u ∈ st(f1, . . . , fn) such that uσ′ = t, then for all t ∈ st(img(σ′mgu(U))),
there exists u ∈ st(f1, . . . , fn) such that uσ′mgu(U) = t.
We prove this result by induction on m(U) defined as follows:
m(U) = (|vars(U)|, {{|t1|+ |t2| | (t1, t2) ∈ U}})
where {{i1, . . . , in}} is the multiset composed of the integers i1, . . . , in and where |t| is the height of the term
t. We consider here the natural ordering of multisets of integers as well as the lexicographic ordering on
pairs.
Base case m(U) = (0, ∅): In such a case, U = ∅. Thus we have that mgu(U) = Id and so the result trivially
hold since, by hypothesis, we have for all t ∈ st(img(σ′)), there exists u ∈ st(f1, . . . , fn) such that uσ′ = t.
Inductive step: Otherwise, since mgu(U) exists, we have that either (a) U = {f(u1, . . . , um), f(v1, . . . , vm)}∪
U ′ or (b) U = {x, u} ∪ U ′.
In case (a), mgu(U) = mgu(U ′′) with U ′′ = {(u1, v1); . . . ; (um, vm)} ∪ U ′. But U ⊆ st(f1, . . . , fn)σ′ ×
st(f1, . . . , fn)σ
′ implies that U ′′ ⊆ st(f1, . . . , fn)σ′× st(f1, . . . , fn)σ′. Moreover, m(U) > m(U ′′) hence we can
apply our inductive hypothesis on U ′′ and σ′. Since mgu(U) = mgu(U ′′), the result holds.
In case (b), σ′mgu(U) = σ′σ′′mgu(U ′σ′′) with σ′′ = {x→ u}. Let t ∈ st(img(σ′σ′′)), we have that either
there exists v ∈ st(img(σ′)) such that t = vσ′′ or else t ∈ st(u).
If the first case, we know by hypothesis on σ′ that there exists v′ ∈ st(f1, . . . , fn) such that v′σ′ = v
hence v′σ′σ′′ = t.
In the second case, we know that u ∈ st(f1, . . . , fn)σ′ hence t ∈ st(f1, . . . , fn)σ′. Thus either there exists
t′ ∈ st(f1, . . . , fn) such that t = t′σ′ or t ∈ st(img(σ′)). Once again by hypothesis on σ′, we deduce that in
both cases, there exists t′ ∈ st(f1, . . . , fn) such that t = t′σ′. Moreover, mgu(U) existing also implies that
x 6∈ st(u) and so x 6∈ st(t). Therefore, tσ′′ = t which allows us to deduce that t = t′σ′σ′′.
With the fact that m(U) > m(U ′σ′′), we satisfy all the conditions to apply our inductive hypothesis on
U ′σ′′ and σ′σ′′, and so the result holds.
Corollary 4. Let S be a set of seed statements and (w, σ) ∈ IS(S). For all v ∈ stIS(S, σ), for all t ∈ st(vσ),
there exists u ∈ stIS(S, σ) such that uσ = t.
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Lemma 28. Let S be a set of seed statements. Let (w, σ), (w, σ′) ∈ IS(S). Let γ and γ′ be two substitutions
respectively completing (w, σ) and (w, σ′). If wσγ = wσ′γ′ then there exist σ′′, γ′′, α, α′ such that:
– (w, σ′′) ∈ IS(S), γ′′ completes (w, σ′′), wσ′′γ′′ = wσγ, σ′′ = σα = σ′α′; and
– for all x ∈ dom(γ′′), there exists y ∈ dom(γ) and y′ ∈ dom(γ′) such that xγ′′ ∈ st(yγ), xγ′′ ∈ st(yγ′)
and if y ∈ vars(w) (resp. y′ ∈ vars(w)) then y′γ′ ∈ st(yγ) (yγ ∈ st(y′γ′)).
– for all u ∈ stIS(S, σ) (resp. stIS(S, σ′)), uσγ = uσ′′γ′′ (resp. uσ′γ′ = uσ′′γ′′).
Proof. By definition, (w, σ), (w, σ′) ∈ IS(S) implies that there exist f1, . . . fn, g1, . . . , gm ∈ IPC(S), T ⊆
st(f1, . . . , fn)× st(f1, . . . , fn) and R ⊆ st(g1, . . . , gm)× st(g1, . . . , gm) such that
– ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, |w(fi)| ≤ |w|
– ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, |w(gi)| ≤ |w|
– σ = mgu((w||w(f1)|,w(f1)); . . . ; (w||w(fn)|,w(fn));T )
– σ′ = mgu((w||w(g1)|,w(g1)); . . . ; (w||w(gm)|,w(gm));R)
We know that all clauses have distinct variables but some clauses used to generate σ may have been used to
generate σ′. Hence let us define F,E,G the following sets:
– F = {fi|i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, fi 6= gj}
– G = {gj |j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, fi 6= gj}
– E = {fi|i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and ∃j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, fi = gj}
Since wσγ = wσ′γ′, we have that for all f ∈ E, w(f)σγ = w(f)σ′γ′. Moreover, by Lemma 26, for all f ∈ E,
for all t ∈ st(f), vars(t) ⊆ vars(w(f)) hence tσγ = tσ′γ′. Hence, let us build θ such that dom(θ) ⊆ vars(w)∪
{vars(f) | f ∈ E ∪ F ∪G}; and θ[vars(w)] = σγ[vars(w)]; and for all f ∈ E, θ[vars(f)] = σγ[vars(f)]; and
for all f ∈ F , θ[vars(f)] = σγ[vars(f)]; and for all g ∈ G, θ[vars(g)] = σ′γ′[vars(g)]. In such a case, we
deduce that:
– for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, w||w(fi)|θ = w(fi)θ
– for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, w||w(gi)|θ = w(gi)θ
– for all (u, v) ∈ T ∪R, uθ = vθ.
Therefore, there exists σ′′ such that:
σ′′ = mgu
 (w||w(f1)|,w(f1)); . . . ; (w||w(fn)|,w(fn));(w||w(g1)|,w(g1)); . . . ; (w||w(gm)|,w(gm));
T ∪R

Hence (w, σ′′) ∈ IS(S). Moreover, since θ is also a unifier, there exists γ′′ such that θ = σ′′γ′′ and dom(σ′′)∩
dom(γ′′) = ∅ hence wσ′′γ′′ = wσγ.
By definition of a most general unifier, we also have that σ′′ = σmgu(∪x∈dom(σ′){xσ, xσ′σ}) = σ′mgu(∪x∈dom(σ){xσ′, xσσ′}).
Hence we deduce the existence of α, α′ such that σ′′ = σα and σ′′ = σ′α′.
We now show that dom(γ′′) ⊆ vars(wσ′′). Let us consider x ∈ dom(γ′′). Since θ = σ′′γ′′, we deduce that
x ∈ dom(γ′′) ⊆ dom(θ) ⊆ vars(w)∪{y ∈ vars(f) | f ∈ E ∪F ∪G} and x 6∈ dom(σ′′). But by Lemma 26, for
all f ∈ E ∪ F ∪G, for all y ∈ vars(f), y ∈ vars(w(f)). Assume that x ∈ vars(f) with f ∈ E ∪ F ∪G. Since
x 6∈ dom(σ′′), we deduce that x ∈ vars(w(f)σ′′) and so x ∈ vars(wσ′′) by definition of σ′′. If x ∈ vars(w)
then x 6∈ dom(σ′′) also implies that x ∈ vars(wσ′′).
Let us now consider x ∈ vars(wσ′′). We know that σ′′ = σα = σα′ hence we deduce that either
x ∈ vars(wσ) and x 6∈ dom(α) or there exists y ∈ vars(wσ) such that x ∈ vars(yα). But wσ′′γ′′ =
wσαγ′′ = wσγ. Hence either xγ′′ = xγ or there exists y ∈ vars(wσ) such that xγ′′ ∈ st(yγ). In the former,
γ completing (w, σ) implies that x ∈ dom(γ) and so x ∈ dom(γ′′). In the latter, γ completing (w, σ) also
implies that y ∈ dom(γ). Moreover, in combination of γ′ completing (w′, σ′) and wσγ = wσ′γ′, we deduce
that vars(img(γ)) ∩ vars(img(α)) = ∅. Hence x 6∈ st(yγ) and so xγ′′ 6= x which allows us to deduce that
53
x ∈ dom(γ′′). Therefore, in both cases, we have shown that x ∈ dom(γ′′) and that there exists y ∈ dom(γ)
such that xγ′′ ∈ st(yγ). Similarly, we can show that there exists y′ ∈ dom(γ′) such that xγ′′ ∈ st(yγ′).
We have just shown the existence of y ∈ dom(γ) and y′ ∈ dom(γ′) such that xγ′′ ∈ st(yγ) and xγ′′ ∈
st(y′γ′). Moreover, the previous reasoning allows us to show that there exists z ∈ vars(w) such that y ∈
vars(zσ), y′ ∈ vars(zσ′) and zσγ = zσ′γ′ = zσ′′γ′′. Therefore, if y ∈ vars(w) meaning y = z then yσ = y
and so yσγ = yγ = zσ′γ′. Thus, we conclude that y′γ′ ∈ st(yγ). We show similarly, that if y′ ∈ vars(w) then
yγ ∈ st(y′γ′).
We finish by showing that vars(img(γ′′)) ∩ (vars(w) ∪ vars(IPC(S))) = ∅. Let x ∈ vars(img(γ′′)).
Thanks to the property we have just proved, we know that x ∈ vars(img(γ)). By definition of σ′′, we
know that vars(σ′′) ⊆ vars(w)∪ vars(IPC(S)). But γ completes (w, σ) hence we deduce that vars(img(γ))∩
(vars(IPC(S)) ∪ vars(w)) = ∅. Therefore, we conclude that x 6∈ vars(IPC(S)) ∪ vars(w).
Let u ∈ stIS(S, σ). Thus there exists f ∈ F ∪ E such that u ∈ st(f). By Lemma 26, we know that
vars(u) ⊆ vars(w(f)). By construction of σ′′ and σ, wσγ = wσ′′γ′′ implies that for all x ∈ vars(w(f)),
xσγ = xσ′′γ′′ and so uσγ = uσ′′γ′′. We do a similar proof to show that for all u ∈ stIS(S, σ′), uσ′γ′ = uσ′′γ′′.
Lemma 29. Let S be a set of seed statements and (w, σ) ∈ IS(S). Let γ be a substitution completing (w, σ)
and u, v ∈ ⋃t∈stIS(S,σ) st(tσ) such that uγ = vγ. There exist σ′, α = mgu(u, v), γ′ such that (w, σ′) ∈ IS(S),
γ′ completes (w, σ′), σ′ = σα, σγ = σ′γ′, uα = vα and γ′ = γ[dom(γ′)].
Proof. By definition, (w, σ) ∈ IS(K) implies that there exist f1, . . . fn ∈ IPC(S), T ⊆ st(f1, . . . , fn) ×
st(f1, . . . , fn) such that
– ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, |w(fi)| ≤ |w|
– σ = mgu((w||w(f1)|,w(f1)); . . . ; (w||w(fn)|,w(fn));T )
But by Corollary 4, u, v ∈ ⋃t∈stIS(S,σ) st(tσ) implies that there exists u′, v′ ∈ stIS(S, σ) such that u = u′σ
and v = v′σ. Since uγ = vγ, we deduce that ((w||w(f1)|,w(f1)); . . . ; (w||w(fn)|,w(fn));T ; (u′, v′)) are unifiable
by σγ. Let us define σ′ such that σ′ = mgu((w||w(f1)|,w(f1)); . . . ; (w||w(fn)|,w(fn));T ; (u′, v′)). It implies that
there exists γ′ such that σγ = σ′γ′ and dom(σ′) ∩ dom(γ′) = ∅. Moreover, by definition of a most general
unifier, we have that σ′ = σmgu(u′σ, v′σ) with dom(mgu(u′σ, v′σ)) ∩ dom(σ) = ∅. Hence we deduce that
there exists α = mgu(u′σ, v′σ) such that σ′ = σα and dom(α) ∩ dom(σ) = ∅. Let x ∈ dom(γ′). We already
know that x 6∈ dom(σ′). Hence xσ′γ′ = xγ′. But σ′ = σα therefore x 6∈ dom(σ) and so xσγ = xγ. Note that
x ∈ dom(γ′) implies that xγ′ 6= x and so xγ 6= x. We can conclude that x ∈ dom(γ) and xγ = xγ′.
Consider x ∈ vars(wσ′). By definition of σ′, we know that x ∈ vars(w) ∪ vars(IPC(S)). Since σγ = σ′γ′,
we know that wσγ = wσ′γ′. But γ completes (w, σ), hence dom(γ) = vars(wσ) and img(γ) ∩ (vars(w) ∪
vars(IPC(S))) = ∅. Thus x 6∈ vars(wσγ) and so x 6∈ vars(wσ′γ′) which allows us to deduce that x ∈ dom(γ′).
Lastly, γ′ = γ[dom(γ′)] and img(γ)∩ (vars(w)∪ vars(IPC(S))) = ∅ directly allows us to conclude that γ′
completes (w, σ′).
Lemma 30. Let S be a set of seed statements. Let (w, σ) ∈ IS(S) and let γ be a substitution completing
(w, σ). There exists σ′, γ′, α such that:
– (w, σ′) ∈ IS(S), γ′ completes (w, σ′) and (w, σ′) is maximal for γ′ in S; and
– σ′ = σα and wσ′γ′ = wσγ; and
– for all x ∈ dom(γ′), there exists y ∈ dom(γ) such that xγ′ ∈ st(yγ); and
– for all u, v ∈ ⋃t∈stIS(S,σ′) st(tσ′), uγ′ = vγ′ implies u = v.
– for all u ∈ stIS(S, σ), uσγ = uσ′γ′.
Proof. Since we consider S finite, let us denote by N = |vars(IPC(S))|+ |vars(w)|. By definition of IS(S),
we know that for all (w, σ) ∈ IS(S), vars(σ) ⊆ vars(IPC(S)) ∪ vars(w). Hence |dom(σ)| < N . Let us prove
the result by induction on N − |dom(σ)|.
Base case N = |dom(σ)|: In such a case, since vars(σ) ⊆ vars(IPC(S))∪vars(w), we deduce that vars(img(σ)) =
∅. Moreover, we deduce that vars(wσ)) = ∅. Hence, dom(γ) = ∅ and γ = id. We first show (w, σ) is maximal
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for γ. Let (w, σ1) ∈ IS(S) and let γ1 be a substitution completing (w, σ1) such that wσγ = wσ1γ1. By
Lemma 28, there exist σ2, γ2, α, α1 such that (w, σ2) ∈ IS(S), wσ2γ2 = wσγ, σ2 = σα and σ2 = σ1α1.
But we already know that (w, σ2) ∈ IS(S) implies vars(σ2) ⊆ vars(IPC(S)) ∪ vars(w). Hence, dom(σ) =
vars(IPC(S))∪vars(w) and σ2 = σα imply that α = id. Thus, we conclude that σ2 = σ = σ1α1 and so (w, σ)
is maximal. Moreover, since γ = id then for all u, v ∈ ⋃t∈stIS(S,σ) st(tσ), uγ = vγ trivially implies u = v.
Therefore, we can conclude with σ′ = σ, γ′ = γ = id and α = id.
Inductive step N > |dom(σ)|: Let us first assume that (w, σ) is not maximal for γ in S. Therefore, there exist
(w, σ1) ∈ IS(S) and a substitution γ1 completing (w, σ1) such that wσγ = wσ1γ1 and for all θ, σ 6= σ1θ.
By Lemma 28, there exist σ2, γ2, α, α1 such that:
– (w, σ2) ∈ IS(S), γ2 completes (w, σ2), wσ2γ2 = wσγ, σ2 = σα and σ2 = σ1α1;
– for all x ∈ dom(γ2), there exists y ∈ dom(γ) and y ∈ dom(γ1) such that xγ2 ∈ st(yγ), xγ2 ∈ st(y′γ1).
– for all u ∈ stIS(S, σ), uσγ = uσ2γ2.
Therefore, we know that σα = σ1α1. By hypothesis on (w, σ1) and γ1, we deduce that α 6= id (otherwise
we would have that σ = σ1α1 which is a contradiction). Hence, |dom(σ2)| > |dom(σ)|. We can apply our
inductive hypothesis on σ2 and deduce that there exist σ
′, γ′, α2 such that:
– (w, σ′) ∈ IS(S), γ′ completes (w, σ′) and (w, σ′) is maximal for γ′ in S; and
– σ′ = σ2α2 and wσ′γ′ = wσ2γ2; and
– for all x ∈ dom(γ′), there exists y ∈ dom(γ2) such that xγ′ ∈ st(yγ2); and
– for all u, v ∈ ⋃t∈stIS(S,σ′) st(tσ′), uγ′ = vγ′ implies u = v.
– for all u ∈ stIS(S, σ2), uσ′γ′ = uσ2γ2.
But σ2 = σα Hence, σ
′ = σαα2. Moreover, wσ2γ2 = wσγ hence wσ′γ′ = wσγ. We also know that u ∈
stIS(S, σ) and σ2 = σα hence stIS(S, σ) ⊆ stIS(S, σ2). Therefore, for all u ∈ stIS(S, σ), uσγ = uσ2γ2 =
uσ′γ′.
Lastly, for all x ∈ dom(γ′), we know that there exists y ∈ dom(γ2) such that xγ′ ∈ st(yγ2). But we also
know that for all x′ ∈ dom(γ2), there exists y′ ∈ dom(γ) such that x′γ2 ∈ st(y′γ). Thus, it is true for x′ = y
and so there exists y′ ∈ dom(γ) such that xγ′ ∈ st(yγ2) ⊆ st(y′γ).
Let us now assume that (w, σ) is maximal for γ in S. By taking σ′ = σ, γ′ = γ and α = id, the first three
properties are directly proven. We thus focus on the last property: Let u, v ∈ ⋃t∈stIS(S,σ) st(tσ) such that
uγ = vγ. By Lemma 29, there exist σ′′, α′ = mgu(u, v), γ′′ such that (w, σ′′) ∈ IS(S), γ′′ completes (w, σ′′),
σ′′ = σα′, σγ = σ′′γ′′, uα′ = vα′ and γ′′ = γ[dom(γ′′)]. But (w, σ) is maximal for γ in S and wσγ = σ′′γ′′.
Therefore, we deduce that there exists θ such that σ = σ′′θ. With σ′′ = σα′, we deduce that σ = σ′′ and
α′ = θ = id. Thus, we can conclude that u = uα′ = vα′ = v.
Characterisation of the form of a knowledge base
Definition 28. Let S be a set of statements and K be a knowledge base built from S. Let f =
(
kw(R, t)⇐
kw1(X1, t1), . . . , kwn(Xn, tn)
) ∈ K. Consider an initial substitution (w0, σ) ∈ IS(S) and a substitution γ
completing (w0, σ) such that w = w0σγ and (w0, σ) is maximal for γ in S. We say that a term u is well-
formed in f w.r.t. (w0, σ) and γ if there exist u1, . . . , um ∈ stIS(S, σ), i1, . . . , ik ∈ {1, . . . , n} and a context
C built only of function symbols such that:
– for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, tij ∈ X ; and
– u = C[ti1 , . . . , tik , u1σγ, . . . , umσγ]; and
– for all position p of C, there exists T such that
(
kw(T, u|p)⇐ kw1(X1, t1), . . . , kwn(Xn, tn)
) ∈ conseq(Ksolved).
Definition 29. Let S be a set of seed statements and K be a knowledge base built from S. We say that
K is a proper knowledge base if for all f =
(
kw(R, t) ⇐ kw1(X1, t1), . . . , kwn(Xn, tn)
) ∈ K, there exists
(w0, σ) ∈ IS(S) and a substitution γ completing (w0, σ) such that the following properties hold:
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1. (w0, σ) is maximal for γ in S.
2. w = w0σγ
3. for all x ∈ dom(γ)r vars(w0), vars(xγ) ⊆ vars(t1, . . . , tn).
4. for all x ∈ dom(γ) ∩ vars(w0), xγ ∈ X , xγ 6∈ vars(t, t1, . . . , tn) and xγ occurs only once in w.
5. for all x ∈ dom(γ), xγ 6∈ X implies that either xγ ∈ st(t1, . . . , tn) or there exists T such that
(
kw(T, xγ)⇐
kw1(X1, t1), . . . , kwn(Xn, tn)
) ∈ conseq(Ksolved).
6. one of the two following properties holds:
a) there exists u ∈ stIS(S, σ) such that t = uσγ and for all v ∈ {t1, . . . , tn}, v is well formed in f w.r.t.
(w0, σ) and γ.
b) there exist u and T such that t ∈ st(u), (kw(T, u)⇐ kw1(X1, t1), . . . , kwn(Xn, tn)) ∈ conseq(Ksolved).
7. if f ∈ Ksolved then one of the two following properties holds:
a) there exists u ∈ stIS(S, σ) such that t = uσγ and uσ 6∈ X .
b) σ = id and t = f(t1, . . . , tn) for some function symbol f, all variables ti are distinct and w = wi (1 ≤
i ≤ n).
Note that when f ∈ Ksolved, Property 7.a (resp. 7.b) implies Property 6.a (resp. 6.b). Also note that given
a statement f , the properties 1 to 7 are parametrized by only K and S.
Lemma 31. Let S be a set of seed statements and K be a proper knowledge base built from S. Let f be a
statement verifying the properties of Definition 29 parametrized by K and S. If K ⊕ f = K ∪ {f⇓} then
K ⊕ f is a proper knowledge base.
Proof. Let us denote K ′ = K ∪ {f⇓}. Let g ∈ K. we know that g verifies the properties of Definition 29
parametrized by K and S. But Ksolved ⊆ K ′solved and conseq is monotonous by inclusion. Hence, g also
verifies the properties of Definition 29 parametrized by K ′ and S.
Let us now focus on f⇓. We show by induction on the number of rules applied during the canonisation
of f that f⇓ verifies the properties of Definition 29 parametrized by K ′ and S.
The base case is direct since f verifies the properties of Definition 29 parametrized by K and S and since
conseq is monotonous as previously mentioned.
We thus focus on the inductive step. Note first that by Definition 16, we necessarily have that f is solved
in such case since f⇓ = f when f is not solved. Let us denote f = (kw(R, t)⇐ kw1(X1, t1), . . . , kwn(Xn, tn)).
By inductive hypothesis on f , we know there exists (w0, σ) ∈ IS(S) and a substitution γ completing (w0, σ)
such that:
1. (w0, σ) is maximal for γ in S.
2. w = w0σγ
3. for all x ∈ dom(γ)r vars(w0), vars(xγ) ⊆ vars(t1, . . . , tn).
4. for all x ∈ dom(γ) ∩ vars(w0), xγ ∈ X , xγ 6∈ vars(t, t1, . . . , tn) and xγ occurs only once in w.
5. for all x ∈ dom(γ), xγ 6∈ X implies that either xγ ∈ st(t1, . . . , tn) or there exists T such that
(
kw(T, xγ)⇐
kw1(X1, t1), . . . , kwn(Xn, tn)
) ∈ conseq(Ksolved).
6. one of the two following properties holds:
a) there exists u ∈ stIS(S, σ) such that t = uσγ and uσ 6∈ X .
b) dom(γ) = vars(w0) and t = f(t1, . . . , tn) for some function symbol f and w = wi (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
We do a case analysis on the rule applied:
Rule Rename: In such a case, there exist i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that i 6= j, ti = tj and wj = wiv for some v.
Let us denote g =
(
kw(R, t)⇐ kw1(X1, t1), . . . , kwj−1(Xj−1, tj−1), kwj+1(Xj+1, tj+1) . . . , kwn(Xn, tn)
){Xj →
Xi}. We prove the result on g with (w0, σ) and γ. By hypothesis on f , we know that g verifies properties
1 and 2. Moreover, since ti = tj , we also know that vars(t1, . . . , tn) = vars(t1, . . . , tj−1, tj+1, . . . , tn) and
vars(t, t1, . . . , tn) = vars(t, t1, . . . , tj−1, tj+1, . . . , tn). Therefore, g verifies properties 3 and 4. Let x ∈ dom(γ)
such that xγ 6∈ X . By hypothesis on f , we know that either xγ ∈ st(t1, . . . , tn) or there exists T such that(
kw(T, xγ)⇐ kw1(X1, t1), . . . , kwn(Xn, tn)
) ∈ conseq(Ksolved). In the former case, we directly have that xγ ∈
st(t1, . . . , tj−1, tj+1, . . . , tn) since ti = tj . In the later case, a simple induction on the number of rules applied
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allows us to deduce that
(
kw(T{Xj → Xi}, xγ)⇐ kw1(X1, t1), . . . , kwj−1(Xj−1, tj−1), kwj+1(Xj+1, tj+1) . . . , kwn(Xn, tn)
) ∈
conseq(Ksolved). Therefore, g verifies property 5. Lastly, by definition, f cannot verify 6.b since two variables
ti and tj are not distinct. Thus, f verifies property 6.a and so we directly have that so does g; else f verifies
property 6.b. We can conclude that g verifies the properties of Definition 29 parametrized by K and S.
Rule Remove: In such a case, there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that ti 6∈ vars(kw(R, t)). Let us denote g =(
kw(R, t) ⇐ kw1(X1, t1), . . . , kwi−1(Xi−1, ti−1), kwi+1(Xi+1, ti+1) . . . , kwn(Xn, tn)
)
. Once again we prove the
result on g with (w0, σ) and γ. Once again, we directly have that g verifies properties 1 and 2. Let x ∈ dom(γ).
Since γ completes (w0, σ), we know that dom(γ) = vars(w0σ) and so vars(xγ) ⊆ vars(w0σγ) = vars(w). But
ti 6∈ vars(kw(R, t)) hence we directly have that vars(xγ) ⊆ vars(t1, . . . , ti−1, ti+1, . . . , tn) and so g verifies
property 3 and 4. By hypothesis on f (Prop. 5), we know that either xγ ∈ st(t1, . . . , tn) or there exists T such
that
(
kw(T, xγ) ⇐ kw1(X1, t1), . . . , kwn(Xn, tn)
) ∈ conseq(Ksolved). Once again since ti 6∈ vars(xγ), we de-
duce that in the former case xγ ∈ st(t1, . . . , ti−1, ti+1, . . . , tn); and in the later case, a simple induction on the
number of rules applied allows us to deduce that
(
kw(T, xγ)⇐ kw1(X1, t1), . . . , kwi−1(Xi−1, ti−1), kwi+1(Xi+1, ti+1) . . . , kwn(Xn, tn)
) ∈
conseq(Ksolved). Therefore g verifies property 5. Lastly, by definition, f can only verifies 6.b since tj 6∈ vars(t).
Thus, f verifies property 6.a and so we directly have that so does g; else f verifies property 6.b. We can
conclude that g verifies the properties of Definition 29 parametrized by K and S.
Note that all the statements are universally quantified and thus can be renamed. Therefore, we consider
of statements during the saturation are freshly renamed and so different from the variables of the set of seed
statements S.
Lemma 32. Let S be a set of seed statements. Ki(S) is a proper knowledge base.
Proof. By definition, Ki(S) = f1 ⊕ . . .⊕ fn with {f1, . . . , fn} is S with all its variables renamed. We prove
by induction that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, f1 ⊕ . . .⊕ fi is a proper knowledge base. The base case i = 0 being
trivial, we focus on the induction step n ≥ i > 0.
Let us denote K = f1⊕ . . .⊕ fi−1. By inductive hypothesis, we know that K is a proper knowledge base.
Let us assume that K ⊕ fi = K ∪ {fi⇓} (otherwise the result trivially holds). Thus it implies that if fi is
solved then for all R′, (kw(R′, t)⇐ Side) 6∈ conseq(Ksolved) where fi = (kw(R, t)⇐ Side) for some R.
Relying on Lemma 31, we just need to show that fi verifies the properties of Definition 29 parametrized
by K and S. Let us use the notations of Section 4.1. Let T be a ground trace. Let S = seed(T,M0) and
f =
(
kw(R, t)⇐ kw1(X1, t1), . . . , kwn(Xn, tn)
) ∈ S such that there exists a renaming ρ of the variables of f
and fi = fρ. We distinguish two cases according to whether f ∈ IPC(S) or not.
f ∈ IPC(S) In this case, there exists a fresh initial w0 such that σ = mgu(w0, w) exists, and w = w0σ.
Moreover, (w0, σ) ∈ IS(S) and st(f) ⊆ stIS(S, σ). Taking γ = ρ, we have that w(fi) = wρ = w0σγ. We
know that dom(ρ) = vars(f) and vars(img(ρ))∩ vars(IPC(S)) = ∅. Since w0 is a fresh initial w0, we deduce
that vars(img(γ)) ∩ (vars(w0) ∪ vars(IPC(S))) = ∅ and so γ completes (w0, σ).
By Corollary 30, we know that there exists σ′, γ′, α such that:
– (w0, σ
′) ∈ IS(S), γ′ completes (w0, σ′) and (w0, σ′) is maximal for γ′ in S; and
– σ′ = σα and w0σ′γ′ = w0σγ; and
– for all x ∈ dom(γ′), there exists y ∈ dom(γ) such that xγ′ ∈ st(yγ); and
– for all u, v ∈ ⋃t∈stIS(S,σ′) st(tσ′), uγ′ = vγ′ implies u = v; and
– for all u ∈ stIS(S, σ), uσγ = uσ′γ′.
We prove the result with (w0, σ
′) and γ′. We directly have that Properties 1 and 2 are satisfied. By
definition of f , we know that T is a ground trace and so vars(l1, . . . , ln) = {xj}j∈R(m). It implies that
vars(w) = vars({t1, . . . , tn}). But dom(γ) = dom(ρ) = vars(w). Hence vars(img(ρ)) ⊆ {t1ρ, . . . , tnρ}.
But for all x ∈ dom(γ′), vars(xγ′) ⊆ vars(img(γ)) hence vars(xγ′) ⊆ {t1ρ, . . . , tnρ}. This allows us to
prove that Property 3 is satisfied. Property 4 is trivially satisfied since dom(σ) = vars(w0) ⊆ dom(σ′) and
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dom(γ′) = vars(w0σ′). Property 5 is also trivially satisfied since γ is a mapping and for all x ∈ dom(γ′),
xγ′ ∈ st(img(γ)) implying that xγ′ ∈ X .
Since st(f) ⊆ stIS(S, σ), we know that t ∈ stIS(S, σ). But vars(w0) = dom(σ) and vars(w0)∩vars(t) = ∅.
Hence t = tσ and so tρ = tσγ. But vars(t) ⊆ vars(w) = vars(w0σ) and w0σ′γ′ = w0σαγ′ = w0σγ. Thus
tρ = tσγ = tσ′γ′. For the same reason, we directly have that t1ρ, . . . , tnρ are well formed in f . Lastly, if f is
solved, we have by our hypothesis K ⊕ fi = K ∪ {fi⇓} that t 6∈ X .
f 6∈ IPC(S) In this case, we know that w is initial and vars(t, t1, . . . , tn) ∩ vars(w) = ∅. Defining σ to be
the identity substitution, there exists an initial w0 and a variable renaming γ from vars(w0) to vars(w)
such that (w0, σ) ∈ IS(S) and w = w0γ = w0σγ. Property 3 trivially holds since dom(γ) \ vars(w0) = ∅.
Property 4 also directly holds since vars(t, t1, . . . , tn) ∩ vars(w) = ∅ and w is initial. Property 5 holds since
for all x ∈ dom(γ), xγ ∈ X . As we focus on subterm convergent rewriting system and since we assumed that
K ⊕ fi = K ∪ {fi⇓}, we know that either f is not solved and there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that t ∈ st(ti)
or else f is solved and t = f(t1, . . . , tn) for some function symbol f with t1, . . . , tn all distinct. Thus Property
6.b holds respectively with u = ti or u = t. Lastly, when f is solved, we already showed that t = f(t1, . . . , tn)
and therefore Property 7.b holds.
Lemma 33. Let S be a set of seed statements and K be a proper knowledge base built from S. Let (w0, σ) ∈
IS(S) and let γ be a substitution completing (w0, σ) such that (w0, σ) is maximal for γ in S. Assume
that
(
kw0σγ(R, u) ⇐ kw1(R1, t1), . . . , kwn(Rn, tn)
) ∈ conseq(Ksolved). There exist u1, . . . , um ∈ stIS(S, σ),
i1, . . . , ik ∈ {1, . . . , n} and a context C built only on function symbols such that:
– u = C[ti1 , . . . , tik , u1σγ, . . . , umσγ]; and
– for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, uiσ 6∈ X ; and
– for all p position of C, there exists T such that
(
kw0σγ(T, u|p)⇐ kw1(R1, t1), . . . , kwn(Rn, tn)
) ∈ conseq(Ksolved).
Proof. We proceed by induction on the sizeN of the derivation of f =
(
kw0σγ (R, u)⇐ kw1(R1, t1), . . . , kwn(Rn, tn)
) ∈
conseq(Ksolved).
Base case N = 0: either there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that u = ti (rule Axiom) and we trivially conclude
choosing C = , k = 1, m = 0, i1 = i; or there exist
(
kw(R
′, t′)⇐ ) ∈ Ksolved and a substitution α such that
wα v w0σγ, u = t′α and R = R′α. In fact vars(t′) = ∅ and so u = t′. But K is a proper knowledge base
and in particular, Properties 1,2 and 7.a hold. Hence there exist σ′, γ′ and a term u0 ∈ st(S, σ′) such that
(w′0, σ
′) ∈ IS(S), w′0σ′γ′ = w, u0σ′γ′ = t′ and u0σ′ 6∈ X for some w′0w′′0 = w0.
Let us define δ such that dom(δ) = vars(w′′0 ) ∪ dom(γ′), δ[vars(w′′0 )] = σγ[vars(w′′0 )] and δ[dom(γ′)] =
γ′α[dom(γ′)]. In such a case, we deduce that w0σ′δ = w0σγ. But (w, σ) is maximal for γ in K hence there
exists θ such that σ = σ′θ. Therefore, we have that u0σγ = u0σ′θγ and u0σ 6∈ X . But w0σ′δ = w0σ′θγ and
vars(u0σ
′) ⊆ vars(w0σ′) hence we deduce that u0σ′θγ = u0σ′δ and so u0σγ = u0σ′γ′α = u. We conclude
with C = , k = 0,m = 1, u1 = u0.
Inductive step N > 0: there exists g =
(
kw(R
′, t′) ⇐ B1, . . . , Bm
) ∈ Ksolved and a substitution α such
that wα v w0σγ, u = t′α, R = R′α and for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
(
Biα ⇐ kw1(R1, t1), . . . , kwn(Rn, tn)
) ∈
conseq(Ksolved). Since K is a proper knowledge base there exist σ
′
0, γ
′ such that (w′0, σ
′) ∈ IS(K), w′0σ′γ′ =
w with w′0w
′′
0 = w0. Moreover, either Property 7.a holds and so there exists u0 ∈ stIS(S, σ′) such that
u0σ
′γ′ = t′ and u0σ′ 6∈ X or else Property 7.b holds and so σ′ = id and t = f(y1, . . . , ym) for some function
symbol f where for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, yi is the variable of Bi.
In the case Property 7.a, we do the same reasoning as in the base case of the induction which al-
lows us to conclude. Let us focus on the case where Property 7.b holds. Since for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},(
Biα ⇐ kw1(R1, t1), . . . , kwn(Rn, tn)
) ∈ conseq(Ksolved), by induction hypothesis, we deduce that for all
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, there exist ui1, . . . , uimi ∈ stIS(S, σ), ji1, . . . , jiki ∈ {1, . . . , n} and Ci built only on function
symbol such that:
– yiα = Ci[tji1 , . . . , tjiki




– for all ` ∈ {1, . . . ,mi}, ui`σ 6∈ X ; and




i, yiα|p) ⇐ kw1(R1, t1), . . . , kwn(Rn, tn)
) ∈
conseq(Ksolved)
This allows us to first deduce that t′α = u has the expected form with a context f(C1, . . . , Cm). Secondly,





′, u|p)⇐ kw1(R1, t1), . . . , kwn(Rn, tn)
) ∈ conseq(Ksolved).
Lemma 34. Let S be a set of seed statements and K a proper knowledge base built from S. Consider f ∈ K
and g ∈ Ksolved such that:
– f =
(






′, t′)⇐ kw′1(X ′1, x′1), . . . , kw′m(X ′m, x′m)
)
; and
– there exists ω v w1 such that θ = mgu(kω(X1, t1), kw′(R′, t′)).
Let h =
(
kw(R, t) ⇐ kw2(X2, t2), . . . , kwn(Xn, tn), kw′1(X ′1, x′1), . . . , kw′m(X ′m, x′m)
)
θ. We have that K ′ =
K ⊕ h is a proper knowledge base.
Proof. We only focus on the case where K ⊕ h = K ∪ {h⇓} otherwise the result trivially holds. According
to Lemma 31, we only need to prove that g satisfies the properties of Definition 29 parametrized by K and
S. Since K is a proper knowledge base, we deduce that there exist (w0, σ0) ∈ IS(K) and a substitution γ
completing (w0, σ0) such that the following properties hold:
f.1) (w0, σ0) is maximal for γ in K.
f.2) w = w0σ0γ.
f.3) for all x ∈ dom(γ)r vars(w0), vars(xγ) ⊆ vars(t1, . . . , tn).
f.4) for all x ∈ dom(γ) ∩ vars(w0), xγ 6∈ vars(t, t1, . . . , tn) and xγ occurs only once in w.
f.5) for all x ∈ dom(γ), xγ 6∈ X implies that either xγ ∈ st(t1, . . . , tn) or there exists T such that(
kw(T, xγ)⇐ kw1(X1, t1), . . . , kwn(Xn, tn)
) ∈ conseq(Ksolved).
f.6) one of the two following properties holds:
a) there exists u ∈ stIS(S, σ0) such that t = uσ0γ and for all v ∈ {t1, . . . , tn}, v is well formed in f
w.r.t. (w0, σ) and γ.
b) there exist u and T such that t ∈ st(u), (kw(T, u)⇐ kw1(X1, t1), . . . , kwn(Xn, tn)) ∈ conseq(Ksolved).
Moreover, we also deduce that there exist (w′0, σ
′
0) ∈ IS(K) and a substitution γ′ completing (w′0, σ′0) such
that the following properties hold:
g.1) w′0 v w0 and (w′0, σ′0) is maximal for γ′ in K.




g.3) for all x ∈ dom(γ′)r vars(w′0), vars(xγ′) ⊆ vars(x′1, . . . , x′m).
g.4) for all x ∈ dom(γ′) ∩ vars(w′0), xγ′ 6∈ vars(t′, x′1, . . . , x′m) and xγ occurs only once in w′.
g.5) for all x ∈ dom(γ′), xγ′ 6∈ X implies that there exists T such that (kw′(T, xγ′)⇐ kw′1(X ′1, x′1), . . . , kw′m(X ′m, x′m)) ∈
conseq(Ksolved).
g.6) one of the two following properties holds:
a) there exists u ∈ stIS(S, σ′0) such that t′ = uσ′0γ′ and uσ′0 6∈ X .
b) σ′0 = id, t
′ = f(x′1, . . . , x
′
m) for some function symbol f, all variables x
′
1, . . . , x
′
m are distinct and
w′ = w′i (1 ≤ i ≤ m)
Note that the Property g.5 should have been a disjunction with xγ′ ∈ st(x′1, . . . , x′m) being a possibility. But
since x′1, . . . , x
′
m ∈ X , it is trivially impossible.
Since (w′0, σ
′
0) ∈ IS(K) and w′0 v w0 (Prop. g.1), we deduce that (w0, σ′0) ∈ IS(K). Since w′0 v w0, there




0 . Let us define δ
′ such that dom(δ′) = dom(γ′) ∪ vars(w′′0 ), δ′[dom(γ′)] =
γ′θ[dom(γ′)] and δ′[vars(w′′0 )] = σ0γθ[vars(w
′′
0 )]. Moreover, let us denote δ = γθ[dom(γ)]. We know that
θ = mgu(kω(X1, t1), kw′(R









′. Moreover, since dom(σ′0) ∩ vars(w′′0 ) = ∅, we have w′′0σ′0δ′ = w′′0 δ′ = w′′0σ0γθ.






By Lemma 28, there exist σ′′0 , γ












– for all x ∈ dom(γ′′), there exist y ∈ dom(δ) and y′ ∈ dom(δ′) such that xγ′′ ∈ st(yδ), xγ′′ ∈ st(y′δ′) and
if y ∈ vars(w0) (resp. y′ ∈ vars(w0)) then y′δ′ ∈ st(yδ) (resp. yδ ∈ st(y′δ′)); and
– for all u ∈ stIS(S, σ0) (resp. u ∈ stIS(S, σ′0)), uσ0δ = uσ′′0γ′′ (resp. uσ′0δ′ = uσ′′0γ′′)
Moreover, by Lemma 30, there exist σ′′′0 , γ
′′′, α′′ such that the following properties hold:
s.1) (w0, σ
′′′
0 ) ∈ IS(K) and is completed by γ′′′ and is maximal for γ′′′ in K.
s.2) σ′′′0 = σ
′′
0α







′′ = w0σ0δ = w0σ′0δ
′.
s.4) for all x ∈ dom(γ′′′), there exists y ∈ dom(γ′′) such that xγ′′′ ∈ st(yγ′′); and so there exists z ∈ dom(δ)
and z′ ∈ dom(δ′)) such that xγ′′′ ∈ st(zδ), xγ′′′ ∈ st(zδ′) and if z ∈ vars(w0) (resp. z′ ∈ vars(w0)) then
z′δ′ ∈ st(zδ) (resp. zδ ∈ st(z′δ′)).
s.5) for all u, v ∈ stIS(S, σ′′′), uσ′′′γ′′′ = vσ′′′γ′′′ implies that uσ′′′ = vσ′′′.
s.6) for all u ∈ stIS(S, σ′′0 ), uσ′′0γ′′ = uσ′′′0 γ′′′; and so since stIS(S, σ0) ⊆ stIS(S, σ′′0 ) and stIS(S, σ′0) ⊆
stIS(S, σ′′0 ), we have that for all u ∈ stIS(S, σ0) (resp. stIS(S, σ′0)), uσ0δ = uσ′′′0 γ′′′ (resp. uσ′0δ′ =
uσ′′′0 γ
′′′).
Let us now prove the different properties required for h with (w0, σ
′′′
0 ) ∈ IS(K) and γ′′′. We al-
ready proved that (w0, σ
′′′
0 ) is maximal for γ
′′′ in K and that γ′′′ completes (w0, σ′′′0 ) (Property s.1).
Moreover, we know that w = w0σ0γ hence wθ = w0σ0γθ = w0σ0δ = w0σ
′′′
0 γ
′′′ (Property s.3). Let








mθ) and let us denote
TB = {t2θ, . . . , tnθ, x′1θ, . . . , x′mθ}. It remains to prove the following properties:
h.3) for all x ∈ dom(γ′′′)r vars(w0), vars(xγ′′′) ⊆ vars(TB).
h.4) for all x ∈ dom(γ′′′)∩ vars(w0), xγ′′′ 6∈ vars(tθ)∪ vars(TB) and xγ′′′ is a variable that occurs only once
in h.
h.5) for all x ∈ dom(γ′′′), xγ′′′ 6∈ X implies that either xγ′′′ ∈ st(TB) or there exists T such that(
kwθ(T, xγ
′′′)⇐ Side) ∈ conseq(Ksolved).
h.6) one of the two following properties holds:
a) there exists u ∈ stIS(S, σ′′′0 ) such that tθ = uσ′′′0 γ′′′ and for all v ∈ TB , v is well formed in h.
b) there exist u and T such that tθ ∈ st(u), (kwθ(T, u)⇐ Side) ∈ conseq(Ksolved).
h.7) if h is solved then there exists u ∈ stIS(S, σ′′′0 ) such that tθ = uσ′′′0 γ′′′ and uσ′′′0 6∈ X .
Before proving properties h.3–h.7 we will show two other useful properties.
Sub-property 1: Assume that Property f.6.a is satisfied. For all x ∈ dom(θ), if xθ 6∈ X then one of the
following property holds:
– there exists u ∈ stIS(S, σ′′′0 ) such that uσ′′′0 6∈ X and xθ = uσ′′′0 γ′′′.
– xθ is well formed for h w.r.t. (w0, σ
′′′
0 ) and γ
′′′.
To prove this sub-property, we do an induction on the size of |xθ| with x ∈ dom(θ). Let us assume that
xθ 6∈ X . We need to consider θ, that is θ = mgu(kw′0σ0γ(X1, t1), kw′0σ′0γ′(R′, t′)). By the properties of the
most general unifier, we deduce that one of the following property holds:
1. there exists r ∈ st(w′0σ0) such that r 6∈ X and rγθ = xθ:
By Corollary 4, there exists u ∈ stIS(S, σ0) such that uσ0 = r and so uσ0γθ = xθ. But u ∈ stIS(S, σ0)
implies u ∈ stIS(S, σ′′′0 ) since σ′′′0 = σ0αα′′. Thus with r = uσ0 6∈ X , we deduce that uσ′′′0 6∈ X . Moreover,
by Property s.3, w0σ
′′′
0 γ
′′′ = w0σ0δ. Thus, xθ = uσ′′′0 γ
′′′.
2. there exists r ∈ st(w′0σ′0) such that r 6∈ X and rγ′θ = xθ:
Using the same reasoning as above, we deduce that there exists u ∈ stIS(S, σ′′′0 ) such that xθ = uσ′′′0 γ′′′
and uσ′′′0 .
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3. there exist y ∈ dom(γ) and r ∈ st(yγ) such that rθ = xθ and yγ 6∈ X :
By Property f.5, we know that either yγ ∈ st(t1, . . . , tn) or there exists T such that kw(T, yγ) ⇐
kw1(X1, t1), . . . , kwn(Xn, tn)
) ∈ conseq(Ksolved).
In the former case, let us assume that yγ ∈ st(ti0) for some i0 ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By Property f.6.a, we have for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ti is well formed in f w.r.t. (w0, σ) and γ. Hence, there exists u1, . . . , uk ∈ stIS(S, σ0),
i1, . . . , i` ∈ {1, . . . , n} and a context C built on function symbols such that ti0 = C[ti1 , . . . , ti` , u1σ0γ, . . . , ukσ0γ],
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , `}, tij ∈ X and for all position p in C, there exists T such that
(
kw(T, ti0 |p) ⇐
kw1(X1, t1), . . . , kwn(Xn, tn)
) ∈ conseq(Ksolved).
In the later case, by combining Lemma 33 and the fact that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ti is well formed
in f w.r.t. (w0, σ) and γ (Prop f.6.a), we obtain that there exist u1, . . . , uk ∈ stIS(S, σ0), i1, . . . , i` ∈
{1, . . . , n} and a context C built on function symbols such that yγ = C[ti1 , . . . , ti` , u1σ0γ, . . . , ukσ0γ],
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , `}, tij ∈ X and for all position p in C, there exists T such that
(
kw(T, yγ|p) ⇐
kw1(X1, t1), . . . , kwn(Xn, tn)
) ∈ conseq(Ksolved).
Therefore, in both cases, we deduce that r ∈ st(C[ti1 , . . . , ti` , u1σ0γ, . . . , ukσ0γ]). W.l.o.g., we can assume
that there exists a position p of C such that r = C[ti1 , . . . , ti` , u1σ0γ, . . . , ukσ0γ]|p (otherwise we refer to
previous cases). Thus, it allows us to deduce that r is well formed in f w.r.t. (w0, σ) and γ. Furthermore,
by applying our induction hypothesis on each ti1 , . . . , ti` and by application of Lemma 23, we deduce
that rθ = xθ is well formed in h w.r.t. (w0, σ
′′′
0 ) and γ
′′′.
4. there exist y ∈ dom(γ′) and r ∈ st(yγ′) such that rθ = xθ and yγ′ 6∈ X :













) ∈ conseq(Ksolved). But by Lemma 33 and the fact that all x′1, . . . , x′m are
variables, we obtain that yγ is well formed in g w.r.t. (w0, σ
′
0) and γ
′. Then we apply the same reasoning
as Case 3.
5. there exists r ∈ st(t1) such that rθ = xθ with r 6∈ X :
Since Property f.6.a holds, we know that t1 is well formed in f . Hence we can apply the same reasoning
as in Case 3 (we had yγ well formed in f w.r.t. (w0, σ0) and γ, and r ∈ st(yγ)).
6. there exists r ∈ st(t′) such that rθ = xθ with r 6∈ X :
If Property g.6.a holds then we have that r ∈ st(uσ′0γ′) for some u ∈ stIS(S, σ′0) such that uσ′0γ′ = t′.
In such a case, either there exists r′ ∈ st(w′0σ′0) such that r′ 6∈ X and r′γ′ = r or else there exists
y ∈ dom(γ′) such that r ∈ st(yγ′) and yγ′ 6∈ X . We can respectively apply the same reasoning applied
in Case 2 and 4.
If Property g.6.b holds then t = f(t1, . . . , tn) for some function symbol f. By considering C = f( , . . . , ), we
also have that for all position p of C, there exists T such that kw′(T, t
′|p)⇐ kw′1(X ′1, x′1), . . . , kw′m(X ′m, x′m).
Thus, t′ is well formed in g w.r.t. (w0, σ′0) and γ
′. Hence we can apply the same reasoning as in Case 3
(we had yγ well formed in f w.r.t. (w0, σ0) and γ, and r ∈ st(yγ)).
Sub-property 2: Assume that Properties h.5 and h.3 are satisfied and h is solved. Let u and T such that(
kw0σ′′′0 γ′′′(T, u) ⇐ Side
) ∈ conseq(Ksolved). Let v ∈ st(u). If there is no T ′ such that (kw0σ′′′0 γ′′′(T, v) ⇐
Side
) ∈ conseq(Ksolved) then there exists v0 ∈ stIS(S, σ′′′0 ) such that v = v0σ′′′0 γ′′′ and v0σ′′′0 6∈ X . We prove
this sub-property by induction on |u|:
Base case |u| = 1: In such a case, by Lemma 33, we deduce that either u ∈ TB or there exists r ∈ stIS(S, σ′′′0 )
such that rσ′′′0 γ
′′′ = u and rσ′′′0 6∈ X . But v ∈ st(u) and |u| = 1 imply that v = u. Thus, u ∈ TB is in
contradiction with the fact that there is no T ′ such that
(
kw0σ′′′0 γ′′′(T, v)⇐ Side
) ∈ conseq(Ksolved). Hence
rσ′′′0 γ
′′′ = u and rσ′′′0 6∈ X which means that the result holds.
Inductive Step |u| > 1 : By Lemma 33, we deduce that there exists u1, . . . , uk ∈ stIS(S, σ′′′0 ), v1, . . . , v` ∈ TB
and a context C built only on function symbols such that:
– u = C[v1, . . . , v`, u1σ
′′′
0 γ
′′′, . . . , ukσ′′′0 γ
′′′]; and
– for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, ujσ′′′0 6∈ X ; and





But h is solved meaning that TB ⊆ X . But v ∈ st(u) and there is no T ′ such that
(
kw0σ′′′0 γ′′′(T, v) ⇐
Side




′′′. In such a case, either there exists r ∈ stIS(S, σ′′′0 ) such that rσ′′′0 ∈ st(viσ′′′0 ), rσ′′′0 γ′′′ = v and
rσ′′′0 6∈ X , or else there exists y ∈ dom(γ′′′) such that v ∈ st(yγ′′′). In the first case, the result directly




′, yγ′′′)⇐ Side) ∈ conseq(Ksolved). But h is solved hence TB is a set of variables meaning
that yγ′′′ ∈ st(TB) implies yγ′′′ ∈ TB and so v ∈ TB which is in contradiction with the fact that there is
no T ′′ such that
(
kw0σ′′′0 γ′′′(T
′′, v) ⇐ Side) ∈ conseq(Ksolved). Hence v ∈ st(yγ′′′) where |yγ′′′| < |u| and
there exists T ′ such that
(
kw0σ′′′0 γ′′′(T
′, yγ′′′)⇐ Side) ∈ conseq(Ksolved). We can conclude by applying our
inductive hypothesis on yγ′′′.
Sub-property 3: Assume that Property h.4 holds. Let x ∈ dom(γ′′′) such that xγ′′′ 6∈ X . If there exists
z ∈ dom(γ′) r vars(w′0) such that xγ′′′ ∈ st(zγ′θ) then either xγ′′′ ∈ st(TB) or there exists T such that
(kwθ(T, xγ
′′′)⇐ Side) ∈ conseq(Ksolved).
We prove this result by induction on |zγ′|. The base case |zγ′| = 0 being trivial, we focus on the inductive
case |zγ′| > 0. Let us do a case analysis on whether zγ′ ∈ X or not. If zγ′ ∈ X then by Prop. g.3, we know that
zγ′ ∈ {x′1, . . . , x′m} and so xγ′′′ ∈ st(zγ′θ) ⊆ st(TB). Otherwise zγ′ 6∈ X and so by Prop. g.5, we know that
there exists there exists T such that (kw0σ′0γ′(T, zγ
′) ⇐ kw′1(X ′1, x′1), . . . , kw′m(X ′m, x′m)) ∈ conseq(Ksolved).
By Lemma 33, we know that there exists u1, . . . , u` ∈ stIS(S, σ′0) and i1, . . . , ik ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and a context
C built only on function symbols such that






′, . . . , u`σ′0γ
′]
– for all i ∈ {1, . . . , `}, uiσ′0 6∈ X
– for all p positions of C, there exists T ′ such that (kw0σ′0γ′(T
′, zγ′|p)⇐ kw′1(X ′1, x′1), . . . , kw′m(X ′m, x′m)) ∈
conseq(Ksolved)
But xγ′′′ ∈ st(zγ′θ). So either there exists a position p of C such that xγ′′′ = zγ′θ|p; or there exist j ∈
{1, . . . , `} and v ∈ stIS(S, σ′0) such that v is a strict subterm of uj and xγ′′′ = vσ′0γ′θ (by Corollary 4), or there
exists y ∈ dom(γ′)r vars(w′0) such that xγ′′′ ∈ st(yγ′θ) and |yγ′| < |zγ′| (since for all i ∈ {1, . . . , `}, uiσ′0 6∈
X ). In the first case, we know that (kw0σ′0γ′(T ′, zγ′|p) ⇐ kw′1(X ′1, x′1), . . . , kw′m(X ′m, x′m)) ∈ conseq(Ksolved)
and so we can deduce by Lemma 23 that (kw0σ′′′0 γ′′′(T
′, zγ′θ|p)⇐ Side) ∈ conseq(Ksolved). Hence the result
holds. In the second case, since xγ′′′ 6∈ X , we deduce by Prop. h.4. that x ∈ dom(γ′′′) r vars(w0) and so
x ∈ stIS(S, σ′′′0 ). But v ∈ stIS(S, σ′0) and xγ′′′ = vσ′0γ′θ = vσ′0δ′. But vσ′0δ′ = vσ′′′0 γ′′′ by Prop. s.6 and
v ∈ stIS(S, σ′′′0 ). By Prop. s.5, we can conclude that xγ′′′ = xσ′′′0 γ′′′ = vσ′′′0 γ′′′ implies x = vσ′′′0 = vσ′0α′α′′
and so vσ′0 ∈ X . Thus, vσ′0 ∈ dom(γ′)rvars(w′0) with vσ′0γ′θ = xγ′′′. But we know that v is a strict subterm
of uj and so |vσ′0γ′| < |zγ′|. Therefore, it corresponds to the third case. In the third case, we can apply our
inductive hypothesis on |yγ′| which allows us to conclude.
Now that we proved the sub-properties we need, we will prove Properties h.3 to h.7.
Property h.3 Let x ∈ dom(γ′′′) r vars(w0). By Property s.4, we know that there exists y ∈ dom(δ) (resp.
dom(δ′)) such that vars(xγ′′′) ⊆ vars(yδ) (resp. vars(yδ′)). Moreover, vars(w′0) ⊆ vars(w0) and by definition
of δ and δ′, Properties f.3 and g.3 allow us to deduce that vars(xγ′′′) ⊂ vars(TB) ∪ {t1θ}. Since t1θ = t′θ
with vars(t′) ⊆ {x′1, . . . , x′m} we conclude that vars(xγ′′′) ⊂ vars(TB). Therefore Property h.3 holds.
Properties h.4 Let x ∈ dom(γ′′′)∩vars(w0). But γ′′′ completes (w0, σ′′′0 ). Hence, we deduce that x 6∈ dom(σ′′′0 ).
But we know that σ′′′0 = σ0αα
′′ = σ′0α
′α′′ (Prop. s.2). Therefore, we deduce that x 6∈ dom(σ0) and x 6∈
dom(σ′0). But by Definition 25, we know that vars(img(σ0))∩vars(w0) = ∅ and vars(img(σ′0))∩vars(w0) = ∅.




0 v w0 and so
dom(γ) = vars(w0σ0) and dom(γ
′) = vars(w′0σ
′
0). Hence we deduce that x ∈ dom(γ) and if x ∈ vars(w′0)
then x ∈ dom(γ′). By Prop. f.4, we deduce that xγ 6∈ vars(t, t1, . . . , tn) and xγ occurs only once in w.
Let us do a small case analysis on x.
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′′′ (Prop. s.3), x 6∈ dom(σ0) and x 6∈ dom(σ′0) and so xγθ = xγ′′′. Therefore, xγ′′′ occurs only
once in wθ. Moreover, we know that xγ 6∈ vars(t, t1, . . . , tn) by Prop f.4 and also that xγ 6∈ {x′1, . . . , x′m}
since f and g have distinct variables. Therefore, we can conclude that xγ′′′ = xγθ 6∈ vars(tθ)∪ vars(TB).
– if x ∈ vars(w′0), we know that Prop g.4 that xγ′ 6∈ vars(t′, x′1, . . . , x′m). Hence, we deduce w.l.o.g.
that θ = {xγ′ → xγ}θ′ where xγ, xγ′ 6∈ vars(θ′). Hence, since xγ 6∈ vars(g), we obtain that xγ′θ =
xγ 6∈ vars(t′θ, x′1θ, . . . , x′mθ). But we already know that xγ 6∈ vars(t, t1, . . . , tn) and xγ 6∈ dom(θ).




′′′ (Prop s.3) and x 6∈ dom(σ0) thus xγθ = xγ′′′. Since xγ occurs only once in w and
xγ 6∈ vars(θ′) and xγ′ 6∈ vars(w), we deduce that xγθ = xγ′′′ occurs only once in wθ = w0σ′′′0 γ′′′.
Properties h.5 Let x ∈ dom(xγ′′′) such that xγ′′′ 6∈ X . By Property s.4, we know that there exists z ∈ dom(δ)
and z′ ∈ dom(δ′) such that xγ′′′ ∈ st(zδ), xγ′′′ ∈ st(zδ′) and if z ∈ vars(w0) (resp. z′ ∈ vars(w0)) then
z′δ′ ∈ st(zδ) (resp. zδ ∈ st(z′δ′)). By definition of δ, we know that z ∈ dom(γ) and zδ = zγθ. We prove the
result by induction on |zγ|. The base case (|zγ| = 0) being trivial, we focus on the inductive step (|zγ| > 0).
Assume first that z ∈ dom(γ)∩vars(w0). In such a case, we know by Prop. f.4. that zγ 6∈ vars(t, t1, . . . , tn)
and zγ is a variable that occurs only once in w. If z ∈ vars(w′′0 ) then zγ 6∈ vars(θ) and so zγθ = zδ is a
variable. This is impossible since xγ′′′ ∈ st(zδ) and xγ′′′ 6∈ X . Therefore, z ∈ vars(w′0). But z ∈ vars(w′0)
implies that z′δ′ ∈ st(zδ). Let us look at z′. By construction of δ′, we deduce that z′ ∈ dom(γ′). If z′ ∈
vars(w′0) then by Prop. g.4. we have z
′γ′ 6∈ vars(t′, x′1, . . . , x′m) and z′γ′ occurs only once in w′. But zγ is also
a variable that occurs only once in w and zγ 6∈ vars(t, t1, . . . , tn). Thus by construction of θ, zγθ, z′γ′θ ∈ X .
This is once again impossible since xγ′′′ ∈ st(zδ) and xγ′′′ 6∈ X . Therefore, z′ ∈ dom(γ′)r vars(w′0). We can
therefore conclude by applying the Sub-Property 3.
Assume now that z ∈ dom(γ)rvars(w0). If zγ ∈ X then by Prop. f.3., we know that zγ ∈ vars(t1, . . . , tn).
Else by Prop. f.5., we know that either zγ ∈ st(t1, . . . , tn) or there exists T such that
(
kw(T, zγ) ⇐
kw1(X1, t1), . . . , kwn(Xn, tn)
) ∈ conseq(Ksolved). Therefore independently of zγ ∈ X or not, we obtain
that either zγ ∈ st(t1, . . . , tn) or there exists T such that
(
kw(T, zγ) ⇐ kw1(X1, t1), . . . , kwn(Xn, tn)
) ∈
conseq(Ksolved). We do a case analysis:
– if zγ ∈ st(t2, . . . , tn): In such a case, we directly have that zγθ ∈ st(t2θ, . . . , tnθ) ⊆ st(Tn). And so
xγ′′′ ∈ st(Tn).
– if zγ = t1: In such a case, we know that t1θ = t













) ∈ conseq(Ksolved). Therefore, by Lemma 23, we can conclude that (kwθ(R′, zγ)⇐
Side
) ∈ conseq(Ksolved).
– if zγ is a strict subterm of t1: Once again, we know that t1θ = t
′θ. If Prop. g.6.b. holds then we
directly that that zγθ ∈ st(x′1θ, . . . , x′mθ) and so xγ′′′ ∈ st(TB). If Prop. g.6.a. holds then there exists
u ∈ stIS(S, σ′0) such that t′ = uσ′0γ′ and uσ′0 6∈ X . Therefore either there exists v ∈ stIS(S, σ′0) such that
xγ′′′ = vσ′0γ
′θ = vσ′0δ
′ or there exists y ∈ dom(γ′)r vars(w′0) such that xγ′′′ ∈ st(yγ′θ). In the former,
we know that xγ′′′ = xσ′′′0 γ
′′′. Moreover, by Prop. s.6., vσ′0δ
′ = vσ′′′0 γ
′′′. Thus by Prop. s.5, we deduce





′α′′, we deduce that vσ′0 ∈ X and so vσ′0 ∈ dom(γ′) r vars(w′0). We can
conclude by applying Sub-Property 3. In the latter case, we can directly apply Sub-Property 3.
– if there exists T such that
(
kw(T, zγ)⇐ kw1(X1, t1), . . . , kwn(Xn, tn)
) ∈ conseq(Ksolved). By Lemma 33,
there exist u1, . . . , u` ∈ stIS(S, σ0), i1, . . . , ik ∈ {1, . . . , n} and a context C built only on function symbols
such that:
• zγ = C[ti1 , . . . , tik , u1σ0γ, . . . , u`σ0γ]; and
• for all i ∈ {1, . . . , `}, uiσ0 6∈ X ; and
• for all p positions of C, there exists T ′ such that (kw(T ′, zγ|p) ⇐ kw1(X1, t1), . . . , kwn(Xn, tn)) ∈
conseq(Ksolved).
Since xγ′′′ ∈ st(zγ), either xγ′′′ ∈ st(ti1θ, . . . , tikθ) and so we conclude like in previous cases; or there




kw1(X1, t1), . . . , kwn(Xn, tn)
) ∈ conseq(Ksolved) which allows us to conclude thanks to Lemma 23; or
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there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , `} and y ∈ uiσ0 such that xγ′′′ ∈ st(yγθ) and so we can conclude by ap-
plying our inductive hypothesis on yγ since uiσ0 6∈ X meaning that |yγ| < |zγ|; or else there exists
i ∈ {1, . . . , `} and v ∈ st(ui) such that vσ0γθ = xγ′′′. In the latter case, by Prop. s.6., we know that
vσ0γθ = vσ0δ = vσ
′′′
0 γ




and so vσ0 is also a variable meaning that vσ0 ∈ dom(γ) and |vσ0γ| < |zγ|. We can thus conclude by
applying our inductive hypothesis.
Property h.6 We know that either Property f.6.a or f.6.b holds. Let us assume that Property f.6.a holds. In
such a case, we know that there exits u ∈ stIS(S, σ0) such that t = uσ0γ and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ti is well




Let x ∈ {x1, . . . , xm} ∪ {t2, . . . , tn} ∩ X . If x 6∈ dom(θ) then x ∈ TB and trivially well formed in h.
If x ∈ dom(θ) then by Sub-property 1 and the fact that xθ ∈ TB , we deduce that xθ is well formed in
h. Let v ∈ {t2, . . . , tn} r X . By Property f.6.a, we deduce that v is well formed in f that is there exist
u1, . . . , uk ∈ stIS(S, σ0), i1, . . . , i` ∈ {1, . . . , n} and a context C built on symbol functions such that v =
C[ti1 , . . . , ti` , u1σ0γ, . . . , ukσ0γ], for all j ∈ {1, . . . , `}, tij ∈ X and for all position p of C, there exists T such
that
(
kw(T, u|p)⇐ kw1(X1, t1), . . . , kwn(Xn, tn)
) ∈ conseq(Ksolved). Thus, vθ = C[ti1θ, . . . , ti`θ, u1σ′′′0 γ′′′, . . . , ukσ′′′0 γ′′′].
By applying Sub-Property 1 on each tijθ, j ∈ {1, . . . , `}, we can conclude that vθ is well formed in h and so
Property h.6.a holds.
Assume now that Property f.6.b holds. There exists u and T such that t ∈ st(u) and (kw(T, u) ⇐
kw1(X1, t1), . . . , kwn(Xn, tn)
) ∈ conseq(Ksolved). Therefore, we directly have by Lemma 23 that (kwθ(Tθ, uθ)⇐
Side
) ∈ conseq(Ksolved).




) ∈ conseq(Ksolved). If Property h.6.a holds then there exist u ∈ stIS(S, σ′′′0 )
such that tθ = uσ′′′0 γ
′′′. Thus, we only need to show that uσ′′′0 6∈ X . We show it by contradiction: uσ′′′0 ∈ X
implies that uσ′′′0 ∈ dom(γ′′′). But if uσ′′′0 γ′′′ ∈ X then tθ = uσ′′′0 γ′′′ ∈ TB , and if tθ = uσ′′′0 γ′′′ 6∈ X , Property
h.5 holds. Therefore, we deduce that there exists T such that
(
kwθ(T, tθ)⇐ Side
) ∈ conseq(Ksolved), which
is a contradiction with our hypothesis. Therefore, when Property h.6.a holds, Property h.7.a holds.
Let us now focus on the case where Property h.6.b holds which implies that there exists u and T such
that tθ ∈ st(u) and (kwθ(T, u) ⇐ B) ∈ conseq(Ksolved). Therefore, by applying Sub-property 2, we deduce
that there exists v0 ∈ stIS(S, σ′′′0 ) such that tθ = v0σ′′′0 γ′′′ and v0σ′′′0 6∈ X . Hence we can conclude that
Property h.7 holds.
Combining Lemmas 32 and 34 we obtain the following corollary
Corollary 5. Let S be a set of seed statements and K a knowledge based built from S. K is well-formed.
The measures
Definition 30. Let S be a set of seed statements and K be a proper knowledge base built from S. Let
N = |st(IPC(S))|. Let f = (kw(R, t) ⇐ B1, . . . , Bn) ∈ K. Let (w0, σ0) ∈ IS(K) and γ be a substitution
completing (w0, σ0) such that (w0, σ0) is maximal for γ in S and w = w0σ0γ. (Existence of (w0, σ0) and γ
is guaranteed since K is a proper knowledge base). We define the measure
mC(f,K) = N −
∣∣{u ∈ stIS(S, σ0) | ∃T.(kw(T, uσ0γ)⇐ B1, . . . , Bn) ∈ conseq(Ksolved)}∣∣
Lemma 35. Let S be a set of seed statements and K be a proper knowledge base built from S. Consider
f ∈ K rKsolved and g ∈ Ksolved such that:
– f =
(










– there exists ω v w1 such that θ = mgu(kω(X1, t1), kw′(R′, t′)).
Let h =
(
kw(R, t)⇐ kw2(X2, t2), . . . , kwn(Xn, tn), kw′1(X ′1, x′1), . . . , kw′m(X ′m, x′m)
)
θ. We have that:
– mC(h,K) ≤ min(mC(f,K),mC(g,K))
– for all f ′ ∈ K, mC(f ′,K ⊕ h) ≤ mC(f ′,K)
– if h is solved and K ⊕ h = K ∪ {h⇓} then mC(h⇓,K ⊕ h) < min(mC(f,K),mC(g,K))
Proof. SinceK is a proper knowledge base, we know that there exist w0, σ0, σ
′′
0 , γ, γ
′′ such that (w0, σ0), (w0, σ′′0 ) ∈
IS(K) and:
– (w0, σ0) (resp. (w0, σ
′′
0 )) is maximal for γ (resp. γ
′′) in K
– γ completes (w0, σ0) and γ
′′ completes (w0, σ′′0 )






0 ) is maximal for γ
′′, we deduce that there exists α such that σ′′0 = σ0α. Therefore, we deduce
that γθ[dom(γ)] = αγ′′[dom(γ)].
Let u ∈ stIS(S, σ0) and T such that
(
kw(T, uσ0γ) ⇐ kw1(X1, t1), . . . , kwn(Xn, tn)
) ∈ conseq(Ksolved).
Since σ′′0 = σ0α, we deduce that u ∈ stIS(S, σ′′0 ). Moreover, by Lemma 23,
(




kwθ(T, uσ0γθ)⇐ kw2θ(X2, t2θ), . . . , kwnθ(Xn, tnθ), kw′1θ(X ′1, x′1θ), . . . , kw′mθ(X ′m, x′mθ)
) ∈
conseq(Ksolved). But uσ0γθ = uσ0αγ
′′ = uσ′′0γ
′′. Hence, we can conclude that mC(h,K) ≤ mC(f,K). By
applying similar reasoning, we deduce that mC(h,K) ≤ mC(g,K). Therefore, we conclude that mC(h,K) ≤
min(mC(f,K),mC(g,K)).
Let f ′ ∈ K. By definition of conseq, we directly have that conseq(Ksolved) ⊆ conseq((K ⊕ h)solved).
Therefore, we deduce that mC(f
′,K ⊕ h) ≤ mC(f ′,K).
Moreover, if h is solved andK⊕h = K∪{h⇓} then there is no T such that (kw(T, t)⇐ kw2(X2, t2), . . . , kwn(Xn, tn), kw′1(X ′1, x′1), . . . , kw′m(X ′m, x′m))θ ∈




′′), we can prove by an induction on the number of step applied to calculate h⇓ = (H ⇐ Side) that





′′)⇐ kw2θ(X2, t2θ), . . . , kwnθ(Xn, tnθ), kw′1θ(X ′1, x′1θ), . . . , kw′mθ(X ′m, x′mθ)
) ∈





′′)⇐ Side) ∈ conseq(Ksolved). Second, since K
is a proper knowledge base, we know that there exists u0 ∈ stIS(S, σ′′0 ) such that tθ = u0σ′′0γ′′. Therefore, we
deduce that u0 6∈ {u ∈ stIS(S, σ0)|∃R s.t.
(
kw(R, uσ0γ)⇐ kw1(X1, t1), . . . , kwn(Xn, tn)
) ∈ conseq(Ksolved)}.
It implies that mC(h⇓,K⊕h) < mC(f,K⊕h). By using a similar reasoning, we deduce that mC(h⇓,K⊕h) <
mC(g,K ⊕ h) and so we can conclude that mC(h⇓,K ⊕ h) < min(mC(f,K),mC(g,K)).
Definition 31. Let S be a set of seed statements and K be a proper knowledge base built from S. Let
f ∈ KrKsolved and g1, . . . , gn ∈ Ksolved. We denote by SRes(f, [g1, . . . , gn]) the set of clauses such that for all
h ∈ SRes(f, [g1, . . . , gn]), there exist clauses h0, . . . , hn such that h0 = f , h = hn and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
hi is the result of an application of the rule Resolution on hi−1 and gi.
Moreover we define the measure
mA(K, f, [g1, . . . , gn]) = |{h⇓ | h ∈ SRes(f, [g1, . . . , gn])}rK|
Corollary 6. Let S be a set of seed statements and K be a proper knowledge base built from S. Let f ∈
K rKsolved. Let g1, . . . , gn ∈ Ksolved. For all h ∈ SRes(f, [g1, . . . , gn]), for all f ′ ∈ K,
– mC(h,K ⊕ h) ≤ min(mC(f,K),mC(g1,K), . . . ,mC(gn,K))
– mC(f
′,K ⊕ h) ≤ mC(f ′,K)
– if h is solved and K ⊕ h = K ∪ {h⇓} then mC(h⇓,K ⊕ h) < min(mC(f,K),mC(g1,K), . . . ,mC(gn,K))
Lemma 36. Let S be a set of seed statements and K a proper knowledge base built from S. For all f ∈ K,
there exists N ∈ N such that for all M > N , for all g1, . . . , gM ∈ Ksolved, SRes(f, [g1, . . . , gM ]) = ∅.
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Proof. For all f =
(
H ⇐ kw1(X1, t1), . . . , kwn(Xn, tn)
) ∈ K, we define the multiset
m(f) = {{(|wi|, |ti|) | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}}




′, t′)⇐ kw′1(X ′1, x′1), . . . , kw′m(X ′m, x′m)
)
;
– t1 6∈ X and
– there exists u v w1 such that θ = mgu(ku(X1, t1), kw′(R′, t′)).
Let h =
(
H ⇐ kw2(X2, t2), . . . , kwn(Xn, tn), kw′1(X ′1, x′1), . . . , kw′m(X ′m, x′m)
)
θ.
We know that K is a proper knowledge base. In particular, there exist (w0, σ0) ∈ IS(S) and a substitution
γ completing (w0, σ0) such that w
′ = w0σ0γ. Moreover, either (a) t′ = f(x′1, . . . , x
′
m) for some function
symbol f and w′ = w′1 = . . . = w
′
m; or else (b) there exists u ∈ stIS(S, σ0) such that t′ = uσ0γ. In case (b),
u ∈ stIS(S, σ0) implies that vars(uσ0) ⊆ vars(w0σ0). Therefore, vars(t′) ⊆ vars(w0σ0γ) = vars(w′) and so
by Corollary 3, we deduce that for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, |w′i| < |w′|.
In case (a), since t1 6∈ X , we deduce that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, tiθ = ti and for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
|x′jθ| < |t1θ|. Therefore, whether it is Case (a) or (b), m(h) is the multi set m(f) where we replace the
element (|w1|, |t1|) by several elements (|w′θ|, |x′iθ|), i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} strictly smaller than (|w1|, |t1|). We can
conclude that m(h) < m(f) and so the result holds.
Definition 32. Let S be a set of seed statements and K be a proper knowledge base built from S and such
that Ki(S) ⊆ K. We denote by mF (K) the following multiset:

(
min(mC(f,K),mC(g1,K), . . . ,mC(gn,K)),
mA(K, f, [g1, . . . , gn])
) ∣∣∣∣∣∣
f ∈ Ki(S)rKi(S)solved,
g1, . . . , gn ∈ Ksolved,
SRes(f, [g1, . . . , gn]) 6= ∅


We use the natural ordering on multiset with the lexicographic ordering for the elements of mF (K).
Lemma 37. Let S be a set of seed statements and K be a proper knowledge base built from S and such
that Ki(S) ⊆ K. Let f ∈ Ki(S)rKi(S)solved. Let g1, . . . , gn ∈ Ksolved. Let h ∈ SRes(f, [g1, . . . , gn]) such that
h⇓ 6∈ K and K ⊕ h = K ∪ {h⇓}. We have that mF (K ⊕ h) < mF (K).
Proof. Let f ′ ∈ Ki(S) rKi(S)solved and g′1, . . . , g′m ∈ Ksolved such that SRes(f ′, [g′1, . . . , g′m]) 6= ∅. By Corol-
lary 6, we know that mC(f
′,K ⊕ h) ≤ mC(f ′,K) and for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, mC(g′i,K ⊕ h) ≤ mC(g′i,K).
Moreover by definition, we trivially have that mA(K ⊕ h, f ′, [g′1, . . . , g′m]) ≤ mA(K, f ′, [g′1, . . . , g′m]). Since
h⇓ 6∈ K, h ∈ SRes(f, [g1, . . . , gn]) and h⇓ ∈ K ⊕ h, we also deduce that mA(K ⊕ h, f, [g1, . . . , gn]) <
mA(K, f, [g1, . . . , gn]]).
Let us first consider the case where h is not solved. In such a case, h⇓ = h and Ksolved = (K ⊕ h)solved.
Moreover, we just showed that:
– min(mC(f
′,K ⊕ h),mC(g′1,K ⊕ h), . . . ,mC(g′m,K ⊕ h))
≤ min(mC(f ′,K),mC(g′1,K), . . . ,mC(g′m,K)); and
– mA(K ⊕ h, f ′, [g′1, . . . , g′m]) ≤ mA(K, f ′, [g′1, . . . , g′m]); and
– min(mC(f,K ⊕ h),mC(g1,K ⊕ h), . . . ,mC(gn,K ⊕ h))
≤ min(mC(f,K),mC(g1,K), . . . ,mC(gn,K)); and
– mA(K ⊕ h, f, [g1, . . . , gn]) < mA(K, f, [g1, . . . , gn]]).
This allows us to deduce that mF (K ⊕ h) < mF (K).
In the case where h is solved, we need to consider more elements for mF (K ⊕ h) since (K ⊕ h)solved =
Ksolved ∪ {h⇓}. By Corollary 6, mC(h⇓,K ⊕ h) < min(mC(f,K),mC(g1,K), . . . ,mC(gn,K)). Therefore, for




1 ,K ⊕ h), . . . ,mC(g′′k ,K ⊕ h)) < min(mC(f,K),mC(g1,K), . . . ,mC(gn,K)). Hence, mF (K ⊕ h) is
the multiset mF (K) where we replaced at least one element, i.e.,
(min(mC(f,K),mC(g1,K), . . . ,mC(gn,K)),mA(K, f, [g1, . . . , gn]]))
by several strictly smaller elements:
– (min(mC(f,K ⊕ h),mC(g1,K ⊕ h), . . . ,mC(gn,K ⊕ h)),mA(K ⊕ h, f, [g1, . . . , gn]))
– (min(mC(f
′′,K⊕h),mC(g′′1 ,K⊕h), . . . ,mC(g′′k ,K⊕h)),mA(K⊕h, f ′′, [g′′1 , . . . , g′′n])) for all f ′′ ∈ Ki(S)r
Ki(S)solved and for all g
′′
1 , . . . , g
′′
k ∈ Ksolved ∪ {h⇓} such that h⇓ ∈ {g′′1 , . . . , g′′k}.
This allows us to conclude that mF (K ⊕ h) < mF (K).
Theorem 4. Let T be a ground trace and S = seed(T ). For a subterm convergent rewrite system the com-
putation of sat(Ki(S)) terminates in a finite number of steps.
Proof. We have by Corollary 5 that sat(Ki(S)) is well-formed. Hence, by Lemma 36 the number of elements
in mF (K) is finite. Moreover, by Lemma 37, mF strictly decreases when applying rule Resolution on
a statement with a knowledge predicate as head. Moreover, by Corollary 5 and Lemma 36 the measure
on the resulting knowledge base also contains a finite number of elements. Hence, the Resolution rule
only generates a finite number of statements in sat(Ki(S)) with a knowledge predicate as head. As a direct
consequence the rule Equation also generates a finite number of statements. Lastly, by Lemma 36, we
can deduce that Resolution and Test generate only a finite number of statements, whatever the head
predicate.
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E Proof of the algorithm
In order to prove Theorem 5 we need the following technical lemmas.
Lemma 38. Let T be a trace and let K be a saturated knowledge base associated to T . Then for any statement
f ∈ K, we have that:
1. if f =
(
rl1,...,ln ⇐ {kwi(Xi, ti)}i∈{1,...,m}
)
and x ∈ vars(lk) then there exists wj = l1, . . . , lk′ with k′ < k
such that x ∈ vars(tj).
2. if f =
(
kl1,...,ln(R, t)⇐ {kwi(Xi, ti)}i∈{1,...,m}
)
and x ∈ vars(t) then x ∈ vars(t1, . . . , tm).
Proof. The seed knowledge base satisfies the above properties and they are preserved by canonicalization,
update and saturation.
Lemma 39. Let T0 be a trace, ϕ0 = ∅ the empty frame, and {c1, . . . , ck} names such that ci 6∈ names(T0)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
If
(T0, ϕ0)
L1=⇒ (T1, ϕ1) L2=⇒ . . . Ln=⇒ (Tn, ϕn)
and ∀1 ≤ i ≤ k
– either ci 6∈ names(L1, . . . , Ln)





===⇒ (T1pi, ϕ1pi) L2pi
′
===⇒ . . . Lnpi
′
===⇒ (Tnpi, ϕnpi),
where pi′ = {ci 7→ Ri}i∈{1,...,k} and pi = {ci 7→ ti}i∈{1,...,k}.
Proof. By induction on n, the same operational steps will take place with the new labels.
Lemma 40. Let T be a trace, let {c1, . . . , ck} be public names not appearing in T and let pi : {c1, . . . , ck} →
Messages and pi′ : {c1, . . . , ck} → Recipes be mappings from names to terms. If T |= kw(R, t) and T |=
kwpi(cipi
′, cipi) then T |= kwpi(Rpi′, tpi).
Proof. By induction on R.
Lemma 41. Let T be a trace and ϕ a frame such that (T, ϕ)
L
=⇒ (T ′, ϕ′) and such that
1. either M = L,
2. or L = in(d,R) and M = in(d,R′) such that (R = R′)ϕ.
Then we have that (T, ϕ)
M
=⇒ (T ′, ϕ′).
Proof. If M = L then the result is obvious. Otherwise, R and R′ are recipes for the same term in ϕ and
therefore the transition still holds. uunionsq
Theorem 5. Let T be a ground trace, P a ground process and K = (sat(Ki(T )))solved. We have that
– if T vct P then Reachability(K,P ) and Identity(K,P ) hold.
– if P is determinate and Reachability(K,P ) and Identity(K,P ) hold
then T vct P .
Proof. We first prove that if any of the tests fail then T 6vct P .
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– If the Reachability test fails, we have that
(
rl1,...,ln ⇐ {kwi(Xi, xi)}i∈{1,...,m}
)
∈ K and for all T ′, ϕ
we have that P 6M1,...,Mn======⇒ (T ′, ϕ). By Theorem 3 (soundness of K), we have that there exists T ′′, ϕ′′ such
that (T, ∅) M1,...,Mn−−−−−−→ (T ′′, ϕ′′). Hence, T 6vct P .






1. either (P, ∅) 6M1,...,Mn======⇒ (T ′, ϕ) for all T ′, ϕ. However, by Theorem 3 (soundness of K), we have that
there exists T ′′, ϕ′′ such that (T, ∅) M1,...,Mn−−−−−−→ (T ′′, ϕ′′). Hence, T 6vct P .
2. or for any T ′, ϕ such that (P, ∅) M1,...,Mn======⇒ (T ′, ϕ) we have (Rpi 6= R′pi)ϕ. By Theorem 3, we have
however that that there exists T ′′, ϕ′′ such that (T, ∅) M1,...,Mn−−−−−−→ (T ′′, ϕ′′) and (Rpi = R′pi)ϕ′′. Hence,
T 6vct P .
Next, we prove that if T 6vct P and P is determinate, then at least one test fails. We assume by
contradiction that T 6vct P , that all tests pass and we derive a contradiction. As T 6vct P , it follows that
there exist L1, . . . , Ln, ϕ such that
– either (T, ∅) L1,...,Ln−−−−−−→ (T ′, ϕ) and ∀S ∈ P, S′, ψ. (S, ∅) 6 L1,...,Ln=====⇒ (S′, ψ).
– or, (T, ∅) L1,...,Ln−−−−−−→ (T ′, ϕ) and (R = R′)ϕ and ∀S ∈ P, S′, ψ if (S, ∅) L1,...,Ln=====⇒ (S′, ψ) then (R 6= R′)ψ.
Let n be the smallest index such that one of the above holds. We then have that:
(T, ∅) L1−−→ (T1, ϕ1) L2−−→ . . . Ln−1−−−→ (Tn−1, ϕn−1) Ln−−→ (Tn, ϕn)
and for all R,R′ and i, such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 and(R = R′)ϕi there exists S ∈ P such that
(S, ∅) L1=⇒ (S1, ψ1) L2=⇒ . . . Li=⇒ (Si, ψi),
and (R = R′)ψi and
1. either for all U ∈ P, V we have (U, ∅) 6 L1,...,Ln=====⇒ (V, ψ)
2. or there exist recipes R,R′ such that for all U ∈ P, V such that (U, ∅) L1,...,Ln=====⇒ (V, ψ) we have (R 6= R′)ψ.
We consider each of these two cases separately:
1. As (T, ∅) L1,...,Ln−−−−−−→ (Tn, ϕn), we have by Theorem 3 (completeness) that rL1ϕn↓,...,Lnϕn↓ ∈ He(K). By the
definition of He, we have that it contains no reachability statements in addition to those in H. Therefore
rL1ϕn↓,...,Lnϕn↓ ∈ H(K). Hence there exist a statement f =
(
rl1,...,ln ⇐ kwi(Xi, xi)i∈{1,...,m}
)
∈ K and a
substitution τ grounding for f such that liτ = Liϕn↓ (for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n) and such that kwiτ (Xiτ, xiτ) ∈
H(K).
Let c1, . . . , ck be fresh public names and let σ : vars(l1, . . . , ln) → {c1, . . . , ck} be a bijection. For all




∈ Ki(T ). By definition of H we have that kwiσ(Xiσ′, xiσ) ∈ H(K)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m where dom(σ′) = {X1, . . . , Xm} and σ′(Xi) = xiσ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Instantiating f with σ∪σ′, we obtain that rl1σ,...,lnσ ∈ H(K). By Theorem 3 (soundness), it follows that
T |= rl1σ,...,lnσ. Therefore, there exist recipes R′i (for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that li = in(di, ti)) such that
T |= kl1σ,...,li−1σ(R′i, tiσ). By Theorem 3 (completeness) and definition of He there exist recipes Ri such
that kl1σ,...,li−1σ(Ri, tiσ) ∈ H(K).
Let Mi = li if li ∈ {test,out(c) | c ∈ C} and let Mi = in(di, Ri) if li = in(di, ti) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. As




M1==⇒ (S′1, ψ′1) M2==⇒ . . . Mn==⇒ (S′n, ψ′n).
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Let i be such that li = in(di, ti). Applying Lemma 38 to f we have that for all x ∈ vars(ti) there
exists wj such that |wj | < i and x = xj . We already have that kwjτ (Xjτ, xjτ) ∈ H(K) by choice
of f and of τ . By Theorem 3 (soundness), we obtain that T |= kwjτ (Xjτ, xjτ). Hence, as |wj | < i,
T |= kl1τ,...,li−1τ (Xjτ, xjτ).
Let pi : {c1, . . . , ck} → Messages and pi′ : {c1, . . . , ck} → Recipes be two mappings such that pi(cl) = xjτ
and pi′(cl) = Xjτ when σ(xj) = cl. As Xjτ = clpi′, xjτ = clpi and l1τ, . . . , li−1τ = l1σpi, . . . , li−1σpi
therefore we have that T |= kl1σpi,...,li−1σpi(clpi′, clpi). We already established that kl1σ,...,li−1σ(Ri, tiσ) ∈
H(K). By Theorem 3 (soundness) we have that T |= kl1σ,...,li−1σ(Ri, tiσ). We apply Lemma 40 to obtain
that T |= kl1σpi,...,li−1σpi(Ripi′, tiσpi). But tiσpi = tiτ and l1σpi, . . . , li−1σpi = l1τ, . . . , li−1τ and therefore








===⇒ (S′1pi, ψ′1pi) M2pi
′
===⇒ . . . Mnpi
′
===⇒ (S′npi, ψ′npi).
We will show by induction on n that
(S′0pi, ψ0pi)
L1=⇒ (S′1pi, ψ′1pi) L2=⇒ . . . Ln=⇒ (S′npi, ψ′npi).
We assume by the induction hypothesis that
(S′0pi, ψ0pi)
L1=⇒ (S′1pi, ψ′1pi) L2=⇒ . . .
Li−1
===⇒ (S′i−1pi, ψ′i−1pi)





We will show that Li and Mipi
′ satisfy the conditions of Lemma 41 which allows us to conclude. Indeed,
either Li = Mipi
′ (in the case of a test or out action), or Li = in(di, R′′i ) and Mipi
′ = in(di, Ripi′) (in
the case of a in action). In the second case, we need to show that (Ripi
′ = R′′i )ψi′−1. By the definition
of |=, we have that T |= kl1τ,...,li−1τ (R′′i , tiτ). We have previously shown that T |= kl1τ,...,li−1τ (Ripi′, tiτ)
and therefore T |= il1τ,...,li−1τ (Ripi′, R′′i ), or, equivalently, (Ripi′ = R′′i )ϕi−1. By the hypothesis, we have
that there exists S ∈ P such that
(S, ∅) L1=⇒ (S1, ψ1) L2=⇒ . . . Li−1===⇒ (Si−1, ψi−1),
and (Ripi
′ = R′′i )ψi−1. By determinacy of P it follows that ψi−1pi ≈s ψ′i−1pi and therefore (Ripi′ =
R′′i )ψ
′
i−1 as well. As the hypothesis of Lemma 41 are satisfied, we can conclude.
We have shown that (S′0, ∅) L1,...,Ln=====⇒ (S′n, ψ′n), therefore obtaining a contradiction. Hence Item 1 cannot
hold.
2. We assume that for all U ∈ P, V, ψU such that (U, ∅) L1,...,Ln=====⇒ (U ′, ψU ) we have (R 6=E R′)ψU to obtain
a contradiction. Since P is determinate, we can fix one such U.
As (T, ∅) L1,...,Ln−−−−−−→ (Tn, ϕn) and (R =E R′)ϕn, by completeness, we have that iL1ϕn↓,...,Lnϕn↓(R,R′) ∈
He(K). Note, we also have that (R 6=E R′)ψU . From the fact that iL1ϕn↓,...,Lnϕn↓(R,R′) ∈ He(K) and
(R 6=E R′)ψU , we can show that
– there exist recipes Q,Q′ and k ≤ n such that iL1ϕn↓,...,Lkϕn↓(Q,Q′) ∈ H(K) but (Q 6=E Q′)ψU .
We fix recipes Q,Q′ such that they satisfy the above condition and such that the sum of the sizes of the
recipes Q and Q′ is the smallest one.









and a substitution τ grounding for f such that kwiτ (Xiτ, xiτ) ∈ H(K) (for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m), l1τ, . . . , lnτ =
L1ϕn↓, . . . , Lnϕn↓, R1τ = Q and R′1τ = Q′. We make the following observations:
(a) Note first that neither R1 nor R
′
1 are recipe variables. This can be shown by proving that none of
the symbolic recipes in a head of a statement in K can be a recipe variable. The latter can be shown
by a straightforward induction the number of steps used in the saturation procedure.
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(b) This implies that if recipe variables Xi and Xj for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m belong to the union of subterms of
R1 and of R
′
1, then the sum of sizes of Xiτ and Xjτ is less than the sum of the sizes of R1τ = Q
and R′1τ = Q
′.
(c) If xi = xj for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m then, by Lemma 16, we have that ii1ϕn↓,...,Lkϕn↓(Xiτ,Xjτ) ∈ H(K) for
some k ≤ n and hence (Xiτ =E Xjτ)ϕk. If k < n we must have that (Xiτ =E Xjτ)ψU as we would
otherwise contradict minimality of n. If k = n, by our construction of Q and Q′ and observation (b)
above, if recipe variables Xi and Xj belong to the union of subterms of R1 and of R
′
1, then we must
have (Xiτ =E Xjτ)ψU . Otherwise we would contradict minimality of Q,Q
′.
(d) For each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, consider the set compi = { j |xj = xi and Xj is a subterm of R1 or R′1 }.
Consider the map least : { 1 ≤ i ≤ m } → { 1 ≤ i ≤ m } defined as follows. least(i) = xr where
r is the least element of the set compi if compi is nonempty and is the least element of the set
{ j |xj = xi } otherwise.
Let τ0 be the substitution such that for τ0(Xi) = τ(Xleast(i)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and τ0(x) = τ(x) for all
message variables. By observation (c) above, we have that
– R1τ =E R1τ0)ψU and hence (Q =E R1τ0)ψU .
– (R′1τ =E R
′
1τ0)ψU and hence (Q
′ =E R′1τ0)ψU .
– (R1τ0 =E R
′
1τ0)ϕn.






L1=⇒ (S′1pi, ψ′1pi) L2=⇒ . . . Ln=⇒ (S′npi, ψ′npi)
where pi(c) = τ(x) if σ(c) = x. Let pi′(ci) = τ0(Xi) if σ(ci) = xi.




n, where ω = {Xi 7→ xiσ}. As the




′ =E R1τ0 and R′1ωpi




npi. Now, thanks to
determinacy, we have that (R1τ0 =E R
′
1τ0)ψU . By observation (d) above, we get (Q =E Q
′)ψU , thus
obtaining a contradiction.
As both cases yield a contradiction, it follows that if T 6vct P then Reachability(K,P ) or Identity(K,P )
fail.
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F Optimisation of the interleaving
We first introduce some additional notation and show some properties of ‖o.
We define vis(T ) to be the trace containing only visible actions of T , i.e., vis() = , vis(τ.T ) = vis(T )
and vis(α.T ) = α.vis(T ). For 0 ≤ i ≤ |vis(T )| we also define testsi(T ) to be the sequence of test actions that
occur before the ith visible action, i.e., tests0(T ) = , testsi(τ.T ) = τ.testsi(T ) and testsi(α.T ) = testsi−1(T ).
We denote by T1 v T2 the fact that T1 is a subsequence of T2.
Lemma 42. For all T ∈ (T1 ‖ T2) there exists To ∈ (T1 ‖o T2) such that vis(T ) = vis(To) and testsi(T ) w
testsi(To) for 0 ≤ i ≤ |vis(T )|.
Proof. We actually prove the following stronger statement.




2 be such that
– vis(T1) = vis(T
′
1) and vis(T2) = vis(T
′
2), and
– testsi(T1) w testsi(T ′1) and testsi(T2) w testsi(T ′2) for 0 ≤ i ≤ |vis(T )|.
Then for all T ∈ (T1 ‖ T2) there exists To ∈ (T ′1 ‖o T ′2) such that vis(T ) = vis(To) and testsi(T ) w testsi(To)
for 0 ≤ i ≤ |vis(T )|.
We proceed by induction on the number v of visible actions in T1 and T2.
Base case: v=0. In this case the lemma trivially holds as vis(T ) =  = vis(To) and tests0(T ) =  = tests0(To).
Inductive case: v=n. As v ≥ 1 we have that










The case where T2 is of this form is symmetric. As T ∈ (T1 ‖ T2) we have by the definition of ‖ that




As T ′ ∈ (T ′1 ‖ T ′2) by induction hypothesis we have that there exists T ′o ∈ (T ′1 ‖o T ′2) such that vis(T ′) =
vis(T ′o) and testsi(T









We indeed have that
– vis(T ) = α.vis(T ′) = α.vis(T ′o) = vis(To), and
– testsi(T ) = τ1 . . . τk.testsi−1(T ′) w τ ′1 . . . τ ′j .testsi−1(T ′o) = testsi(To) for 1 ≤ i ≤ |vis(T )|, and
– tests0(T ) = tests0(To).
uunionsq
Proposition 9. Let T1, T2 be two ground traces.
(T1 ‖ T2) l1,...lk====⇒ (T, ϕ) iff (T1 ‖o T2) l1,...lk====⇒ (To, ϕ)
Proof. (⇒) This direction follows directly from the fact that (T1 ‖o T2) ⊆ (T1 ‖ T2).
(⇐) This direction is a corollary from Lemma 42.
uunionsq
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